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Sartre’s claim in Being and Nothingness that consciousness is nothingness is 
typically understood as meaning either that consciousness is not itself, that it is 
not its objects, that it is not its past, or that it is some sort of state of affairs.  
Although these interpretations of Sartre are often presented independently of 
each other, I argue that one can combine several of them in order to arrive at the 
best understanding of Sartre’s treatment of consciousness.  Such an 
understanding treats consciousness as the state of affairs that is its facticity 
transcending itself toward its objects.  One could also combine the four typical 
interpretations of Sartre so that consciousness for him is a different state of 
affairs, specifically the state of affairs that is the appearance of objects along with 
their various indications.  This second way of understanding Sartre’s treatment of 
consciousness seems inferior to the first way, though, since the former can 
account for what seemingly motivates the latter.  In order to do so, one must 
utilize certain aspects of Husserl’s description of consciousness, a description 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre claims that consciousness is 
nothingness.  Some examples of this claim are the following: 
 
Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being- that is, 
precisely consciousness or for-itself.  It is an absolute event which 
comes to being by means of being and which, without having being, 
is perpetually sustained by being.1 
   
The for-itself in its being is failure because it is the foundation only 
of itself as nothingness.2 
   
The For-itself can never be its Future except problematically, for it 
is separated from it by a Nothingness which it is.3 
 
The For-itself is nothing more than this translucent Nothingness 
which is the negation of the thing perceived....Thus in the 
perception of the object the For-itself acknowledges itself to itself as 
not being the object, while in the unveiling of the Past, the For-itself 
acknowledges itself as being the Past and is separated from it only 
by its nature as For-itself, which can be nothing.4   
   
But if the For-itself is to be the nothingness whereby ‘there is’ 
being, then being can exist originally only as totality.5  
   
...in order for its determination as the nothingness of being to be 
full, the for-itself must realize itself as a certain unique manner of 
not being this being.6 
 
There are many possible interpretations of what he means by the nothingness of 
consciousness and of what leads him to say that, but four interpretations seem  
most supported by the text and most frequently emphasized by commentators.   
                                      
1Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, 1956, p. 126.  
2Ibid, p. 139. 
3Ibid, p. 186. 
4Ibid, p. 200. 




One of those interpretations centers on Sartre's claim that consciousness is not  
itself, a second one on his claim that it is not its object, a third one on his 
treatment of it as not its past, and a fourth one on Sartre’s description of 
consciousness in a manner that can be put using such general ontological terms 
as ‘relation,’ ‘state of affairs,’ and ‘event.’  It should be noted that the first three 
interpretations explain the nothingness of consciousness by means of it not being 
something while the fourth one explains it in terms of what it is.  The type of thing 
that the fourth interpretation treats consciousness as being, then, must be such 
that it somehow is nothing. 
It should also be noted that the first of these propositions- that 
consciousness is not itself- is of course very different from the other three.  For 
one thing, presumably just about everyone agrees that consciousness-or, for that 
matter, anything at all-is not (except in special cases) its own object and not its 
own past, and most would at least be open to the suggestion that consciousness 
is an event or a relation, whereas hardly anybody is inclined to agree that 
consciousness-or, for that matter, anything at all-is not itself.  Secondly, while 
Sartre himself emphasizes the connection, it is hardly clear why anyone should 
agree that, just because consciousness is not its past, or not its object, or is a 
state of affairs, it is therefore nothingness.  The question then naturally arises 
whether either Sartre's insistence that consciousness is 'not itself' or his 
insistence that it is 'nothingness,' or both, are not just melodramatic ways of 
saying something to which one might more readily agree.  For instance, one 
might take the claim that consciousness is not its past simply to mean that 
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consciousness is free and not determined by anything in the past.  Such a 
reading of Sartre is found in the following; 
A pederast is not a pederast, since, in his most intimate 
consciousness, he knows that there is no compulsion for him to be 
what he is.  He is not what he is, for human nature escapes all 
definition and refuses to see in its act any destiny whatsoever.7 
Although an assertion of such freedom is hardly non-controversial, equating such 
freedom with consciousness not being itself or with it being nothingness would 
surely be melodramatic.  But, alternatively, perhaps one should rather suppose 
that Sartre draws the connections that he does precisely because he means to 
assert two additional claims which are neither melodramatic nor ones with which 
many would be inclined to agree, namely, that consciousness is in some sense 
its object, and is its past, in addition to not being them.   
As already noted, each of the four previously-mentioned interpretations of 
Sartre’s treatment of consciousness as nothingness has support from 
commentators.  One can find acceptance of the first interpretation, that the 
nothingness of consciousness signifies that consciousness is not itself, in the 
following passage by Klaus Hartmann: 
   
Consciousness is appearance-to-self, presence-to-self…Sartre’s 
meaning is expressed once more in a pictorial account, in which 
presence-to-self is interpreted as a being with a ‘fissure’…What is 
meant…is a fissure within consciousness…, a fissure within a unity.  
What separates is an ‘ideal distance,’ a ‘nothing’… Nothingness 
regarded as a fissure is, first, separation-a relationship of otherness 
between things.  The separated entities, however, must make up a 
unity if consciousness can be presupposed as a unity of 
immanence.  The separated entities are not each the "other" of the 
other, their relationship is not one of otherness, because the other 
                                      
7 Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale, Harper and Row, New York, 1960, p. 26. 
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maintains an identity with the one.  Thus, this unity is, by its very 
form, a whole negating something which is no Other for it.8 
It seems clear that the nothingness of consciousness is being taken here as its 
not being the very thing it is identical with-itself. 
Some commentators have taken a more minimalist approach to the claim 
that consciousness is not itself, treating that claim as simply making the 
epistemological point that consciousness is necessarily aware of not being 
whatever it is conscious of.  This epistemological take on Sartre would entail that 
consciousness ‘is not’ itself, since, as we shall see in Chapter Two, 
consciousness is always necessarily consciousness of itself.   An example of 
such an epistemological reading of Sartre is the following: 
 
Knowledge entails that the object known is held at a distance from 
the person who knows it:  he distinguishes the object from himself, 
and he thereby forms the judgment, ‘I am not the object.’  This 
distance at which the object is held is the gap or nothingness at the 
heart of the For-itself.9 
 
This epistemological reading of Sartre could also fit with the second        
  
interpretation of the nothingness of consciousness, the interpretation that simply 
 
emphasizes it not being its object.  Another example of that interpretation is  
 
presented by Hazel Barnes in the following: 
   
There is Being-in-itself, which is all of non-conscious reality.  Then 
there is Being-for-itself, which is consciousness, but this, says 
Sartre, is really only the revelation of the In-itself.  In other words, 
there occurred somehow a "hole in being," and the For-itself as this 
hole or lack of Nothingness is thus able to stand back, as it were, 
and so reveal the In-itself.  Man recognizes himself as being what is 
                                      
8Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1966, pp. 
62-65. 
9 Mary Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1965, p. 61. 
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not the world.  Using this same negating power he can recognize 
objects.10 
This 'same negating power' that enables humans to recognize objects is the 
ability of humans to separate or ‘stand back’ from objects as they do from the 
world in the revelation of the world.  And just as such separation from the world is 
the for-itself’s  not being the world, similarly the just-mentioned separation from 
objects is the for-itself's not being its objects.  This negation of objects of 
consciousness that is involved in the revelation of such objects is the 
nothingness of consciousness, at least on Barnes’s reading. 
It is important to note, however, that there is some unclarity in what 
Barnes says.  First, it is one thing to take Sartre’s  claims about the nothingness 
of consciousness to be a way of emphasizing consciousness as not being its 
object.  It is another and presumably stronger thing to say that consciousness is 
not its objects, and also is nothing but, or “really only,” the revelation of its 
objects.  After all, the fact that consciousness seemingly acts would make it more 
than mere revelation.  Second, it is not clear what the latter might in any case 
mean.  For example, in saying that consciousness is only the revelation of its 
objects, does Barnes mean that in some sense it actually is its objects (despite 
also not being them)?  And if so, just how are we to take such a claim?  Or is 
Barnes saying something else?  The very unclarity may make one wonder 
whether Barnes is after all not just emphasizing consciousness as not being its 
object, and not really saying anything else.   Regardless of how Barnes is 
reading Sartre, though, I will argue in Chapter Three that consciousness both is 
not and also is  its object for Sartre, in a sense that goes beyond anything 
clarified by Barnes.  
                                      
10Hazel Barnes, "Jean-Paul Sartre and the Haunted Self," The Western Humanities Review, 10, 
1956, p. 120. 
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Regarding consciousness in some sense both being and not being a 
certain past, one can see such a treatment in the following passage: 
   
The perpetual break in being is nothing other than the temporality 
of the self.  To exist temporally is to be wrenched from identity, from 
a repose in oneself...The for-itself refracts into past, present, and 
future.  Sartre ontologizes these distinctions as disruptions by 
negation, breakages of identity....The past is surpassed by the 
present.  While my past is my past, I am it in the mode of "was,"  
secreting a distinction, and thus negation, between it and the 
present.11 
 
It seems plausible here to treat the ‘break in being’ as nothingness, and since 
this nothingness is attributed to the for-itself, it seems plausible to assume that 
this passage concerns the nothingness of consciousness.  That nothingness is 
thus apparently due to consciousness’s wrenching away, not simply from its past, 
but from its own identity with that very past.  
The final interpretation of the nothingness of consciousness, the 
interpretation that focuses on Sartre’s description of consciousness using such 
general ontological terms as ‘relation,’ ‘state of affairs,’ and ‘event,’ is 
represented in the following: 
  
…the for-itself, or noetic activity, is an irreducible sort of happening, 
or ‘absolute event’…, incorporating a certain sort of material as its 
ingredients.  In a sense, we can then say that an instance of noesis 
is in a way nothing over and above whatever material is in question.  
This would simply recognize that an event (or, in more static terms, 
any ‘state of affairs’), while it is surely something over and above its 
ingredients, is in another respect nothing but them…Namely, it is 
just those ingredients as incorporated into just that sort of 
event….(However,) we would need to add that, as an ‘absolute,’ 
the event in question is not construable as a mere function of 
                                      
11Thomas W. Busch, The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre's 
Philosophy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1990, p. 22. 
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relations among portions of the ‘matter’ in question.  This is 
presumably what Husserl meant to suggest by invoking the 
Aristotelian notion of ‘form.’12  
Here we see consciousness being described in terms that do not rely on Sartre’s 
claims about consciousness’s objects or its past, but rather in a general way that 
may or may not involve those matters.  
Although I have presented these four interpretations of Sartre as 
independent of each other, I will argue that they need not be mutually exclusive 
but rather that they can actually work together to provide a possible 
understanding of what Sartre has in mind in treating consciousness as 
nothingness.  Although I will argue that this possible understanding of Sartre is 
problematic, each of the first three of those interpretations can be used as an 
indispensable step in arriving at conclusions constituting a particular form of the 
fourth interpretation. One might say that because consciousness is not itself that 
consciousness is nothingness, but an adequate account of what is meant by it 
not being itself requires it to be neither its object nor its past, the very things 
which consciousness also is.  And an adequate account of what is meant by 
consciousness being the very objects and the very past it is not requires an 
understanding of it as a special sort of event or state of affairs.   
All of this would seem to follow, one might note, if Sartre is claiming that 
consciousness is nothing other than the fact of or state of affairs that is the 
appearance of phenomena.  Or more particularly, as one might argue, it is just 
the fact of the appearance of phenomena which are thereby at the same time 
‘surpassed’ (and also indicative of still other phenomena either as themselves in 
turn already surpassed or as potentially to be surpassed).  I will argue that such a 
                                      
12 Richard Aquila, “Sartre’s Other and The Field of Consciousness:  A Husserlian Reading,” 
European Journal of Philosophy, 6, 1998, pp. 265, 274. 
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reading of Sartre provides a possible explanation of why consciousness of self 
must also be consciousness of a transcendent object, and that it involves 
Sartre’s reliance upon a notion of the self to reach conclusions that might be 
incompatible with such a notion.  Such a purely phenomenological understanding 
of Sartre has much to recommend it, and it may even be the most plausible and 
defensible take on much of what Sartre actually claims. 
In any case, I will argue that Sartre need not take the above position.  
Although Sartre makes many claims that seemingly justify such an understanding 
of him, many other claims by him seem incompatible with it.  More significantly, 
he actually provides at least the basis for a more defensible alternative to that 
position.  This defensible alternative also describes consciousness as an event or 
state of affairs, but it is the state of affairs that is the transcendence of 
consciousness’s body and past to its objects.  I will argue that, to a significant 
extent, this defensible alternative resembles Husserl’s description of 
consciousness.  In particular, for example, it treats the appearance of 
phenomena as a correlate of consciousness rather than as consciousness itself.  
While this may seem to be just what Sartre denies, I will argue that it actually 




PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the purely phenomenological 
interpretation of Sartre’s position on consciousness treats consciousness as 
nothing but the appearance of phenomena along with their various indications, 
whereas the correlational interpretation treats consciousness as in some way 
something more, as something related to and beyond such appearance, and of 
which such appearance is a mere ‘correlate.’  The purely phenomenological 
interpretation of Sartre thus seems to differ from the correlational interpretation in 
that the former, but not the latter, describes consciousness solely in terms of 
what appears.    Both interpretations find support in Being and Nothingness.  This 
chapter will detail Sartre’s vacillation between a purely phenomenological 
approach to consciousness and a desire to describe it on a deeper ontological 
level. 
Sartre’s phenomenological approach to consciousness in Being and 
Nothingness is evidenced by the book’s subtitle, “An Essay in Phenomenological 
Ontology.”  The book is ontological because its work is to elucidate structures of 
being in an attempt to answer questions about conscious and non-conscious 
being,13 and it is phenomenological because “its method is to describe structures 
                                      
13 Sartre, p. 30. 
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of being that appear to consciousness, so that his readers can verify the truth of 
Sartre’s descriptions in our own conscious experience.”14  This emphasis on  
what appears is found in the opening line of Being and Nothingness, where 
Sartre claims that “(m)odern thought has realized considerable progress by 
reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.”15  He 
further claims that instead of positing a being that exists behind and in support of 
appearances, he embraces a notion of appearance that is “full positivity;  its 
essence is an ‘appearing’ which is no longer opposed to being but on the 
contrary is the measure of it.”16 
Sartre opposes this emphasis on appearance to Kant’s assertion of beings 
that exist beyond the ken of possible experience.  Sartre rejects Kant’s notion of 
some sort of reference by a phenomenon to a noumenon, a referencing Sartre 
describes as a phenomenon pointing “over its shoulder to a true being which 
would be, for it, absolute.”17  Any Kantian ‘thing-in-itself,’ or seemingly anything 
else one might assert to exist beyond possible appearance, is apparently 
rejected by Sartre.  As one commentator notes regarding Sartre, “minds as well 
as physical objects are defined in terms of their overt appearances and all 
references to a hidden event behind the appearances is ruled out.”18  A table, for 
instance, is nothing but a series of appearances, with each appearance referring 
                                      
14 Jeffrey Wilson, “Metaphysical Questions in Sartre’s Phenomenological Ontology,” Sartre 
Studies Internations, 6, 2000, p. 47. 
15 Sartre, p. 3. 
16 Ibid, p. 4. 
17 Ibid. 
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to the total series to which it belongs rather than to some being beyond 
appearance that affects the subject in such a way as to cause such a series of 
appearances.  For Sartre, “there is nothing behind the appearance.”19    
Despite such claims, though, Sartre might seem to go beyond what 
appears when he notes how the notion of the phenomenon, with its essence of 
appearing, “supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”20  This might 
sound similar to Berkeley’s position that, despite the fact that esse est percipi, 
non-perceived minds exist that have perceptions.21  Although Sartre rejects 
Berkeley’s equation of the existence of appearances with their being perceived 
as well as Berkeley’s view of ‘minds,’22 it might seem that Sartre has committed 
the same error one could attribute to Berkeley:  criticizing the notion of something 
that does not appear but then asserting the necessity of something non-
appearing in order for there to be what appears. 
However accurate such a criticism may be for Berkeley, this does not 
seem problematic for Sartre.  Although Sartre does assert the necessity of 
someone to whom appearances appear, the ‘being’ to whom things appear also 
‘appears’ itself.  For Sartre, since “the law of being in the knowing subject is to-
be-conscious,”23 consciousness of something, such as a table, is also always 
                                                                                                                
18 John W. Yolton, “The Metaphysic of En-Soi and Pour-Soi,” The Journal of Philosophy, 48, 
1951, p. 549. 
19 Sartre, p. 6. 
20 Ibid, p. 4. 
21 George Berkeley, Principles of Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and 
Philonous, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 173-174. 
22 Sartre, pp. 9-10. 
23 Ibid, p. 10. 
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consciousness of itself24 (I will say more about self-consciousness in Chapter 
Two).  Sartre says that it is “the first necessity for…consciousness to be seen by 
itself.”25  So, the ‘knowing subject’ seems after all to ‘appear’ along with whatever 
it is conscious of.  Although the way the conscious self appears is evidently 
different from how anything else appears, so that it is self-conscious rather than 
conscious of itself,26 it may be that Sartre has not in fact committed here to 
something beyond appearances, or at least to anything beyond appearances and 
the fact of their appearing. 
One might of course object that Sartre’s consciousness of consciousness 
of something need not be consciousness of the being to whom appearances 
necessarily appear.  Sartre’s consciousness of consciousness could simply be 
awareness of a conscious act rather than awareness of a conscious self or 
subject.  Sartre’s own argument seemingly confirms this.  He argues that 
counting is obviously an instance of the appearance of objects with a certain 
property or quantity, but that counting also involves “a non-thetic consciousness 
of my adding activity.”27  Sartre then shows that this non-thetic consciousness is 
consciousness’s awareness of itself, or consciousness of consciousness.28 Thus, 
one might argue, the conscious being to whom appearances must appear does 
                                      
24 Ibid, p. 11. 
25 Ibid, p. 121. 
26 Ibid, p. 14. 




not necessarily appear itself, so that Sartre is asserting the existence of 
something beyond appearances. 
The problem for this suggestion is that Sartre does indeed seem to assert 
the appearance of the being to whom appearances appear.  He claims that 
“(c)onsciousness…is the dimension of transphenomenal being in the subject.”29  
This seems to make consciousness at least part of the very being of ‘the subject.’  
That in turn would seem to mean that consciousness of consciousness is after all 
consciousness of the subject itself, and not just of a conscious act on its part.  It 
would thus seem that the necessity of a being to whom appearances appear 
need not take Sartre beyond the phenomenological level of attention to 
appearances, since “(c)onsciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 
‘appearance’ in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears.”30     
Despite this seemingly exclusive regard for appearances, though, there 
are numerous instances throughout Being and Nothingness where Sartre seems 
to go beyond what appears in an attempt to explain what appears.  The following 
quotations are evidence of this:   
From the moment the world appears qua world it gives itself as 
being only that.  The necessary counterpart of this apprehension 
then is indeed the emergence of ‘human reality’ in nothingness.31 
 
…we have just discovered a swarm of ultra-mundane beings which 
possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings, but which 
enclose within themselves non-being.  They require an explanation 
which remains within the limits of the real….Nothingness can be 
nihilated only on the foundation of being;  if nothingness can be 
                                      
29 Ibid, p. 10. 
30 Ibid, p. 17. 
31 Ibid, p. 52. 
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given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way 
outside of being.  Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being-like a 
worm.32 
 
The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its 
own Nothingness.33 
 
…every question supposes that we realize a nihilating withdrawal in 
relation to the given….It is essential therefore that the questioner 
have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the 
causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only 
being.34 
 
What we have been trying to define is the being of man in so far as 
he conditions the appearance of nothingness, and this being has 
appeared to us as freedom.35 
  
…rejected possibilities in turn have no other being than their 
‘sustained being;’  it is I who sustain them in being….36 
…the whole idea of foundation comes into the world through the 
for-itself.37  
 
Human reality by which lack appears in the world must be itself a 
lack.  For lack can come into being only through lack….38 
 
But if it is true that the possible is-so to speak-an option on being, 
and if it is true that the possible can come into the world only 
through a being which is its own possibility, this implies for human 
reality the necessity of being its being in the form of an option on its 
being.39 
 
It is through the for-itself that the past arrives in the world because 
its ‘I am’ is in the form of an I am me.40 
 
                                      
32 Ibid, p. 56. 
33 Ibid, p. 59. 
34 Ibid, p. 58. 
35 Ibid, p. 60. 
36 Ibid, p. 67. 
37 Ibid, p. 130. 
38 Ibid, p. 136. 
39 Ibid, p. 151. 
40 Ibid, p. 168. 
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It is through human reality that multiplicity comes into the world;  it 
is the quasi-multiplicity at the heart of being-for-itself which causes 
number to be revealed in the world.41 
 
Totality can come to beings only by a being which has to be its own 
totality in their presence.  This is precisely the case with the for-
itself, a detotalized totality which temporalizes itself in a perpetual 
incompleteness.  It is the for-itself in its presence to being which 
causes there to be an all of being.42 
 
Space…depends on temporality and appears in temporality since it 
can come into the world only through a being whose mode of being 
is temporalization....43 
 
…quantity…is the inapprehensible indifference of being-which can 
appear only if there is being and which, although belonging to 
being, can come to it only from a for-itself....44 
 
Human-reality is the being which causes a place to come to 
objects.45 
 
All of these passages seem to express the notion that consciousness, or at least 
conscious human beings, is a condition of possibility for various aspects of 
appearances.  Such a position would seem to be beyond confirmation by a mere 
inspection of what appears, since even if consciousness always appears, 
consciousness’s necessary role in appearances does not appear.  As Kant 
notes, “(e)xperience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be 
so, and not otherwise.”46 
This willingness by Sartre to deviate from a purely phenomenological  
                                      
41 Ibid, p. 196. 
42 Ibid, p. 250. 
43 Ibid, p. 255. 
44 Ibid, p. 264. 
45 Ibid, p. 370. 
46 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1965, p. 42/A2. 
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ontology would of course be expected by one who adheres to the previously-
mentioned interpretation of him that treats consciousness as something other 
than just an appearance or the fact of their being appearance, namely a correlate 
of appearances by virtue of which they appear.  And in fact one finds further 
support for the correlational treatment of consciousness in Sartre’s claims about 
how consciousness conditions appearances.  In those claims, like the passages 
just quoted, Sartre treats consciousness as somehow related to  
appearances precisely as what enables there to be appearances, and indeed 
particular sorts of appearances.  As already noted, consciousness of anything is 
necessarily consciousness of itself.  This leads Sartre, as we shall see more 
clearly later, to treat self-consciousness as presence to and thus as a certain sort 
of separation from self.47  But Sartre offers an explanation, in turn, of this special 
sort of self-separation.  According to Sartre, this self-separation of consciousness, 
or being-for-itself, originates from a failed attempt by non-conscious being, or 
being-in-itself,  to found or cause itself.  This attempt is, of course, doomed to 
failure, since something cannot both separate from itself in order to be the cause 
of itself and remain the being that is caused.  One might speculate that Sartre 
offers this particular explanation of the self-separation of self-consciousness 
because an attempt at self-causation suggests both a splitting from self in order 
to be the separate cause of self as well as identity with the self that is split from in 
order to also be the effect of this cause.  Perhaps  
                                      
47 Sartre, pp. 11, 121. 
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some notion of a chronological order of a cause and its effect might suggest a 
self-caused being having to return to being its effect after being its own separate 
cause.  A failure to be self-caused might then be treated as a failure to in some 
sense make it all the way back to the self that initially split, so that there is the 
immediate juxtaposition or presence of the self that is caused to that self that is 
its cause.   Facticity is the term Sartre uses for the non-conscious being that 
attempts to cause itself.  As we shall also see later, Sartre describes facticity as 
in some sense the ‘body’ of the for-itself;  I will say more about the body in 
Chapter Four.  In any case, the following quote illustrates Sartre’s account of the 
origin of consciousness:  
For us, on the other hand, the appearance of the for-itself or 
absolute event refers indeed to the effort of an in-itself to found 
itself;  it corresponds to an attempt on the part of being to remove 
contingency from its being.  But this attempt results in the nihilation 
of the in-itself, because the in-itself can not found itself without 
introducing the self or a reflective, nihilating reference into the 
absolute identity of its being and consequently degenerating into 
for-itself.  The for-itself corresponds then to an expanding de-
structuring of the in-itself, and the in-itself is nihilated and absorbed 
in its attempt to found itself.  Facticity…resides in the for-itself as a 
memory of being….  Being-in-itself can found its nothingness but 
not its being….the contingency which the for-itself has derived from 
the in-itself remains out of reach.  It is what remains of the in-itself 
in the for-itself as facticity….48 
 
All of this seems supportive of a correlational rather than a purely 
phenomenological treatment of consciousness.  To put it in Sartre’s own terms, 
this is because these claims are not ontological, but “metaphysical”.  According 
to Sartre, metaphysics and ontology are not the same thing.  Ontology (or at 
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least Sartre’s phenomenological ontology) is the phenomenological description of 
the structures of a being, while metaphysics is “the study of individual processes 
which have given birth to this world as a concrete and particular totality.”49  It 
would seem that for Sartre, “facticity” has two distinct sorts of significance.  
Namely, it has some sort of significance on the purely phenomenological level of 
ontology, and another on the metaphysical level. 
On the phenomenological level of appearances, facticity is what the 
objects of consciousness refer back to, as part of their very meaning, as what 
consciousness in some sense ‘is,’50 despite its “nothingness.” On the 
metaphysical level, though, facticity is the in-itself being that perennially fails to 
cause itself, this failure in turn resulting in it being separated from and present to 
itself as a for-itself being to which objects of consciousness appear in the first 
place.  Facticity as the non-conscious being that failed in this way is presumably 
metaphysical, in Sartre’s sense, because it is part of the process whereby 
consciousness occurs so that there could be any sort of appearances in the first 
place.  And it is not phenomenological because there is no appearance of the 
very fact of a non-conscious in-itself being changing itself into self-present 
consciousness as a result of an attempt at self-causation.  Unfortunately (for 
Sartre), the reason for the lack of such an appearance would seem to reveal the 
very impossibility of the presumed metaphysical fact in question, namely, that 
even “(i)n order to be a project of founding itself, the in-itself would of necessity 
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have to be originally a presence to itself- i.e., it would have to be already 
consciousness.”51  In any case, this passage shows how facticity in its 
metaphysical sense is relevant to the correlational view of consciousness.  For 
here, consciousness is equated with facticity as the non-appearing in-itself being 
that attempts to cause itself, and such a being turns out to be that which  
appearances must appear to.  Thus, as claimed by the correlational view of 
consciousness, it seems that consciousness for Sartre is related to appearances  
rather than being a mere appearance itself, or the mere fact of there being  
appearances.  
One might object here that whatever one might say in regard to their 
apparent impossibility from the start, Sartre’s metaphysical claims about the 
origin of consciousness and of appearances are not actual assertions about 
anything beyond phenomenology but are rather, by his own admission, nothing 
more than hypotheses that “will remain hypotheses since we can not expect 
either further validation or invalidation.”52  After all, even if those claims could be 
true, consciousness could not have been conscious before its origin in order to 
have experienced it.53  Indeed, Sartre claims that “metaphysics is to ontology as 
history is to sociology,”54 suggesting that ontology provides the 
phenomenological data for metaphysics’ speculative hypotheses.  A possible  
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example of ontology’s provision of fodder for metaphysical speculation is the 
following.  According to Sartre, ontology teaches us at least two things about 
non-conscious being-in-itself and consciousness. 
 
(1) If the in-itself were to found itself, it could attempt to do so only 
by making itself consciousness;  that is, the concept of causa sui 
includes within it that of presence to self- i.e., the nihilating 
decompression of being;  (2)  Consciousness is in fact a project of 
founding itself;  that is, of attaining to the dignity of the in-itself-for-
itself or in-itself-as-self-cause.55 
 
According to this passage, first, my consciousness of a table, for example, is 
somehow an attempt to found itself, which is equivalent to an attempt at ‘attaining 
to the dignity of the…in-itself-as-self-cause.’ And second, the only way that a 
non-conscious thing can cause itself is by being present to itself like my 
consciousness of a table.  In any case, for Sartre, ontology’s claims about a self-
caused being as present to itself and of consciousness as a movement toward 
self-causation produces a task for metaphysics, namely “of deciding (emphasis 
added) whether the movement is or is not a first ‘attempt’ on the part of the in-
itself to found itself.”56  Although one might of course wonder if Sartre is basing 
these supposedly ontological claims on his metaphysical explanation, rather than 
vice versa, phenomenological ontology, supposedly remaining on the 
phenomenologically descriptive level, can only say that everything happens as if 
the in-itself modified itself as consciousness as some sort of result of a failed 
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attempt to cause or found itself.57  Thus Sartre’s metaphysical claims may not be 
evidence of his willingness to go beyond the level of appearances in his 
treatment of consciousness. 
Although Sartre certainly makes claims at times about the hypothetical 
nature of his metaphysical account of consciousness, there is on the other hand 
no denying that he also at times treats that account as an assertion about what 
actually is the case.  The previously-cited passage about facticity’s attempt to 
recover itself seems like such an assertion, with no qualification of that attempt  
as a mere possibility.  Further evidence of Sartre’s treatment of metaphysics as 
more than a merely hypothetical endeavor is his insistence on providing certain  
answers to two metaphysical questions.  The first question is “Why does the for-
itself arise in terms of being?,”58 which amounts to asking why consciousness is 
in some sense an in-itself being, and the second is “If the in-itself and the for-
itself are two modalities of being, is there not a hiatus at the very core of the idea 
of being?,”59 which amounts to asking what if anything is in common between 
conscious and non-conscious being.   If metaphysics were truly nothing but 
speculation and hypotheses, then one would not expect Sartre to answer these 
two questions and thus go beyond appearances in his treatment of 
consciousness. 
  Why does Sartre feel the need to answer these metaphysical questions,  
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given that any answer to them is beyond confirmation by experience?  Jeffrey 
Wilson, in his article “Metaphysical Questions in Sartre’s Phenomenological 
Ontology,” suggests that Sartre treats these two questions as he does because 
only a particular answer to them can do justice to what Sartre claims 
ontologically.60  I will argue in Chapter Five that Sartre’s metaphysical claims can  
help account for what he notes on the level of phenomenological ontology about  
the seeming independence of what appears to consciousness, but Wilson says 
that both the freedom of consciousness and its ability to act, two other central 
themes in Sartre’s ontological description of consciousness, require a particular  
answer to each of the above metaphysical questions. 
Regarding the first question, “Why does consciousness arise in terms of 
being?,” one could seemingly eliminate the answer that being-in-itself causes 
there to be consciousness by making itself present to itself.  According to Wilson, 
the reason one could eliminate it is that consciousness would thus be determined 
by the in-itself and no longer free.61  This would be unacceptable to Sartre, since, 
as one commentator notes, “Being and Nothingness may itself be considered a 
long paean to Cartesian freedom.”62  An answer offered by Wilson that would be 
seemingly compatible with the freedom of consciousness is an appeal to 
teleology:  being-in-itself does not cause consciousness but rather freely realizes 
the purpose or goal of attaining consciousness by means of its modification of 
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itself as present to itself.63  The difference between Wilson’s answer to this first 
metaphysical question and the answer rejected by him allegedly explains Sartre’s 
acceptance of this question’s legitimacy, since the former answer but not the 
latter one allows for the freedom of consciousness.  
Regardless of the problems with the answer that Wilson rejects, however, 
his metaphysical claim is itself problematic.  The fact that freedom is the setting 
of ends or purposes would make his answer compatible with the existence of 
freedom, but not with Sartre’s ascription of freedom.  Such an answer would 
seem to ascribe such freedom to the in-itself that consciousness “originated” 
from in addition to consciousness itself.  Indeed, such an ascription would 
actually mean that the originating in-itself was not really in-itself in the first place, 
but for-itself instead, since a goal or end is something that does not exist,64 and 
“what is can in no way determine by itself what is not…(f)or an act is a projection 
of the for-itself toward what is not.”65  Such an equation of the originating in-itself 
with the for-itself would mean that consciousness does not arise at all, since the 
notion of something arising or emerging seemingly requires the non-existence of 
that something until its emergence.  “Why does the for-itself arise in terms of 
being?” thus assumes what Wilson’s teleology precludes, namely the emergence 
of consciousness from non-conscious being, so that Wilson’s teleological 
suggestion ultimately eliminates the question it was intended to answer. 
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Another problem with Wilson’s teleology is its seeming incompatibility with  
Sartre’s description of consciousness as the negation of the in-itself66 (I will say 
more about that in the remaining chapters).  As such a negation, consciousness 
would seem to come after non-conscious being-in-itself, since negation always 
presupposes and is subsequent to what it denies.  As Sartre claims, “…negation 
is a refusal of existence.  By means of it a being…is posited, then thrown back to 
nothingness.”67  The fact that negation comes after whatever it negates seems to 
be further demonstrated when Sartre notes that nothingness, like negation, is the 
denial of what was first posited, so that being, as that which nothingness denies, 
is such that “we must be careful never to posit nothingness as an original abyss 
from which being arose.”68  The point seems to be that, as a negation of being- 
in-itself, consciousness can not come before the in-itself that it negates, but 
rather must come after it.  But how can it come after it if the in-itself in question 
already had a purpose?  As such, must the in-itself not already be for-itself as 
well?  Wilson’s suggested answer to Sartre’s first metaphysical question thus 
seems problematic, even if he is right about Sartre’s reason for answering that 
question. 
In any case, there is a further problem.  Sartre seems to treat temporality 
as inseparable from consciousness,69 so that there can not be anything existing 
before consciousness.  The reason Sartre treats temporality this way is that 
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anything temporal is somehow separated from itself, and being-in-itself exists as 
self-identical with no room for such distinction from itself.70    An example might 
help support this point about the self-separation of temporality.  I am now writing 
this work on Sartre, but several hours ago I was not doing so but was reading 
instead.  The fact that I am now typing but I was reading apparently means that 
some constant existent has endured throughout both activities, namely myself (I 
will say more about Sartre’s treatment of an enduring self or subject later in this 
chapter).  In some way, then, I am the same being that was reading before but is 
not doing so any longer.  But this also seems to imply that, on the other hand, I 
am not the reading being in question, but I was that being.  Such temporal 
distinction from oneself was described in an earlier quote as a “breakage of 
identity” and “disruption by negation,”71 and being-in-itself does not include such 
breakages or any negation.  It simply is. Non-conscious being in-itself thus could 
not exist before it modified itself as consciousness, as Wilson apparently 
suggests, since it could not exist afterward as not being what it was. 
Consciousness, on the other hand, exists as not being that which it is (for 
reasons that will be explained in the next chapter), so that it exists as the very 
separation from self that temporality involves.   
  Due to the importance of this point for Sartre’s position on the origin of 
consciousness, certain objections to this understanding of temporality should be 
addressed.  One might object that Sartre need not resort to any notion of 
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separation from self in order to account for temporality, since one could simply 
appeal to a permanent self that endures while other factors do not.  So, in the 
example offered above, one need not say that my present typing self is somehow 
distinct from my past reading self, but rather the self in both cases is one and the 
same.  What is different in the two cases is the activities engaged in by me, but I 
am (or at least could be) identical throughout those activities.  As such, I do not 
have to not be something, specifically myself in the past, in order to exist both 
before and after certain events (such as my typing and my reading, respectively).  
So, it would also not seem that non-conscious being-in-itself would have to not 
be what it was in the past in order to exist before something, namely 
consciousness.  The fact that it simply is without any of the negation allegedly 
involved with anything that was does not seem to preclude it existing prior to 
something else, so that Wilson could treat being-in-itself as existing prior to its 
project of attaining consciousness. 
Sartre’s response to this objection is that permanence presupposes time, 
and as such it entails the negation required for temporality’s difference from 
self.72  The reason he says this is that permanence is obviously not simply the 
existence of something in the instantaneous now, but rather existence in the past 
as well.  In the above example, a permanent self would exist both in the past as I 
was reading and in the present as I type.  Without such temporal endurance, 
permanence has no meaning.  But what is past is different from what is present,  
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even if it has endured throughout.  To recognize a table, for example (an 
example that will lead into another objection against Sartre’s treatment of 
temporality), as having already been there, even if having been there without 
undergoing any change, is to distinguish what it was from what it is. 
One might say that such distinction is not a difference and thus a lack of 
identity between the present and the past unchanging table, but rather a 
difference between the properties of the past and of the present table.  So, even 
if the past and the present table were identical with no distinction between them 
(indeed, there would then be no “them’ that could be distinct), the table could still 
exist before and after things due to its differing properties.  So, for instance, an 
enduring table could exist both before and after one’s breakfast and yet be 
numerically identical afterward with what it was before.  The properties of the 
table in the past may differ from the properties of the table in the present (for 
instance, the color of parts of the table could be different from what it was before 
because of spilt juice), but the table itself could be identical throughout.   
Sartre’s previously-mentioned points about temporality, however, seem to 
show that even unchanging things are not identical through time.  In the example 
from above, even if one were to focus on the table itself and not concern oneself 
with its properties, there is still a difference and thus a lack of identity between 
the table in the past and the table in the present, no matter how unchanging the 
table may be.  That difference is evident in the fact that the table was in the past 
but it is in the present.  The fact that it has always occupied space, for instance, 
means that it is extended in the present, but it cannot be the case that it is 
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extended before.  Rather, it was extended before.  This shows that, in at least 
one respect, everything with a past must not be what it was:  namely, that it must 
not be (now) anything at all then which it was then, but it must have been it.  
Thus Sartre’s claim that being-in-itself, by virtue of the fact that it simply is 
without not being anything, does not exist temporally.  Consequently, it could not 
exist before consciousness as Wilson seemingly suggests. 
An obvious problem with all of this is that non-conscious things do seem to 
exist temporally, as is evident from the above example of the table.  While my 
use of that example may have shown the unavoidable distinction between 
something in the past and that same thing in the present, it seems to show that 
such distinction is possible for non-conscious being-in-itself.  Since it is true that 
tables and any number of non-conscious things are such that they were even 
though they now are, why is it not possible that non-conscious being-in-itself 
existed before consciousness, thus allowing Wilson, for instance, to say that 
being-in-itself was non-conscious before it modified itself as consciousness? 
Sartre’s answer is that non-conscious beings exist in time due to 
consciousness.  Any object of consciousness, such as a table, appears as 
having a past and a future because “it is revealed to a revelation of which the 
very being is temporalization.”73  So, it is because I as a conscious being exist 
temporally in the sense that I was before but am now that a table can appear to 
me as having already been in the past and as being now.  Somehow the  
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temporality of consciousness is transferred to non-conscious being-in-itself, with 
the result that being-in-itself “reflects time.”74  According to Sartre, without 
consciousness there would be no before nor after for non-conscious beings.  The 
self-separation of consciousness is necessarily involved with the self-separation 
of temporality. 
Perhaps, though, one could save Wilson’s teleological answer to Sartre’s 
metaphysical question by going backward from consciousness to non-conscious 
being-in-itself instead of forward from the latter to the former.  Consciousness is 
capable of not being what it was, so one might say that consciousness is not the 
non-conscious being-in-itself that it was.  A possible problem with this is that one 
can not say, for instance, that consciousness was non-conscious being-in-itself 
but now is consciousness in the same way that I have in mind in saying that, e.g., 
I was reading but am now typing.  The reason for this is that I was conscious 
both when I was reading and as I am typing, so that both myself as reading and 
myself as typing could be each other while still not being each other.  For Sartre, 
this is how one can no longer be what one was.75  As mentioned above, this is 
the way of being and not being something that is involved with temporality.  But it 
does not seem possible that consciousness was non-conscious being-in-itself, 
since the latter is incapable of not being or of being different from consciousness 
the way I as reading in the past am able to be different from or not be I as typing 
in the present.  The inability of non-conscious being-in-itself to not be something 
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would seem to make it just as impossible for consciousness to exist after non-
conscious being as it is for being-in-itself to have existed before consciousness. 
This possible response on behalf of Sartre seems to miss the point.  While 
it may be true that if non-conscious being-in-itself could not be different from 
something due to the fact that it could not not be something, then non-conscious 
being-in-itself could not have existed before consciousness (or anything else) as 
something that it was, the example of the table (or of any number of non-
conscious objects) seems to show that non-conscious beings are capable of not 
being something.  Even though Sartre describes being-in-itself as “not a 
connection with itself….because it is glued to itself,”76 it could be that Sartre 
simply mistakenly equates all lack of self-identity with the difference from self that 
is the self-presence of consciousness, instead of allowing for a distinction 
between such lack for temporality and such lack for self-presence.  In that case, 
he has not ruled out that non-conscious being could exist before consciousness 
or any alleged attempt by the in-itself to achieve consciousness,  
thus allowing Wilson to maintain the emergence of consciousness after its non-
existence.  Sartre has not ruled out that it might have at least that much lack of 
self-identity. 
One might reconcile the seemingly temporal nature of non-conscious 
things with Sartre’s claims about temporality by simply treating those claims as 
purely phenomenological pronouncements.  By that it is meant that Sartre could  
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be simply considering reality only as it is for consciousness, and that reality 
appears to consciousness as temporally structured.  Indeed, Sartre’s previously-
cited quote that “(m)odern thought has realized considerable progress by 
reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it”77 seems to 
suggest that Sartre simply finds useful an approach to things as they appear to 
consciousness, leaving open the question of how things are outside of that 
perspective.  As one commentator notes, one can possibly limit Sartre to “the 
more minimal claim that experienced temporal features derive primarily from the 
inherent temporality of the For-itself…;  that is, temporal experience is…built-in to 
the being of consciousness itself.”78  Consequently, a phenomenological 
understanding of Sartre’s claims about temporality would eliminate any conflict 
between those claims and the earlier suggestion about the in-itself’s attempt at 
consciousness coming after the in-itself’s existence without such an attempt.  
One could simply argue that the possibility of temporal existence for non-
conscious things is beyond the scope of Sartre’s purely phenomenological  
description of temporality.  It should be noted, though, that his earlier claim about 
objects of experience owing their temporal nature to consciousness goes beyond 
a purely phenomenological perspective. As previously stated, one can not 
experience the necessity of certain conditions for appearances. 
Wilson’s consideration of Sartre’s treatment of birth actually suggests a 
purely phenomenological approach by Sartre.  In that treatment, Sartre seems to 
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assert the existence of consciousness after its existence as non-conscious being. 
According to Sartre, consciousness always has a past.79  One understanding of  
that claim is that consciousness always has the structure of having surpassed 
something that already existed and that it in some sense is, like my 
consciousness of a table, for instance, involving some sort of reference to my 
body that was already there and that it in some sense is (I will say more about 
the body in Chapter Four).  The problem with this claim is how the original 
instance of consciousness, perhaps occurring at one’s birth, can refer back to 
something it is when there is nothing preceding it that is consciousness.    In 
order for the first act of consciousness to refer back to what it in some sense is, it 
would seem that consciousness would have to precede itself, which sounds like 
the same impossibility found with the already-mentioned project of being self-
caused.  Sartre tries to avoid this problem by saying that the original act of 
consciousness does not refer to a previous instance of consciousness, which 
would obviously make the referring act non-original, but rather the original act 
refers to an in-itself being that it was. 
This might seem to forget Sartre’s point about the existence of temporality 
due to consciousness, as evident in Sartre’s claim that “(t)he In-itself is what the 
For-itself was before.”80  Wilson, in any case, defends Sartre as not guilty of 
making a problematic claim here.  Wilson suggests that consciousness simply 
confers this prior existence upon the in-itself “by its own immediate self-given 
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structure of pastness.”81  But this is not clearly relevant to Sartre’s first 
metaphysical question, since Sartre need not then be saying that the in-itself 
really existed before consciousness, but rather that consciousness simply 
appears to itself as having already been an in-itself being.  Thus one’s 
awareness at one’s birth, if one could remember it (and if it plausibly had any 
clear structure), would refer to a past as some in-itself being that one was 
(presumably, I will argue later, one’s body) before one’s consciousness existed, 
but no commitment need be made about the actual pre-existence of that in-itself 
being to one’s consciousness.  Wilson’s point in all of this would then seem really 
to be that Sartre’s treatment of birth need not be seen as a venture into 
metaphysics after all, but rather that treatment could be understood as an 
instance of phenomenological description of the structures of consciousness. 
One might also approach Wilson in a different way.  Even if one could 
reconcile Sartre’s claims about temporality with the possibility of consciousness 
existing after there was no consciousness, Wilson’s teleological answer to 
Sartre’s first metaphysical question may not depend upon that possibility at all.  
One might take Wilson as simply saying, instead, that consciousness just is the 
in-itself attempting to found or cause itself, and being-in-itself has always been 
attempting to cause itself and has thus always been “turning itself into” 
consciousness.  This calls to mind the notion of God as always creating matter  
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rather than creating it after existing without matter, and it eliminates any 
debate about the existence of something before consciousness. 
Even if non-conscious being has not existed in a time before any and all 
conscious beings, though, Wilson’s teleology still seems problematic.  It would 
still require that each particular conscious being exist after it was a particular 
non-conscious being that had the project of becoming that conscious being, but 
his teleology does not allow for non-conscious beings’ existence prior to their 
consciousness.  As the project or goal of a non-conscious being, consciousness 
can not yet exist, but having a project means that an in-itself being is already 
conscious.  My body, for instance, can not have the project of being my 
consciousness without thereby being conscious already, but conscious existence 
by my body means that such existence is not the upshot of its project.  Nor would 
it seem that Wilson could defend his teleology by saying that consciousness has 
the project of its future conscious existence, which obviously has not yet 
occurred, since his teleology is not an explanation of the for-itself arising from the 
for-itself, but rather of Sartre’s claim about the for-itself arising from the in-itself82 
(or at least of the in-itself as the consciousness it makes itself be arising from the 
in-itself as making itself consciousness).  Besides, any projection of  
consciousness toward its future is certainly not beyond experience and is thus 
seemingly subject to description by Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, whereas 
Sartre’s first metaphysical question about the for-itself arising in terms  
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of being is such that “ontology can not reply, for the problem here is to explain an 
event, not to describe the structures of a being.”83 The problems for Wilson’s 
teleological answer to Sartre’s first metaphysical question thus go beyond any 
questionable assertions by Sartre about the connection between consciousness 
and time.     
It should be noted that Sartre might seem to share some of these 
problems in his previously-mentioned treatment of facticity’s role in the origin of 
consciousness, but he actually does not have such difficulties.  As already noted, 
Sartre treats consciousness as the failed attempt by in-itself facticity to found or 
cause itself.84  Here we see Sartre seemingly embracing the very option which he 
rules out when saying that “(i)n order to be a project of founding itself, the in-itself 
would of necessity have to be originally a presence to itself- i.e. it would have to 
be already consciousness.”85  It would seem, though, that Sartre does not have 
the same problems as Wilson does.  As already noted, one might accept the 
equation of some in-itself being with consciousness by simply saying that 
consciousness just is the in-itself attempting to cause itself.  The problem for 
Wilson is that the originating in-itself being can not be consciousness since it has 
the goal or project of achieving consciousness.  Sartre, though, does not treat the 
in-itself as having consciousness as its goal, but rather the in-itself has the goal 
of self-causation.86  As already noted, this goal is unrealizable, but unlike Wilson, 
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Sartre does not equate the in-itself’s goal with what the projecting in-itself already 
is by virtue of its projecting. 
Of course, the reason that Wilson thinks consciousness must be the in-
itself’s goal is the need to avoid consciousness having the in-itself as its cause, 
but Sartre might not need to avoid that in order to preserve the freedom of 
consciousness.  As just suggested, in fact, instead of conceiving of the cause of 
consciousness as a separate being from consciousness, Sartre could instead 
treat such a cause as not distinct from consciousness.  As such, the in-itself 
might perhaps be more like the material cause of consciousness rather than its 
efficient cause.  In fact, this may be what Sartre has in mind in saying that the in-
itself facticity “remains at the heart of the for-itself”87 and that consciousness just 
is such an in-itself being attempting to found itself.  This would mean that the in-
itself is the stuff that makes up consciousness in the same way that the material 
cause of a statue, for instance, is the stuff that makes it up (although 
consciousness is not a thing but rather, as I will argue in Chapter Five, an event).  
As noted in the Introduction, treating consciousness as an event would mean that 
it is something beyond its ingredients although it is just those ingredients as 
incorporated into an event.  Such an understanding of consciousness and the in-
itself facticity that in some sense constitutes it could perhaps make facticity a  
“cause” that does not pose any necessary threat to the freedom of 
consciousness.  Although Wilson may be right that Sartre meant to preserve the  
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freedom of consciousness by answering the question “Why does the for-itself 
arise in terms of being?,” it does not seem that such an answer must altogether 
eliminate a cause of consciousness. 
As mentioned earlier, Sartre also treats another metaphysical question as 
legitimate and worth answering, namely “If the in-itself and the for-itself are two 
modalities of being, is there not a hiatus at the very core of the idea of being?”88  
As previously noted, this question is asking what if anything there is in common 
between consciousness and non-conscious being.  Wilson claims that, just as 
with the first question, Sartre treats this question as worthy of legitimate 
consideration because only a particular answer to it is compatible with a central 
feature of Sartre’s ontology of consciousness.  As already noted, the first 
question merits a certain answer, according to Wilson, in order to maintain the 
freedom of consciousness.  In a similar vein, Wilson claims that the second 
question must be answered in such a way as to preserve the ability of 
consciousness to act.  Unsurprisingly, Wilson treats consciousness’s ability to act 
as inextricably connected to consciousness’s freedom, since “freedom is power-
…a power over things in the world that would assure that free choices are 
efficacious in the sense that they make some real modification in being.”89  So, 
according to Wilson, the freedom of consciousness is again at stake with the  
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explanation of whether or not the being of consciousness and of non-conscious 
things is dual or unitary, and thus Sartre is warranted in going beyond the level of 
appearances here. 
Unlike the first question concerning the “origin” of consciousness, this 
second metaphysical question seems to anticipate the possible answers to it.  
Instead of simply asking why, the second question asks which of two possibilities 
is actually the case.  Those possibilities are (1) the being of consciousness and 
the being of non-conscious things are distinct and dual with nothing shared 
between the two, and (2) there is something in common between these two 
modes of being.  Wilson seems to think that Sartre embraces (2),90 and it 
certainly appears that (2) is the answer compatible with consciousness’s ability to 
act on the world, while (1) is not.  Sartre seems to recognize this when noting 
that action is such that “it involves a project which has an immanent origin and 
which determines a modification in the being of the transcendent.”91  So, for 
instance, when I act so as to prepare dinner, I have a conception of a non-
existent meal which functions as part of an act that determines a modification of 
the world and leads to the existence of that meal.  The fact that action seemingly 
encompasses both consciousness (the immanent) and non-conscious being-in-
itself (the transcendent) apparently invites an understanding of the two realms of 
being as united in some fashion.  As one commentator notes, even though one’s 
ability to freely act is in some sense a matter involving oneself, “it must not be  
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forgotten that, in the concrete, freedom, for Sartre, is the very intentionality that 
makes us a being in the world.”92  If consciousness and being-in-itself existed as  
a radical duality, the chasm that would separate the two might indeed seem  
incompatible with Sartre’s ascription of free action, or, for that matter, any action  
at all, to consciousness.  
An example from modern philosophy might help to make this point.  
According to Descartes, the mind and the body are radically distinct beings.  The 
mind’s essence is thinking, whereas the body’s essence is extension.93  
According to Descartes, whenever one performs an action, one first decides 
mentally what one will do and then that mental decision somehow causes one’s 
body to move in a certain way.  The problem with this is how the mind, being in 
essence thought and not being extended, can cause the extended body to do 
something.  One usually thinks of extended bodies as affected by other things 
through surface contact, such as a billiard ball moving after being hit by another 
ball.  Energy’s effects on bodies, such as a magnetic field moving an object, 
occur by such a field pervading a body and thus being located where that body is.  
Such surface contacts and locating, though, must occur at some place, some 
point in space, since the contacted surface and pervaded body exist in space.  
Thought, however, is not extended like the body, so thought does not occupy any 
point in space.  How, then, can a mental, non-extended thought contact an  
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extended body’s surface or be located where a body is?  Without such 
contact or location, no effect upon the extended body seems possible.  This 
problem also exists for the body’s ability to affect the mind, since extended 
bodies seem to produce effects by the same means by which they are affected, 
namely surface contact.  If, as Descartes claims, certain activities or motions in 
one’s eyes, for  
instance, cause one to have a visual sensation, then one’s physically extended 
sense organs have caused the mind to have the mental sensation.  This 
seemingly requires the sense organs or their components to contact the mind, 
but no such contact is possible without an extended surface of the mind to 
contact.  This problem with causal interaction between the mind and the body, 
the interaction that occurs in Descartes’ treatment of action, seems to make 
action an impossibility.  The source of this problem seems to be Descartes’ 
treatment of the mind and the body as radically distinct types of being. 
One might simply dismiss this as a problem specific to the distinction 
made by Descartes and not see any necessary difficulty caused by any and all 
radical dualisms between consciousness and non-conscious things.  It should be 
noted, though, that Sartre seemed concerned with avoiding Descartes’ problem 
of connecting the mind with the world, a problem Sartre traces to the fact that “it 
is not profitable first to separate the two terms of a relation in order to try to join 
them together again later.”94  Thus one commentator notes that “just as (with)  
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the incoherence of the Cartesian dualism…so in the present instance 
would it seem that the dichotomy of for-itself and in-itself must give way to a unity 
of in-itself-for-itself if the requirement of coherence is to be satisfied.”95  This is a 
condemnation of a dualism of consciousness and non-conscious reality, and it is 
an endorsement of a unified sense of being shared by the for-itself and the in- 
itself.  Given the noted context of that condemnation and endorsement, it would 
seem that Wilson is right about what motivates Sartre’s apparent answer to the 
metaphysical question about the unity of conscious and non-conscious beings.  
Action for Sartre requires a connection between the conscious and the non-
conscious, and an affirmation of a basic unity of the two might seem necessary 
for that connection.  Since Sartre ascribes free action to consciousness, he must 
also ascribe unity to the for-itself and the in-itself. 
Why, though, is this a metaphysical matter?  It might not seem promising 
to delve into the processes that have led to the differences between the for-itself 
and the in-itself, as metaphysics does, rather than to describe the different 
structures of the two types of being, as phenomenological ontology does, since 
even a shared origin for the two types of being would not guarantee any 
connection between them.  After all, Descartes treats the mental and the physical 
as both created by God, but that shared source does not suppress the 
previously-mentioned difficulties with uniting the two types of being.  Perhaps, 
though, metaphysics can show how the two are united by showing, once again, 
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that the for-itself’s origin makes it really nothing more than the in-itself.  As 
already noted, the for-itself originates from in-itself facticity attempting to found or 
cause itself (or at least one might so describe it, as if this is the case), and 
facticity remains at the heart of the for-itself as what the for-itself in some sense 
is.  The in-itself, one might say, is certainly changed by its failed attempt and 
subsequent separation from itself, but the in-itself is still the basic ‘matter’ that 
makes up consciousness, or at least “out of” which consciousness is composed.  
As Sartre notes, “(b)eing-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly 
consciousness….”96 
By showing that consciousness is really just the in-itself (at least as 
regardable in a certain way) doing something, Sartre’s metaphysical claims 
demonstrate the unity of the being of the in-itself and of the for-itself.  As already 
noted by Wilson, such unity then allows Sartre to affirm the ability of 
consciousness to act.  As also already noted, Sartre’s metaphysical claims might 
additionally support another feature of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, 
namely the independent nature of appearing phenomena.  As I will argue in 
Chapter Five, the fact that the for-itself’s facticity is just the in-itself doing 
something enables facticity to be of such a nature as to contribute to that 
appearance of independence.   
 As previously stated, in any case, Sartre’s willingness to answer these two 
metaphysical questions suggests his willingness to go beyond appearances in  
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his treatment of consciousness, and his possible answers to them certainly seem 
to make consciousness something more than what appears.  Those answers 
treat consciousness as an in-itself facticity (at least regardable as something) 
that attempts to found itself, and such facticity would not seem capable of 
appearance, since an in-itself being can not make such an attempt.  Despite the 
impossibility of Sartre’s answers to his two metaphysical questions, all of this 
suggests the previously-mentioned correlational treatment of consciousness 
rather than the purely phenomenological one, since consciousness would not 
merely be an appearance or appearances of some sort, nor the mere fact of 
there being appearances, as the latter treatment claims, but would rather be, as 
the former treatment claims, something beyond appearances that makes 
appearances possible in the first place.   
 Still, though, Sartre’s forays beyond phenomenology and into metaphysics 
might actually support the purely phenomenological treatment of consciousness.  
Sartre claims that the attempted self-recovery of the in-itself would not only show 
the unity of the in-itself and the for-itself (as already noted), but it would also lead 
to the rejection of the very distinction between consciousness and the rest of 
being.97    In its place would be “a being which we shall call the phenomen(on) 
and which will be provided with two dimensions of being, the dimension in-itself 
and the dimension for-itself.”98  This indeed calls to mind the proposal that 
consciousness for Sartre just is the fact that phenomena appear and indicate 
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other phenomena in various ways, rather than consciousness being something 
more that correlates with such appearance.  Sartre might then be seen as 
treating the “unity” of the in-itself and the for-itself as incompatible with anything  
like the sort of duality that a correlational approach to consciousness would  
seem to endorse, and such a reduction of reality to phenomena would obviously 
preclude any treatment of consciousness as something beyond the 
phenomenological level. 
 This apparent rejection of such duality may seem especially evident in 
Sartre’s seeming rejection of a ‘subject’ that experiences the world.  Although the 
focus of this work is Being and Nothingness, Sartre gives an extended treatment 
of the notion of an experiencing ego in The Transcendence of the Ego99 
(hereafter referred to as TOE).  Although one can question whether or not the 
ego is the same as the subject, Sartre’s claims about the ego would certainly 
seem relevant to the general issue regarding an experiencing being such as the 
subject is supposed to be, and, I will show, his claims about an experiencing 
being in TOE seem to be generally accepted in Being and Nothingness.100  The 
following, then, is a brief presentation of his claims about the ego in TOE.   
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 In TOE, Sartre claims that the ego is not an inhabitant of consciousness, 
but is rather “outside, in the world.”101 Sartre does not think that every instance of 
consciousness is such that there is always an ‘I’ that appears, but rather an ‘I’  
appears only upon reflection.102  So, for instance, my awareness of a table is not  
such that I am aware of me as being aware of that table, but rather I am simply 
aware of the table without any awareness of some object that is myself.  Only by 
reflecting upon my awareness of the table does there appear an ‘I’ that was 
aware of it.  Sartre supports this by appealing to experience,103 and he also notes 
that the notion of an ego that inhabits consciousness is contradictory.  The 
reason for this is that such an ego would be both an object and a free creator of 
consciousness’s states and actions, but an object cannot be truly free.  As Sartre 
notes, “Genuine spontaneity must be perfectly clear:  it is what it produces and 
nothing else,”104 so that an ‘I’ that is something and is thus not something else 
would somehow be limited by what it is in what it can do.  Such limitation would 
not be compatible with the spontaneity of a free consciousness.  So, instead of 
consciousness always being aware of some object that it is, it is rather 
awareness of something other than itself and of itself as such awareness, without 
it being an object.105  There thus seems to be no opposition of an experiencing 
being, or ‘subject,’ and the world it experiences, an opposition seemingly present 
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in a correlational treatment of consciousness and absent from the purely 
phenomenological understanding of Sartre. 
 It should be noted that Sartre sees this position on the ego as radically 
opposed to Husserl’s treatment of consciousness.106  Sartre claims that for  
Husserl, a “transcendental I…would be, so to speak, behind each consciousness, 
a necessary structure of consciousness whose rays…would light upon each 
phenomenon presenting itself in the field of attention.”107  And this is in fact 
Husserl’s position in Ideas.108  Husserl arrives at this position by performing what 
he calls the phenomenological reduction, a process whereby one no longer treats 
what appears to one as something existing independently of one.  As Husserl 
states, the phenomenological reduction “completely bars me from using any 
judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence….109  By eliminating such 
judgment, one can focus on what exactly appears to consciousness so that one 
can find what is certain in experience.   Such focus, according to Husserl,  
reveals two alleged facts to which Sartre objects.  First, it reveals that there is a 
self-identical ego belonging to each and every experience, and that “no reduction 
can get any grip on it.”110  Second, it also reveals that the ego always intends or 
is of something by means of some sort of ‘taking up’ of (in the case of sensory 
awareness) sensible elements, so that “out of the sensile-element…the concrete 
                                      
 
107 Ibid, p. 37. 
108 Edmund Husserl, Ideas:  General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Collier Macmillan 
Publishers, New York, 1931. 
109 Ibid, p.100. 
110 Ibid, p. 214. 
 47
intentional experience takes form and shape.”111  (One might take this in turn to 
mean that the ego combines and forms sensory material into its very object, or 
else that the ego somehow surpasses such material, in its “forming” of it, toward 
its object, possibly like consciousness for Sartre surpasses its facticity.)  Husserl 
gives the term ‘hyle’ to these basic components of experience, and he gives the 
term ‘noesis’ to the bestowal of meaning upon experience, by way of “formative” 
acts.112  Whatever appears to consciousness is then called the ‘noema,’113 and 
Husserl claims that the appearing noema need not be treated as a real element 
of experience while both the ego’s apprehension of what appears, and the hyletic 
materials therein, are treated as real.  The reason for this is that the 
phenomenological reduction shows that an appearance still remains even after 
one stops judging it as an independent existent.  If one performs the reduction 
while looking at a tree, for instance, one finds that it “has not forfeited the least 
shade of content from all the phases, qualities, characters with which it appeared 
in this perception.”114  What appeared, then, may not be an aspect of 
independent reality.  The ego, though, is always there, so that there is always 
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“the directing of the glance of the pure Ego upon the object ‘intended’ by it….”115  
Unlike TOE, then, Husserl treats the ego as ever-present and fundamental in all 
experience.  There is no appearance of something without an ego that plays a 
role in such appearance, and this opposition of an experiencing being to an 
experienced being seems similar to the correlational interpretation of Sartre with 
its treatment of consciousness as a being beyond appearances. 
 All of this is relevant to Sartre’s treatment of the subject in Being and 
Nothingness because Sartre echoes there his rejection of Husserl found in TOE, 
albeit for different reasons.  In Being and Nothingness, Sartre finds fault with 
Husserl’s treatment of the appearing noema as unreal in contrast to the real  
noesis.  The reason for this is that “Husserl defines consciousness as a 
transcendence…But from the moment that he makes of the noema an unreal, a 
correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to 
his principle.”116  Sartre sees the transcending of consciousness to what it is of 
as implying the independent existence of what it is of, but Husserl does not 
seemingly recognize such independence in his treatment of the noema. 
 One might defend Husserl by noting that all of his conclusions about the 
noesis and noema followed from his performance of the previously-mentioned 
phenomenological reduction, so that it is only when one performs this operation 
that the noema appears as unreal.  After all, Husserl recognizes that without this 
reduction, in what he calls the ‘natural attitude,’ one does treat the things that 
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appear as having independent existence.117  As one commentator notes, 
“Husserl…speaks of the reduction, and of the epoche specifically, as an 
epistemological reduction….He makes no ontological claims whatever in this 
sketch of phenomenology and phenomenological methodology.”118  Still, though, 
it is not as if Husserl is simply treating his conclusions as mere consequences of 
a decision to not view the objects of one’s experience as independently real, a 
decision one can obviously refuse.  Rather, Husserl performs the reduction in 
order to find what is certain in experience, to discover the truth about 
consciousness.119  So, his treatment of the noesis and of the ego as real in 
contrast to what one is conscious of is arguably a rejection of the transcendence 
of consciousness to an independently existing being.  Sartre sees that rejection 
as incompatible with Husserl’s recognition of the intentional nature of 
consciousness, and he claims that Husserl “has shut himself up inside the 
cogito…,”120 and that “(c)onsciousness, as Husserl conceived it, can not in reality 
transcend itself… toward the world….”121 
  Sartre thus sees Husserl’s correlational treatment of consciousness as 
leading to a rejection of the world.  This is in stark contrast to Sartre’s claim in 
Being and Nothingness that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of that- 
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nothing.”122  This certainly sounds like TOE’s similar rejection of an experiencing 
being.  We thus seem left, after all, with Sartre’s previously-mentioned notion of 
the phenomenon, with its combination of the for-itself and the in-itself, rather than 
with an opposition of consciousness and the world.  Although Sartre based that 
combination earlier on his metaphysical claim about the attempted self-causation 
of the in-itself, we can see that his criticism of an ego-inhabited consciousness 
and of a Husserlian primacy of the ego gives other reasons for rejecting any sort 
of divide between what is experienced and what experiences.  It should be noted, 
however, that one need not in fact correlate what is experienced with an ego, as 
Husserl does, but could rather correlate appearances with an event such as a 
sort of ‘taking up’ activity like Husserl’s noesis.  Still, any such correlation would 
presumably have to cohere with Sartre’s apparent rejection of anything beyond 
the world that appears. 
 Despite that rejection, though, there is still reason to believe that a subject 
exists for Sartre.  Indeed, his unifying notion of the phenomenon, rather than 
eliminating the subject,  might seem unintelligible without a subject.  Since the 
phenomenon is that which appears, it would seem to require a witness in order 
for it to be an appearance.  As previously noted, Sartre recognizes this in his 
Introduction when he claims that “(r)elative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to 
appear’ supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”123  Hence his claim 
in the Conclusion that “(t)he phenomenon of in-itself is an abstraction without 
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consciousness….”124  As one commentator says about Sartre, “(t)he subject may 
be deferred, dissolved, and deconstructed, but it is not relinquished,”125 and 
another notes how “Sartre…refrains from…effacing the subject completely.”126  
These comments seem verified by Sartre’s earlier claim that “the law of being in 
the knowing subject is to-be-conscious.”127  Indeed, this assertion of a subject 
would seemingly mean that there is more than just a noetic act correlated with  
what appears, and it might suggest a treatment of consciousness as more than  
just the appearance of phenomena or the fact of such appearance. 
 Even if Sartre does retain something that experiences over against what is 
experienced, though, it should be noted that he certainly rejects Husserl’s 
treatment of the appearing as possibly unreal in contrast to the real status of the 
being things appear to.  Although there are no appearances without 
consciousness, the being of what appears, being-in-itself,  is not dependent upon 
consciousness, whereas consciousness is dependent upon being-in-itself.128  
The reason for the independence of the in-itself is the earlier-mentioned 
transcendence of consciousness to what it is of, a transcendence that requires 
something other than consciousness for it to transcend toward, while the 
dependence of consciousness is due to its nature as presence to what it is of (I  
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will say more about that in Chapter Three).  So, regardless of Sartre’s position on 
the subject, he does not accept Husserl’s primacy of the experiencing being over 
what is experienced.  I will argue in Chapter Five, though, that  a correlational 
treatment of consciousness can accommodate Sartre’s claims about the 
independent nature of what is experienced by consciousness, even if Husserl 
can not.  
 Still, Sartre not only claims the dependence of the experiencing being 
upon the experienced, he seemingly rejects the very existence of such a being in  
his earlier claim that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of that-nothing.”129    
How this claim can cohere with his position that there must be somebody for  
phenomena to appear to is problematic, but it seems that Sartre’s unclear stance 
on the existence of the subject is matched by his unclear stance on the nature of 
consciousness.  Just as he vacillates between there not being and being an 
experiencing subject, he also shifts from consciousness being nothing but the 
appearance of phenomena to consciousness being other than and related to 
such appearance.  This chapter has shown how both readings of Sartre have 
some support, but I will argue in the following chapters that Sartre should 
ultimately embrace the position that consciousness is more than just the fact that 
phenomena appear and indicate other phenomena in various ways.  Still, though,  
any understanding of that position must recognize his seeming resistance to 
consciousness being anything more than that fact. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: 
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITSELF 
 Keeping in mind Sartre’s vacillation between a purely phenomenological 
and a correlational understanding of consciousness, let us return to the claim that 
consciousness is nothingness.  As noted in the Introduction, I believe the best 
place to start in order to understand what this means is Sartre’s claim that 
consciousness is not itself.   One of the arguments Sartre gives for that claim is 
based on the self-consciousness of consciousness.  He gives that argument 
without reference to what exactly consciousness is, but rather focusses on its 
relationship to whatever it is.  I will say more about what consciousness is for 
Sartre in the following chapters, but for now I will address this argument for its 
non-identity with itself. 
 In the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre seems to present the 
notion of consciousness not being itself on the basis of the claim that 
consciousness must be conscious of itself, and this without any specific mention 
of the previously-noted things that consciousness is not (namely, its object and 
its past) while perhaps also in some sense being them .  Here is Sartre’s 
argument for the claim that consciousness is necessarily conscious of itself: 
   
...the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing 
consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be 
consciousness of itself as being that knowledge.  This is a 
necessary condition, for if my consciousness were not 
consciousness of being consciousness of that table, it would then 
be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so.  
In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an 
unconscious-which is absurd.  This is a sufficient condition, for my 
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being conscious of being conscious of that table suffices in fact for 
me to be conscious of it.130 
As significant as I take the self-consciousness of consciousness to be in Sartre's 
overall position, it should be noted that the argument he presents here is 
problematic.  According to Sartre, a consciousness without self-consciousness, 
which in the above passage he seems to equate with a conscious act without 
self-consciousness, would be absurd since it would then be a seemingly 
contradictory unconscious consciousness.  As one commentator notes, though, a 
flaw in Sartre’s reasoning is “the move from ‘consciousness ignorant of itself’ to 
‘unconscious,’ when the strongest conclusion the premises warrant would be 
‘unselfconscious.’”131  Another commentator claims that since Sartre is really 
referring to two different things, namely “…(1) the first-order world-directed 
consciousness…and (2) the self-consciousness (of) the first-order 
consciousness…” then it follows that “Sartre needs to show that (1) cannot occur 
without (2) and his main argument does not really do so, since an unconscious 
(2) does not contradict having a conscious (1).”132  Another way of seeing this 
problem is to recognize that there are surely all kinds of things that any given 
consciousness is unconscious of, without that fact seeming to lead to any 
absurdities.  For instance, surely Sartre would grant that there are some objects 
of one consciousness that are not and will not be objects for a second 
consciousness.  Specific experiences from my childhood, for instance, may be 
objects of my awareness but may never be the objects of another's awareness.  
Does this lack of consciousness of such things render the other consciousness 
unconscious?  If so, then every consciousness would be absurdly unconscious, 
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since there are obviously objects for every consciousness that are not so for 
either any or all other consciousnesses.  Sartre clearly does not think that this 
obvious fact leads to such absurdity, so why would a lack of consciousness of 
itself make a consciousness unconscious?  All consciousnesses lack 
consciousness of something, so it may seem unreasonable to hold that they can 
not be unconscious of themselves. 
 One might claim that the reason for the need for the special sort of self-
consciousness that is supposed to be in question is the avoidance of an infinite 
regress.  Sartre says as much in the following passage: 
   
The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our 
introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is 
typical of knowledge.  But if we accept the law of the knower-known 
dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order for the knower to 
become known in turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma:  
Either we stop at any one term of the series-the known, the knower 
known, the knower known by the knower, etc.  In this case the 
totality of the phenomena falls into the unknown:  that is, we always 
bump up against a non-self-conscious reflection and a final term.  
Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress (idea ideae 
ideae, etc.), which is absurd...Consciousness of self is not dual.  If 
we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, 
non-cognitive relation of the self to itself.133 
This absurd infinite regress is, according to one commentator, that “one knows 
only in consequence of an antecedent activity of knowing.”134  One knows that a 
table is in front of one, for instance, because one already knows that one knows 
this, and one knows that one knows this because one already knows that one 
knows that one knows this, and so on.  If this were the case, then one would 
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never seem capable of arriving at knowledge of anything, since there must first 
be an infinite sequence of knowing certain things. 
The problem for Sartre, though, is that it is only if the 'totality of the 
phenomena,' namely, the knower and the known which are distinct according to 
the ‘law of the knower-known dyad,’  must be known that an infinite regress 
follows from a lack of self-consciousness.  But that is precisely what is being 
questioned, namely, why consciousness must be conscious of itself (or, to be 
true to Sartre's position, conscious (of) itself).  As already stated, consciousness 
is surely not consciousness of everything (specifically, not every object of every 
other consciousness), so why must it be conscious of itself?  With no satisfying 
answer to this, there seems no reason for the 'immediate, non-cognitive relation 
of the self to itself’ that is self-consciousness, and there seems no danger of an 
infinite regress without such self-awareness. 
 One might object that this criticism of Sartre fails to account for his 
contrast between consciousness and its opaque objects.  In his discussion of the 
self-transcending activity of consciousness, Sartre distinguishes consciousness 
from its objects in the following manner: 
 
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of 
something.  This means that there is no consciousness which is not 
a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that 
consciousness has no 'content.'  We must renounce those neutral 
'givens' which, according to the system of reference chosen, find 
their place either 'in the world' or 'in the psyche.'  A table is not in 
consciousness-not even in the capacity of a representation.  A table 
is in space, beside the window, etc.  The existence of the table in 
fact is a center of opacity for consciousness;  it would require an 
infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing.  To 
introduce this opacity into consciousness would be to refer to 
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infinity the inventory it can make of itself, to make consciousness a 
thing, and to deny the cogito.135 
One might try to use this point to argue that to deny the necessary self-
awareness of consciousness is to reduce it to something unknown in the same 
manner in which the totality of an object is unknown.  Just as consciousness can 
never be aware of every content of its infinitely dense objects, similarly 
consciousness would be unaware of itself, making it also an infinitely dense 
being.  Such infinite density would preclude consciousness 'exhausting' itself in 
its transcendence to its object,136 which would constitute a denial of Husserl's 
central insight into consciousness. 
 This attempt to appeal to the difference between consciousness and its 
objects in defense of Sartre’s claim about the necessary self-consciousness of 
consciousness still misses the mark.   A lack of self-consciousness by 
consciousness need not be due to it possessing an infinite number of contents 
which could not be canvassed.  It could simply be due to consciousness not 
being aware of itself at all, the way it is not aware of certain objects of another 
consciousness.  The lack of awareness of the infinite contents of an object is not 
a complete lack of awareness of that object, but rather an awareness of only part 
of what that object is.  But the objection to Sartre is not that he has failed to rule 
out such a 'partial' awareness of consciousness by itself, but rather that he has 
failed to rule out a complete lack of self-awareness.  Even if consciousness is 
such that it does not have a density that can never be fully known, it still seems 
that one need not be aware of consciousness.  Self-awareness may be an all or 
nothing proposition.  Sartre has not shown that it is not completely absent from at 
least some acts of consciousness. 
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Another way of seeing this point is by realizing that just as there seems no 
reason for Sartre to claim that every 'opaque' object of other consciousnesses 
are available to consciousness, similarly there seems no reason for him to claim 
that consciousness is aware of all other consciousnesses.  Whatever one makes 
of Sartre's account of the encounter with the Other as subject, or as 
consciousness (an encounter that occurs with 'the Look'), it does not seem that 
Sartre is asserting that one encounters or has some sort of awareness of all 
other consciousnesses.  This is especially so if one takes his account to be of the 
generalized Other, or no particular other consciousness at all.  The point is that 
Sartre himself seems to accept a lack of awareness of certain translucencies, 
specifically of at least some other consciousnesses, so a lack of self-awareness 
seems capable of being just another example of such a lack of awareness, with 
no need for accepting the opacity of consciousness as a consequence of its 
possible absence of self-awareness. 
 Perhaps the most adequate defense of Sartre’s claim about the necessity 
for consciousness to be self-conscious is provided by Stephen A. Dinan.  In his 
article “Intentionality in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness,” Dinan 
connects Sartre’s acceptance of Husserl’s claim that consciousness must be 
consciousness of something with Sartre’s insistence on the necessity of self-
consciousness for  consciousness.  As was shown in the last quote from Sartre, 
he treats consciousness as always consciousness of something, a fact about 
consciousness that means “there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a 
transcendent object....”137  Dinan claims that any such positing by consciousness 
can only occur if consciousness is aware of itself.  The reason for this is that  
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if it [consciousness] were not [self-conscious], consciousness would 
 be conscious of its object without being conscious that it was 
so.  This would seem to mean that consciousness, no longer 
conscious of itself, could not distinguish its object as object, that is, 
as other  than itself, or transcendent, in the manner in which it is 
experienced (italics mine).”138    
A key point here is that an object of consciousness does not simply happen to 
have the property of transcendence to consciousness, a property which 
consciousness need not be aware of (the way it is not aware of many ‘non-
inventoried’ contents of its infinitely dense objects).  Rather, consciousness treats 
an object as transcendent by the very act of positing it.  That is the very manner 
in which it is aware of objects.  To take away the transcendence of an object of 
consciousness is to take the object itself away, and without an object there is no 
consciousness (since it is always of something).  And the only way an object 
appears as transcendent of consciousness is by appearing as other than it, and 
this otherness requires an awareness of what the object is being contrasted with, 
namely, consciousness.  Hence the necessity of the self-consciousness of 
consciousness.  This analysis by Dinan is impressive since it explains why a lack 
of self-consciousness is not a mere limitation of consciousness by placing 
something outside of its ken (namely, itself), but is rather the elimination of 
consciousness by removing a necessary condition for consciousness to be what 
Sartre has already established it to be (namely awareness of something).  As 
already stated, there seems to be no problem with consciousness simply lacking 
awareness of something (which it obviously does since it lacks omniscience), but 
clearly there is a problem for consciousness if a lack of self-awareness means a 
lack of awareness of any and all transcendent objects.  Perhaps one could 
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challenge either Dinan’s assertion that “ofness” for an object means it is present 
as transcendent or his notion that such presentation requires the presentation of 
consciousness, but he at least shows a way for Sartre to connect consciousness 
with self-consciousness. 
 We may now consider the possible reasoning toward a further conclusion 
on Sartre’s part.  Since consciousness is necessarily self-conscious, it stands in 
"an immediate, non-cognitive relation...to itself."139  Because of this self-
consciousness, consciousness is present to itself.  The reason this follows is 
Sartre's claim that consciousness of something is the confrontation of 
consciousness by 'a concrete and full presence,'140 so that self-consciousness is 
the presence  of consciousness to itself.  This leads to consciousness not being 
itself.  This consequence of presence to self is demonstrated in the following: 
 
 ...presence to always implies duality, at least a virtual separation.   
 The presence of being to itself implies a detachment on the part of  
 being in relation to itself...Presence to self...supposes that an  
 impalpable fissure has slipped into being.  If being is present to  
 itself, it is because it is not wholly itself.  Presence is an immediate  
 deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes separation.  But if we  
 ask ourselves at this point what it is which separates the subject  
 from himself, we are forced to admit that it is nothing...nothing can  
 separate the consciousness (of) belief from belief, since belief is  
 nothing other than the consciousness (of) belief...The being of  
 consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from  
 itself as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being  
 carries in its being is Nothingness.141 
Since consciousness is separated from itself, it is other than itself, and, 
consequently, not itself.  This means that the principle of identity, which states 
that everything is such that it is itself, “limits it scope to a region of definite 
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being,”142 the region of being-in-itself.  One could then argue that not being itself 
makes consciousness nothingness.  After all, whatever something it could 
possibly be would not be it, because it is not itself.  There is thus ample evidence 
for the position that consciousness is nothingness for Sartre because self-
consciousness requires it to not be itself. 
 One might object at this point that Sartre has merely asserted that the 
presence of consciousness to itself means it is separated from itself and that he 
has not shown why this is so.  Indeed, why could it not be that an instance of 
consciousness is simply directed to a transcendent object as well as to itself?  
Why would such self-direction by consciousness necessitate any sort of 
separation of consciousness from itself?  And why must consciousness’s 
presence to itself be anything more than such a ‘self-contained’ act of self-
direction? 
 In order to see why self-presence means separation from self for Sartre, 
one must look to Sartre’s account of presence in general.  One can see this 
account in the following: 
 
Presence to --- indicates existence outside oneself near to ---....I 
can be present to this chair only if I am united to it in an ontological 
relation of synthesis, only if I am there in the being of the chair as 
not being the chair.143 
It follows from this that since consciousness is present to itself it exists in the 
manner of not being itself, just as presence to anything means existing in the 
manner of not being whatever one is present to.  But, again, one can still ask why 
Sartre treats presence in this manner.  It seems clear that Sartre treats presence 
as a type of relationship, and he does not think any type of relationship with 
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oneself can be had by a being which simply is what it is in self-identity.  As noted 
in Chapter One, being-in-itself is such a type of self-identical being, and Sartre 
sees such being as “at rest ‘in-itself;’...it simply is.”144  Its identity with itself is not 
seen as any type of relationship with itself, but rather identity is taken to be the 
absence of relationship with whatever something is identical with.145  Identity and 
relationship with the same thing are incompatible since identity is the complete 
cohesion of being with itself, its absolute fullness of itself, a total plenitude.  Such 
density is the complete absence of diversity,146 with no place for 
distinguishability, so what place could there be for any type of relationship with 
oneself?  Although being related to oneself allows that one is oneself, it does 
mean that one is not oneself as well.  In fact, one could say that a necessary 
feature of all relationships is some distinction between what is being related.  So, 
how could that which is identical with itself be related to itself since the 
distinguishability required for such a relationship is missing?  This is not simply a 
matter of self-identity being different from self-presence, with no reason 
precluding that which is the former from also being the latter.  Presence to self is 
a relationship of the self to itself, and whatever is identical with itself is not 
distinguishable from itself as something related to itself must be.  Thus, the self-
identity of what is present to itself, namely, consciousness, seems precluded.  
Self-identity and self-presence are thus not descriptions which are different yet 
compatible (like ‘round’ and ‘green,’ for instance), but rather they are descriptions 
which are incompatible as well as different (like ‘round’ and ‘square’).  
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Consciousness is not identical with itself, then, and thus other than and 
separated from itself. 
 But perhaps things are not so easy.  In the above passage concerning the 
necessity that presence involve the existence of something as what it is not, the 
example given by Sartre to make this point was of presence to an object 
(specifically, a chair).    But has not Sartre made it clear that self-awareness and 
object-awareness are two very different things?  As already noted, awareness of 
an object is arguably always of something transcendent to consciousness, 
making such objects other than consciousness.  Such otherness seems to clearly 
make object-awareness an example of the ‘knower-known’ dyad found with 
cases of knowledge.  Sartre, though, clearly distinguishes the sort of relation 
between the knower and known and the non-cognitive relation of the self to itself.  
Indeed, one might claim that what makes self-awareness non-cognitive is exactly 
the lack of separation between the self that is aware and the self that it is aware 
of (or, again, aware (of)).  Presence to self is that non-cognitive relation of the 
self to itself, so perhaps the example of object-awareness with its obvious 
distinction between the object and consciousness is inapplicable to the case of 
presence to self.   Sartre’s previously mentioned point about the non-being 
required for presence might just be a point about presence to objects and not a 
point about presence to self. 
 Kathleen Wider makes a similar criticism of the supposed self-separation 
of self-presence in her article “Through the Looking Glass:  Sartre on Knowledge 
and the Pre-Reflective Cogito.”147 According to that article, Sartre inconsistently 
attempts to apply the subject-object duality found with knowledge to the case of 
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self-awareness (the pre-reflective cogito) in order to maintain his central 
distinction between the type of being of consciousness and the type of being of 
its objects.  That distinction, as mentioned above, rests on the fact that being-in-
itself (the type of being of non-conscious things) involves identity with itself, while 
being-for-itself (the type of being of consciousness) entails non-identity with itself.  
To avoid the self-identity of consciousness, Sartre separates it from itself by 
making it present to itself in the same manner, Wider suggests, that it is present 
to objects.  But this is inconsistent on his part, since such a separation of 
consciousness from itself is an introduction of the subject-object dyad he 
explicitly distinguishes from self-awareness.  Wider then makes the following 
point: 
   
Unless Sartre maintains that belief is consciousness (of) belief, for 
example, the possibility arises that there could be something in 
consciousness of which consciousness is unaware;  that is, an 
unconscious act of consciousness.  To avoid this possibility, Sartre 
holds to his earlier claim that there is no distinction between an act 
of consciousness and consciousness of that act.  To maintain this 
unity and duality presence to oneself entails, Sartre argues that 
what separates consciousness from itself at the pre-reflective level 
is nothing.  But he can’t have it both ways.  If we take his claim 
seriously that nothing separates an act of consciousness from 
consciousness of that act, then the distance and separation 
involved with the notion of presence developed in the section on 
knowledge does not apply.  The unity remains undivided.148  
 I do not think that Sartre is guilty of such inconsistency.  While it is true 
that his example of the non-being required for “presence to ---” was an example 
of presence to an object, his point was still about the nature of presence in 
general, not simply presence to objects.  The fact that his example was of one 
type of presence and not of another should not obscure that point.  More 
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significantly, Wider’s point that the separation of consciousness from itself by 
nothing is equivalent to it not being separated from itself at all is incorrect.  In 
Sartre’s description of the ‘fullness’ and ‘density’ of the in-itself, he notes that  
“there is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which 
nothingness might slip in.”149  It is the fact that nothingness is not found in the in-
itself that makes it identical with itself.  Wider’s point seems to be that simply 
dividing something by nothing is not to divide it at all, to not distinguish the things 
that are divided by nothing.  But this lack of distinction of the for-itself from itself 
would not be equivalent to identity with itself.  The in-itself’s identity with itself is 
not a case of nothingness dividing it from itself.  As just noted, nothingness is not 
found in the in-itself at all, so it could not divide it from itself.  So, the fact that 
consciousness is divided from itself by nothing (whatever that eventually turns 
out to mean) does not make it identical with itself.  And that is enough for Sartre 
to distinguish consciousness from being-in-itself, enough for Sartre to claim that 
consciousness is not itself.  The fact that consciousness (of) belief is not identical 
with consciousness (of) belief means that it is not itself, so Wider’s point that 
Sartre’s description of self-awareness does not introduce any sort of duality or 
distinguishability into consciousness does not seem correct.  While it is certainly 
true that Sartre argues for the unity of consciousness with the self it is aware of 
at the pre-reflective level, that difference from object-awareness does not amount 
to consciousness being identical with itself.  Only nothingness separates 
consciousness from itself in the self-awareness of the pre-reflective cogito, but 
that still keeps consciousness separate from itself.  Presence to self   may then, 
for all Wider shows, produce separation from self, even if it is not awareness of 
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an ‘othered,’ transcendent object, and, again, separation from self leads to not 
being oneself so that consciousness is nothingness. 
 This contrast between object-awareness and self-awareness brings up a 
further significant point.  Although the separation of consciousness from itself is 
different from its separation from its object, one might argue that consciousness 
just is its object.  Indeed, as noted in Chapter One, the purely phenomenological 
interpretation of Sartre states that consciousness for Sartre is nothing more than 
the fact that phenomena appear (and, as we shall see more clearly later, are 
surpassed as well as indicate other phenomena that have been surpassed or are 
potentially surpassed).  These appearing phenomena are the presentation in 
profile of objects, in the world, for consciousness, so it might seem that this 
interpretation of Sartre would not differentiate awareness of such objects from 
self-awareness since it claims that there is nothing more to consciousness than 
the appearance of such objects.  If consciousness is nothing more than the 
appearance of objects, then awareness of its objects would seem to be 
awareness of consciousness.   
Although the current discussion of self-awareness is meant to be 
understood in abstraction from any specific position about what the self in 
consciousness’s self-awareness is, I will simply note here that although part of 
what the purely phenomenological position on Sartre takes consciousness to be 
is the fact that objects appear, that is not all of what it takes consciousness to be.  
As just stated, it is also the fact that these appearing objects are surpassed and 
indicate other phenomena that have been surpassed or possibly will be 
surpassed.  So it is not the case that this position would take consciousness’s 
awareness of objects to just be its awareness of itself, but it would rather take the 
former awareness as part of what the latter awareness is.  Thus the distinction 
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between object-awareness and self-awareness, a distinction crucial to 
establishing both consciousness’ unity with and separation from itself, does not 
collapse with the purely phenomenological interpretation of Sartre’s treatment of 
consciousness as some kind of nothingness. 
 It might be objected at this point that my description of object-awareness 
is problematic.  I have discussed Sartre’s treatment of the presence of objects, 
not to mention of self-presence, as a confrontation of consciousness by whatever 
it is that consciousness is “present to.”   Perhaps a better suggestion would be to 
treat object-awareness, for instance, as simply the presence of objects rather 
than the presence of consciousness to certain objects.  The latter position treats 
consciousness as something that stands in a relationship with objects, whereas 
the former suggests that all that there are are objects without any existent thing 
called consciousness standing in some sort of relationship with them.  This 
suggestion, which I will call the ‘presence of’ position, has the virtue of giving a 
clear sense to how consciousness is nothingness, and it reminds one of Sartre’s 
quote from the previous chapter that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of 
that- nothing.”150  The ‘presence of ‘ position avoids any need that phenomena 
may have of appearing to something, because what is present for this position 
are objects rather than appearances.  One could say that this position is much 
like the result of Occam’s Razor, with no need  to multiply any entities beyond the 
bare objects.   This position would be problematic for my treatment of the 
separation of consciousness from itself, since this position would mean that 
presence does not require the relationship and thus the distinguishability found 
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with self-presence.  Instead of presence involving both that which is present and 
that which it is present to, presence need only involve the former. 
 Of course, if the view to be attributed to Sartre is that consciousness is its 
objects in the sense of being nothing other than the fact of the appearance of its 
objects, then there would seem to be an easy response to the charge that Sartre 
fails to distinguish consciousness of itself from consciousness of objects.  
Consciousness of itself would be consciousness of a certain fact regarding the 
objects in question.  Here, however, we encounter an issue relating to what I 
called the fourth aspect of Sartre’s view of the nothingness of consciousness.  
On that view, consciousness is indeed a certain sort of fact (or event or state of 
affairs), but that fact is at the same time said to be nothing more than whatever it 
is a fact regarding, or whatever are the “ingredients” of that fact.  I will have more 
to say about this later.  
In any case, I do not think that the ‘presence of’ position accurately 
reflects Sartre’s claims.  The reason for this is that the in-itself, the type of being 
of objects, is “at rest ‘in-itself,’”151and can not be present to anything, not even to 
other objects that are also in-itself.  As Sartre notes, presence to anything is not 
“a matter of a simple external relation of contiguity,”152 but is rather a synthesis 
with what something is present to.  The fact that one object is co-present with 
any other is due to a synthesis with both objects, a unification with both objects  
not being either object, so that presence is inexplicable if only in-itself objects 
existed.  But that is exactly the problem with the previously mentioned ‘presence 
of’ position:  it attempts to explain presence by appeal to nothing but in-itself 
objects.  The presence of an object requires that it be in some sort of relationship 




with something else, since being present means to be located in some fashion.  
But any such locating of anything in relationship with anything else requires that it 
not be what it is related to, and the in-itself simply is.153  Thus one can not explain 
presence as simply being the presence of something without it being presence to 
something it is not, and non-conscious being-in-itself is not such that it is not 
something.  In turn, then, presence to self must mean some sort of separation of 
the consciousness that is present from the consciousness that it is present to. 
 Of course, the same objection from Chapter One regarding Sartre’s 
treatment of temporality could be made against his treatment of presence.  Just 
as one could say that non-conscious objects seem to be capable of existing 
temporally by not being what they were, so one could say that such objects seem 
capable of being present to other things by not being other things.  As noted in 
Chapter One, Sartre’s claim that consciousness is necessary for not being 
something may just seem like an assertion without convincing support.  For that 
reason, one might instead want to read Sartre as simply considering the world as 
it exists for consciousness, rather than making claims about reality in and of 
itself.  Even so, the ‘presence of’ position may still seem problematic as an 
account of the awareness of objects, as opposed to just the existence of objects, 
since awareness seemingly requires something more than just the objects that 
there is awareness of.  If not, there would seem to be no distinction between an 
instance of awareness of certain objects and an instance when such objects 
existed without there being any awareness of them.  Consequently, the 
‘presence of’ position does not seem a satisfying account of object-awareness, 
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and thus does not threaten the notion that presence to something requires 
distinguishability from that something. 
 Returning to the issue of self-presence, there still seems to be a general 
problem with the whole notion of consciousness not being itself.  If there is 
something that consciousness is (namely, itself), what sense does it make to 
then say that it is also not that very thing it is?  Wider applies this general point to 
the claim that consciousness is not itself, or, more specifically, to Sartre’s claim 
that consciousness (of) belief is not consciousness (of) belief, in the following: 
   
...pre-reflective consciousness must somehow exist as a witness to 
itself as well and ‘thus by the sole fact that my belief is 
apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief;  that is, it is 
already no longer belief, it is troubled belief’ (Being and 
Nothingness, p.121).  For Sartre, consciousness (of) belief 
irreparably alters belief.  But that is impossible on Sartre’s view.  
Consciousness even at the pre-reflective level must be self-
conscious.  Belief is not belief;  it is consciousness (of) belief.  
Although he acknowledges that since it is part of the very being of 
belief that it be self-conscious, that it ‘can exist only as troubled,’ he 
still concludes that it ‘exists from the start as escaping itself’ (Being 
and Nothingness, p. 122).  But if from the start what it is is self-
conscious, then how does it escape what it is by the results of its 
self-consciousness?154 
 
 One could argue that Sartre is simply meaning to contrast the type of 
being of consciousness with the type of being of non-conscious reality.  Just prior 
to the passages from Sartre quoted by Wider, Sartre discusses the fullness and 
self-identity of being-in-itself.  He there notes that being-in-itself simply is.  He 
then states that the being of consciousness (being-for-itself) can not be 
described as one would describe being-in-itself, so that one can not say of belief 
that it is belief as one can say of a table that it is a table.155  It might seem 
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plausible then to read Sartre as saying that belief’s escape from itself is its not 
being itself the way that an object such as a table is itself, rather than reading 
Sartre as saying that belief’s escape from itself is its not being itself the way 
belief is itself.  The latter reading of Sartre would seem to make him guilty of 
inconsistency, since he would be first granting self-identity to belief and then 
denying it by saying belief escapes such identity.  But it need not be the case 
that, as Wider claims, Sartre first describes belief as escaping from itself and 
then says that it escapes from, or is not, such an escape.  It seems equally 
plausible, and certainly more charitable, to say that Sartre is first considering the 
position that belief is self-identical and then showing how belief escapes from and 
is not such a manner of being.  Indeed, other passages in which Sartre describes 
the for-itself as the failed attempt of being-in-itself to be itself while also being 
other than itself as its own cause156 supports this more charitable interpretation, 
since it shows consciousness as an escape from self-identity.  However 
problematic the notion of such an attempt by the in-itself may be (as noted in the 
previous chapter), it does not thus seem that Sartre is guilty of inconsistently 
saying belief, or any instance of consciousness, escapes from and alters what it 
is by being present to itself.  Whatever it is supposed to amount to, belief, like 
any other instance of consciousness, is presence to itself.  
 Wider raises yet another problem with Sartre’s treatment of presence to 
self, however, specifically with his treatment of such presence in the case of pre-
reflective consciousness.  In her article “The Failure of Self-Consciousness in 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,”157 Wider argues that Sartre fails to distinguish 
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pre-reflective consciousness from pure reflection.  Pre-reflective consciousness 
for Sartre is a kind of self-consciousness.  It is the ‘immediate, non-cognitive 
relation of the self to itself’ previously mentioned in Sartre’s denial that presence 
to self is an example of knowledge, with its dyad of knower-known.158  Pure 
reflection is also a kind of self-consciousness.  Specifically, it is the presence of  
consciousness to itself not as an object but as consciousness, “the appearance 
of the for-itself for the for-itself.”159  Because pure reflection does not objectify 
what it is present to (namely, itself), it does not involve the duality of the knower-
known dyad.  It thus remains one with what it reflects upon, which, again, is itself.  
As Sartre claims, “To know is to make oneself other.  Now the reflective can not 
make itself wholly other than the reflected-on since it is-in-order-to-be the 
reflected-on.”160 For Wider, this description of pure reflection is indistinguishable 
from Sartre’s description of pre-reflective consciousness.  Both, after all, are 
cases of remaining one with and of not objectifying what they are present to.  
And since what consciousness is present to in both cases is consciousness itself, 
why does Sartre put such emphasis on distinguishing between two seemingly 
identical cases? 
 The reason Sartre treats pre-reflective consciousness as distinct from 
pure reflection is not a difference in the relationship between consciousness and 
what it is present to, but rather what it is that consciousness is present to in each 
case.  Before broaching the topic of reflection in general and pure reflection in 
particular, Sartre characterizes consciousness as a failed attempt by being in-
itself to cause itself, to be distinct from and then identical with itself, a failure that 
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results in it being present to itself.  As mentioned in Chapter One, the in-itself 
would not seem capable of making such an attempt, but Sartre asserts such an 
attempt in the following: 
   
But while being-in-itself is contingent, it recovers itself by falling into 
for-itself.  It is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself.  In a word, being 
is and can only be.  But the peculiar possibility of being-that which 
is revealed in the nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as 
consciousness through the sacrificial act which nihilates being.  The 
for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself 
as consciousness.161 
 
One sees here the self-identity of being without the attempt at self-foundation, 
and one also sees that this self-identity is lost once the attempt at self-foundation 
results in consciousness.  This loss of self-identity is the self-presence of 
consciousness, something shown by Sartre in the following: 
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the 
immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being 
his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity-in 
short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between 
identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity 
as a synthesis of multiplicity.  This is what we shall call presence to 
self.  The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation 
of consciousness, is to be itself in the form of presence to itself.162 
 
The consciousness that results from the attempted self-foundation is a failure 
since the being that is present to itself has not succeeded in causing itself.  As 
noted in Chapter One, the reason for this failure by being-in-itself to cause itself 
is the impossibility of being both distinct from something as its cause and 
identical with that same thing as well.  As previously stated, presence to self puts 
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one at a distance from oneself, makes one separate from oneself, so that self-
present consciousness is not identical with itself as an impossibly self-caused 
being would be.  As Sartre notes, “the turning back of being on itself can only 
cause the appearance of a distance between what turns back and that on which 
it turns.”163   
This discussion by Sartre of this failed attempt by the in-itself is filled 
throughout with mention of pre-reflective consciousness,164 but, as already noted, 
this discussion precedes his analysis of reflection, and thus of pure reflection.  
When Sartre does turn to the topic of reflection, however, he describes reflective 
consciousness not as the attempt by the in-itself to found and recover itself, but 
rather as the attempt by the for-itself to do so.  According to Sartre, “reflection or 
the attempt to recover the for-itself by a turning back on itself results in the 
appearance of the for-itself for the for-itself.”165  The for-itself is, of course, 
consciousness, and Sartre had already described it as the in-itself’s failed 
attempt to found and recover itself.  This thus means that reflection in general 
and pure reflection in particular is presence to a transcending of the in-itself (the 
failed attempt by the in-itself to found itself), a transcending that is the  
for-itself, while pre-reflective consciousness is awareness of an in-itself that has 
been transcended.  Both are united with what they are present to, since both are 
an attempt by different “things” to found themselves.  Both thus are (though also 
in some way are not) what they are present to, which amounts to saying they are 
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both instances of presence to self.  But pre-reflective consciousness and pure 
reflection are not present to the same thing.  Sartre’s distinction between the two 
thus does not seem susceptible to Wider’s attempt to collapse it, so that Sartre’s 
discussion of self-consciousness and of its role in making consciousness 
nothingness does not seem mired in inconsistency. 
This way of responding to Wider has a potential problem.  As already 
noted, in his Introduction, Sartre claims that consciousness’ awareness of 
something is always also an awareness of itself being aware of something.  
Sartre then argues that this fact about consciousness requires the existence of 
pre-reflective consciousness.166  The problem this poses for my above response 
to Wider is that this seems to show pre-reflective consciousness, and not just 
pure reflective consciousness, involving an awareness of and thus presence to 
the for-itself.  After all, pre-reflective consciousness is aware of itself as 
consciousness, and since the for-itself is consciousness, then pre-reflective 
consciousness is present to the for-itself.  How can this be reconciled with my 
above attempt to distinguish these two types of consciousness by means of what  
 
each was present to?                                                                                                                     
 Such a reconciliation can occur by recognizing Sartre’s distinction 
between metaphysics and ontology and by realizing that, at least as presented 
so far, the above distinction between these two types of consciousness depends 
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upon certain metaphysical claims.  As noted in Chapter One, metaphysics for 
Sartre is “the study of individual processes which have given birth to this world as 
a concrete and particular totality,”167 while ontology is the (phenomenological) 
description of the structures of being.168  Sartre’s talk of consciousness as the in-
itself’s attempt at self-foundation is an example of metaphysics, since it is an 
attempted explanation of how the structures of consciousness came to be, not a 
phenomenological description of those structures.  Since one can not directly 
observe the in-itself’s project of founding itself (such observation, as noted in 
Chapter One, would require consciousness to impossibly be both a self-identical 
in-itself being and a self-present for-itself being), one can only offer it as an 
explanation of what one can observe.  All of this is relevant to my response to 
Wider because my distinction between pre-reflective and pure reflective 
consciousness is based on this metaphysical explanation.  Specifically, its above 
claims about the difference between pre-reflective and pure consciousness have 
been put wholly in terms of the different processes that Sartre claims give rise to 
these two distinct types of consciousness, namely, processes involving two 
different things attempting to found themselves.  Although both processes can be 
called an attempt by consciousness to found itself, pre-reflective  
consciousness is an attempt at self-foundation by consciousness as an in-itself 
being that is transcending itself while pure reflection is such an attempt by 
consciousness as the transcendence of an in-itself being.  As noted in Chapter 
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One, metaphysics shows Sartre that consciousness just is the in-itself doing 
something (attempting self-causation), so pre-reflective consciousness is present 
to what is doing this while pure reflection is present to what is being done.  On 
the other hand, since there are no further entities involved in pure reflection than 
in pre-reflective consciousness, one might also describe them as presence to the 
same thing after all, namely consciousness.  So, again, there seems no 
inconsistency in Sartre’s account of how the self-presence of consciousness 
makes it nothingness.    
Of course, not everything that exists as being-in-itself has attempted to 
found itself.  An inanimate object, for instance, exists in the manner of the in-
itself, because it has not attempted to found itself only to end up present to itself.  
But human beings are examples of things that existed in the manner of the in-
itself and attempted self-foundation only to achieve self-presence.  (It is unclear if 
only humans have attempted self-foundation and not, for instance, animals, and 
it is also unclear when humans first attempt this, such as at birth or some time 
before or after that.)  Both inanimate objects and humans co-exist as examples 
of things with being, but the former are in-itself beings and thus self-identical 
while the latter are in-itself beings that have eliminated self-identity through an 
attempt at self-foundation.  One can certainly wonder why all of being-in-itself did 
not attempt to found itself, but Sartre’s explanation of pre-reflective 
consciousness does not seem dependent upon explaining this.  
Having dealt with these numerous objections against Sartre, let us review 
his argument from self-consciousness for consciousness not being itself.  
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According to him, in order to avoid the absurdity of an unconscious 
consciousness, consciousness must be conscious of itself.  One possible 
defense of this point is the suggestion that consciousness of a transcendent 
object that is not consciousness requires an awareness of consciousness in 
order to distinguish such an object from consciousness.  However compelling 
that defense may or may not be, Sartre reasons that since consciousness of 
something is presence to that thing, self-consciousness is presence to the self.  
This means that consciousness is present to itself, and the relationship of 
presence requires one not be whatever one is present to.  Thus consciousness, 
being self-conscious and consequently self-present, is not itself.  One may take 
consciousness not being the very thing that it is as Sartre’s meaning when 
describing consciousness as nothingness. 
Having now explained why Sartre says that consciousness is not itself, the 
next step in understanding what he meant in treating consciousness as 
nothingness is understanding what it is that consciousness is not.  One possible 
way to do that is to turn to Sartre’s claim that consciousness is not its object. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITS OBJECT 
As mentioned earlier, the claim that consciousness is not its object seems 
like something most would accept, but the interest of the claim stems from Sartre 
also claiming that consciousness is the very object it is not.  If that were so, it 
would explain why consciousness is nothingness, since it would not be the very 
thing that would make it something, namely whatever it is.  It would also provide 
a necessary supplement to the position that consciousness is not itself, since it 
would say more about what it is that consciousness is not, in not being itself. 
Evidence of Sartre’s acceptance of consciousness both being and not 
being its object is found in the following: 
 
Knowing belongs to the for-itself alone, for the reason that only the 
for-itself can appear to itself as not being what it knows.  And as 
here appearance and being are one-since the for-itself has to be its 
appearance-we must conclude that the for-itself includes within its 
being the being of the object which it is not inasmuch as the for-
itself puts its own being into question as not being the being of the 
object.…(I)n the case of an internal negation…it is within and upon 
the being which it is not that the for-itself appears as not being what 
it is not…In the internal negation the for-itself collapses on what it 
denies…the term of origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the 
thing which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an 
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the very thing 
only by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very 
content.169 
This passage centers upon what Sartre terms an internal negation.  An internal 
negation is “such a relation between two beings that the one which is denied to 
the other qualifies the other at the heart of its essence-by absence.”170  An 
example from Sartre of such a negation is the denial involved in a statement like 
“I am not rich.”171  If one is affected in one’s very being by this fact (perhaps by 
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feeling depressed or inferior), one is characterized by the lack of what is denied 
(in this case, wealth).  The other type of negation is an external negation, and 
Sartre treats this as a denial of something that does not affect the very being of 
what lacks that denied thing.172  An example of this would be one non-conscious 
object not being another such object, such as a table not being a chair.   Sartre 
claims that the for-itself is not only ‘in’ a relation of internal negation with its 
object (‘the thing which is there’), but the for-itself is so dependent upon that 
object that nothing other than the object exists ‘in’ that relation.  Thus the for-itself 
is not something other than its object, since all that there is in the case of the for-
itself’s knowing of anything is the known in-itself and “an emptiness.”  But the for-
itself is still not its object as well, since it is the negation of its object.  One sees 
again the ambiguity of Sartre’s position on the subject, as he seemingly vacillates 
between something other than what is experienced and nothing but the 
experienced.  Be that as it may, it seems that consciousness is, at least partly (I 
will say more about that later), the very object it  is not. 
The reason that the for-itself ‘collapses’ on the object it knows has to do 
with the nature of presence.  Sartre’s claim, quoted above, about the for-itself’s 
collapse on its object is part of a discussion of knowledge, but that discussion is 
relevant to the nature of presence.  Sartre claims that all knowledge is intuitive 
knowledge, and such knowledge amounts to the presence of consciousness to 
what is known.173  Knowledge for Sartre is thus like everything else for the for-
itself, since he claims that “(t)he For-itself is defined as presence to being.”174  
Now Sartre had previously said, as we saw, that  consciousness always being 
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consciousness of something means that consciousness is always “confronted 
with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness.”175  Presence to 
something requires one to be distinct from that something.  Thus our earlier 
discussion of self-presence showed how consciousness must be related to and 
separated from itself in order to be present to itself.  In his further discussion of 
consciousness’ presence to its objects, however, Sartre notes another aspect of 
presence:  some sort of ‘unity’ with whatever one is present to.  Despite the 
apparent lack of identity with its objects implied by its presence to them, Sartre 
claims that the presence of consciousness to something means it somehow is 
that something.  Sartre explains why in the following passage: 
   
Presence to-- is an internal relation between the being which is  
present and the beings to which it is present.  In any case it can not 
be a matter of a simple external relation of contiguity.  Presence to-
- indicates existence outside oneself near to--.  Anything which can 
be present to-- must be such in its being that there is in it a relation 
of being with other beings.  I  can be present to this chair only if I 
am united to it in an ontological relation of synthesis, only if I am 
there in the being of the chair as not being the chair.176 
     
Sartre seems to be suggesting something between presence as unity with 
something and presence as being something (‘…I am there in the being of the 
chair…’).  Although the above quote seems to endorse the treatment of presence 
to something as unity with it by saying that one can be present to something only 
if one is united to it, the fact that the quote rejects the notion of presence as 
simple contiguity with something also seems to oppose the view of presence as 
unity, since unity seems to involve the distinctness of what is united.  In any 
case, the very fact that Sartre is ambiguous as to these different treatments of 
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presence seems significant.  After all, consciousness both not being and being its 
object correlates well with presence being unity with and also actually being what 
one is present to.   
 Of course, just as one could wonder why Sartre would treat presence as 
requiring the separation of what is present from what it is present to (a point 
addressed in the previous chapter), one could also wonder why Sartre treats 
presence as requiring what is present to be (or to be ‘in the being of’) what it is 
present to.  Sartre’s reason seems to be that nothing that is completely distinct 
from something else can ever be connected to that something else, and, as 
shown in the previous quote, Sartre considers presence as a type of relationship, 
a form of connection between what is present and what it is present to.  Sartre 
speaks to this in the following passages: 
A being which is present to -- can not be at rest ‘in-itself’;  the in-
itself can not be present…177 
 
I can not determine myself not to be an object which is originally 
severed from all connection with me.  I can not deny that I am a 
particular being if I am at a distance from that being.  If I conceive 
of a being entirely closed in on itself, this being in-itself will be solely 
that which it is, and due to this fact there will be no room in it for 
either negation or knowledge.178 
 
We have seen that (presence) can not be the pure co-existence of 
two existents, conceived as a simple relation of exteriority….179 
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A possible explanation of Sartre’s reasoning here could be that any two 
completely distinct beings would require a third being to connect them, and if the  
third being were distinct from the other two, then a fourth and fifth being would  
be necessary to connect the third being with the first and the second being, etc.  
One might object that it is only if one treats a connection between things as being 
itself a thing of some sort that any possible need for additional connecting beings 
emerges.  It would not seem, though, that any third being not distinct from  two 
other things, so that it was in some sense connected to both of them, could be a 
connection between those two things, since the two distinct beings would then be 
connected to the third being instead of to each other.  Consequently, the for-itself 
can not be completely separated from the objects it is present to in order to be 
connected to them by the relation of presence.  It is, in some sense, ‘united’ with 
them.  But there is nothing other than the for-itself and its object that unites them.  
Indeed, according to Sartre’s previous quote about the for-itself as the internal 
negation of the in-itself, there is seemingly nothing other than the object of 
consciousness at all.  So the for-itself must be ‘united’ with its object in its very 
being.  But then we have Sartre’s conclusion:  the very being of the for-itself is to 
be found in its object.  Although I do not think that the best way of understanding 
Sartre, namely the correlational account of consciousness, treats consciousness 
as being (as well as not being) its object, Sartre does equate consciousness with 
its object here.  Any defense of the correlational account will thus have to explain 
such equation, and I will attempt to do so in Chapter Five.  
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 Despite the ultimate untenability of Sartre’s treatment of consciousness as 
both being and not being its object, the position that all there is with 
consciousness of an object is that object offers a possible explanation of why 
self-consciousness is always consciousness of a transcendent object.  Such an 
explanation would remedy a problem with Sartre’s previously mentioned 
metaphysical explanation of consciousness (Sartre’s claim that consciousness is 
the failed attempt by the in-itself to found itself), that problem being a failure to 
account for the necessity of consciousness’s presence to such an object.  Sartre 
needs to account for this given his agreement with Husserl’s insight that 
consciousness is always consciousness of something, an insight he takes as 
meaning that “there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent 
object.”180  In Sartre’s metaphysical explanation, though, all that is involved is the 
being that becomes present to itself in its failed attempt to found itself, and that 
being is not other than self-present consciousness.  There is thus no apparent 
need for an object that is not consciousness.  The following quotation seems to 
demonstrate this lack of such an object in consciousness’s originating act of 
failed self-foundation: 
But while being in-itself is contingent, it recovers itself by falling into 
for-itself.  It is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself.  In a word being is 
and can only be.  But the peculiar possibility of being-that which is 
revealed in the nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as 
consciousness through the sacrificial act which nihilates being.   
The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found  
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itself as consciousness.181 
 
A reconciliation of this explanation with the necessary presence of consciousness 
to a transcendent object might be achieved, though, if one says that 
consciousness just is (although it also is not) its object.  Consciousness must 
have an object, because consciousness just is its object (in addition to not being 
it).  Being present to self makes consciousness present to an object since 
consciousness is its object. 
 This reconciliation of Sartre’s metaphysical explanation with his ontological 
description of consciousness as always being consciousness of a transcendent 
object may, however, seem incoherent.  Sartre must treat consciousness’ object 
as not being consciousness in order to maintain his understanding of Husserl’s 
phenomenological point, but he then must turn right around and treat such an 
object as not being other than consciousness in his metaphysical account of 
consciousness as a failure at “self-foundation.”  One seems faced with the 
following dilemma:  either Sartre maintains the otherness of the object but leaves 
unexplained the necessity of consciousness transcending to such an object and 
always being of something, or Sartre explains that necessity, in his metaphysical 
account, by making such objects the very thing that their transcendence would 
keep them from being-namely, consciousness itself.  In order to maintain the 
second alternative, then, one must explain how consciousness can both be and 
not be its object.  One might attempt to make sense of this by saying that Sartre 
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treats consciousness as the fact that there are certain objects as opposed to 
treating consciousness as the objects themselves, but I will explore that 
possibility in Chapter Five.  For now, though, one can see the work that might be 
done for Sartre by consciousness both being and not being its object. 
To be sure, Sartre does himself offer another and different explanation of 
why self-conscious consciousness must be consciousness of a transcendent 
object.  It does not, however, seem to reconcile his phenomenological ontology 
with his metaphysics.  Sartre claims that the for-itself exists “in the form of the 
phantom dyad-the reflection-reflecting….(with) the two terms outlined in the dyad 
point(ing) to each other.”182  This condition of reciprocal reference seems to 
follow from consciousness being present to itself.  The reason it follows is that 
self-presence is a state of existing as seen by and as witness of oneself.183  The 
one seen is thus the same as the one seeing, and the one witnessed is the same 
as the one witnessing, meaning that what is seen or witnessed is itself seeing or 
witnessing what makes it seen or witnessed.  But, Sartre argues, consciousness 
can not just be a reference of itself to itself, because then one would have “the 
two terms of the quasi-dyad support their two nothingnesses on each other, 
conjointly annihilating themselves.”184  Since “the reflecting exists only in order to 
reflect the reflection, and the reflection is a reflection only in so far as it refers to 
the reflecting,”185  one is thus referred from the one to the other, and vice versa, 
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ad infinitum, without ever arriving at something that is more than a reference 
back to that from which one was referred.  Even two mirrors facing each other 
and thus reflecting each other are more than just reflections of each other, 
namely glass objects, and Sartre seems to think that the dependence of both  
reflecting and reflected beings requires a being that exists independently of 
reflection.  Perhaps this is similar to Aquinas’s claim that contingent beings can 
only exist if there is a necessary being.  Regardless, in order for consciousness 
to be, then, there must be reference to something that is not only a reflexive 
reference back.  This makes consciousness necessarily conscious of something 
other than itself.  Hence, consciousness must be consciousness of a 
transcendent object.186 
As mentioned above, this explanation fails to reconcile Sartre’s 
metaphysics with his phenomenological ontology.  Before one can see the 
reason for this failure, though, one must see how the “reflection-reflecting” 
explanation differs from the earlier explanation I derived from consciousness both 
being and not being its object.  The former, unlike the latter, treats 
consciousness’s object as merely related to consciousness, and not as being 
consciousness.  It claims that “the for-itself is...in the form of the phantom dyad-
the reflection reflecting…(and) the reflection…makes itself qualified by something 
other than itself or, if you prefer,…it is reflected as a relation to an outside which 
it is not.” 187   Although the earlier alternative explanation also accepts 
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consciousness being related to what it is not (namely, its object), the reflection-
reflecting explanation does not treat, or at least need not be taken as treating, 
what consciousness is of, as of an object, as also being consciousness.  In order 
to see this, one must understand two points.  First, in at least some of his claims, 
Sartre treats the being that consciousness in some sense is as its facticity, the in-
itself being that “becomes” consciousness in its failed attempt to found itself.  The 
following passages show this: 
But the peculiar possibility of being-that which is revealed in the 
nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as consciousness 
through the sacrificial act which nihilates being.  The for-itself is the 
in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself as 
consciousness.188 
 
It follows that this in-itself, engulfed and nihilated in the absolute 
event which is the appearance of the foundation or upsurge of the 
for-itself, remains at the heart of the for-itself as its original 
contingency.189 
 
This perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself which, 
without ever allowing itself to be apprehended, haunts the for-itself 
and reattaches it to being-in-itself-this contingency is what we shall 
call the facticity of the for-itself.  It is this facticity which permits us 
to say that the for-itself is, that it exists….190 
  
Thus the attempt by the in-itself to found itself, an attempt that is the for-itself, is 
an attempt by what thereby becomes the facticity of consciousness.  And this 
facticity, qua transcended, is what consciousness is then said to “be.”  Now given  
the reference to “haunting” in the passage just quoted, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that Sartre’s description of the “dyad” in question in the reflection-
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reflecting argument as a “phantom” dyad is meant to refer to this particular 
context of discussion.  And so when Sartre argues that the phantom dyad that is 
consciousness needs to be “related” to something transcendent in order to avoid 
falling into nothingness, he presumably just means that consciousness, as some 
sort of “phantom dyad” that is (and also is not) its facticity, needs to be so related 
in order to avoid falling into nothingness.  Consequently, second, this facticity  
does not seem to be consciousness’s object in any clearly phenomenological  
sense, possibly because it seems to be rather just the being that is surpassed 
toward objects.  Or at least, minimally put, what Sartre says doesn’t seem to say 
any more than that.  In any case, the following passages about the body seem to 
support this: 
 The body is what I nihilate.  It is the in-itself which is surpassed by  
 the nihilating for-itself and which reapprehends the for-itself in this  
 very surpassing.191 
 
 The body as a sensible center of reference is that beyond which 
 I am in so far as I am immediately present to the glass or to the  
 table or to the distant tree which I perceive.192   
   
The body seems to be equated with facticity in the first passage (I will say more 
on the body in the next chapter), and the body, and, consequently, facticity, is 
then described as surpassed toward consciousness’s objects.  So, in claiming  
that consciousness must be of an object in order to avoid falling into nothingness, 
Sartre is not necessarily claiming thereby that consciousness is its object (as 
opposed to being, in some sense, what is surpassed toward its  
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object).  Thus his attempt to reconcile his phenomenological ontology with his 
metaphysics differs from the alternative attempt which centers on consciousness 
both being and not being its object.  (It should be noted that, even though this 
attempt also centers on consciousness both being and not being its facticity- 
since, as noted in Chapter Two, consciousness is not whatever it is-what remains 
in question is how both consciousness’s object and its facticity are-and are not-
consciousness, given that they are not the same thing.) 
This demonstration of the difference between Sartre’s explanation in terms 
of reflection requiring something more than just a reference to something else 
and my alternative explanation shows the problem with the former’s attempt to 
reconcile his phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics.  The problem is 
that in the metaphysical account, since consciousness is “already” something 
independent of its “reference” to an object, namely an in-itself being that has 
been transcended (which, as just noted, is the facticity of consciousness), then 
consciousness does not seem to be necessarily dependent upon the 
transcendent being of its object to prevent it from falling into nothingness.  If, on 
the other hand, consciousness just is its object, then its presence to self is 
already a presence to a transcendent object.  To be sure, our  understanding of 
how consciousness can be transcendent of and thus other than itself while also 
still being itself needs elaboration, but treating consciousness as both being and 
not being its object seems, for better or worse, the best way to reconcile Sartre’s 
phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics.  
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One might defend Sartre’s appeal to the notion of reflection-reflecting in 
his attempted reconciliation of his phenomenological ontology with his 
metaphysics by claiming that the self-transcendence of facticity means that one 
could never grasp what consciousness is without “reference” to some 
transcendent object, since one would be otherwise continually referred from that 
facticity specifically as “reflecting” to that facticity as “reflected,” and vice versa.  
But even if such attempted grasping would be like a dog futilely chasing its tail, it 
does not follow that consciousness, as transcended facticity, would fall into 
nothingness without reference to some transcendent object.  Even if one could 
not ever actually grasp some self-present facticity, that facticity still is, and it is 
not clear why its being should depend upon a reference to consciousness’s 
object in order to be.  Facticity, even transcended facticity, does not need to refer 
to an object in order to be.  Thus my disagreement with this part of Sartre’s 
reasoning. 
By way of anticipation, we might in any case note a possible way of 
connecting Sartre’s talk about consciousness “being” its facticity and his talk 
about it “being” its object, or at least being nothing more than its object.  As I 
have already suggested, we may regard Sartrean facticity as in some way 
necessarily indicated, or reflected, by consciousness’s object.  As already 
mentioned, the purely phenomenological reading of Sartre in fact sees 
consciousness as nothing more than the fact that phenomena both appear and in 
various ways indicate other phenomena (or the possible appearance of other 
phenomena) in various ways. This position might perhaps then be further 
 92
elaborated to say that Sartre treats the facticity of consciousness just as being 
what is in a certain way indicated or reflected by appearing phenomena.  To this 
extent, such a reading of Sartre could at least have him say that facticity is an 
aspect of consciousness’s object.  I will explore this suggestion in the next 
chapter.  It should also be noted again that Sartre’s claims about consciousness 
in some sense being its object may seem problematic for the correlational 
treatment of consciousness since that treatment does indeed seem to make 
consciousness something more than either appearing objects or the fact of their 
appearing.  As previously stated, I will address this problem in Chapter Five.  For 
now, though, we could at least also add that, in this very “indicating” of certain 
sorts of things, in certain sorts of phenomenologically characterizable ways, it 
might be held that the object of consciousness is thereby in some way also 
indicating, or “reflecting,” what is metaphysically characterizable (if not directly 
graspable) as the facticity of consciousness, transcended toward objects in its 
“effort” to found itself. 
One could object, however, that my emphasis upon consciousness being 
its facticity is overly simplistic due to its applicability to pre-reflective 
consciousness only and not to reflective consciousness.  As noted in Chapter 
Two, from the point of view of Sartre’s metaphysics, pre-reflective consciousness 
is the presence of the in-itself to itself arising from its failure to found and recover 
itself, whereas (pure) reflective consciousness, arising from a similar failure on 
the part of the for-itself, has as its phenomenological upshot the presence of the 
for-itself to itself as such.  So, even if pre-reflective consciousness is present to 
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itself as in-itself facticity, one might object that reflective consciousness is not 
present to any sort of faciticity at all, and that it in no way “is” any such thing. 
Although Sartre notes how (pure) reflection is the presence of a for-itself 
being to that very same for-itself being, reflective consciousness nonetheless still 
retains the in-itself facticity of consciousness.  Sartre says (pure) reflection “is not 
the appearance of a new consciousness directed on the for-itself but an intra-
structural modification which the for-itself realizes in itself…” 193   With pure 
reflection, the consciousness that was there before reflection, namely a pre-
reflective consciousness that in some sense is its facticity, “makes itself exist in 
the mode reflective-reflected-on…;”  thereby reflection allows pre-reflective 
consciousness “to subsist as a primary inner structure”194 of the consciousness in 
question.  This means that the facticity that pre-reflective consciousness in some 
sense is remains in reflective consciousness.  Granted, pre-reflective 
consciousness is the self-presence (and thus the transcendence) of facticity, 
while reflective consciousness is the self-presence (and thus transcendence) of 
that transcended facticity. So what pre-reflective consciousness both is and is 
present to is in some sense not the same thing that reflective consciousness is 
and is present to.  In any case, the same facticity is found in both, even if 
differently “reflected” phenomenologically.  The relevance of all of this is that, at 
least in terms of Sartre’s own attempted reconciliation of his phenomenology with 
his metaphysics, it remains unclear why either reflective consciousness or pre-
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reflective consciousness has need of reference to the actual being of a 
transcendent object of consciousness in order to avoid falling into nothingness.  
Why is not the facticity in question sufficient in both cases? 
It should be noted that a further problem exists for Sartre’s claims about 
consciousness being nothing more than its object.  That problem is how such 
treatment could account for the unity of consciousness over time.  If one were to 
say “I see a table” and then say “I see a chair,’ there would seem to be 
something constant (“I”) referred to in these two statements.  But what could be 
constant between consciousness of one object and that of another if there is 
nothing more to consciousness than its object?  One might say that a person is 
constant in one’s awareness of different objects, but how can Sartre 
accommodate that claim without something more to consciousness of an object 
than its object?  Although Sartre often seems unclear as to whether or not there 
is a subject that makes something more of consciousness than just its object, 
perhaps any constancy throughout different conscious acts requires that a 
subject exist.  Otherwise, once an object of consciousness has changed, what 
remains the same? 
It should be noted that Sartre in fact sounds at times as if there is not 
anything that persists from consciousness of one object to that of another.  He 
claims that “(i)t is not in the future that I rediscover my presence since the future 
releases the world to me as correlative with a consciousness to-come.”195  This  
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certainly sounds as if a fundamental change is brought with every future change 
in consciousness’s object.  One way, however, that Sartre attempts to preserve 
the unity of consciousness, in spite of this apparent multiplicity, is found in his 
discussion of possibility.  In that discussion, Sartre claims that the consciousness 
of a particular object is in some way the consciousness of that object’s potential 
changes.196   Sartre’s reasoning starts from the idea that what an object for 
consciousness is depends upon that object’s lack of some potential 
development.  For instance, Sartre notes how a crescent moon is what it is by 
contrast to a full moon which it is not.197  Lacking what would make it a full moon 
is just part of what a crescent moon is.  Sartre treats this denial by an object of 
another object as a kind of “return” by the denied object to the denying object, so 
that it is in light of what an object is not that an object is what it is.  What is 
denied in these instances are potentialities of an object, and these potentialities 
are at least partly constitutive of an object. 
All of this is relevant to the issue of an enduring consciousness because 
Sartre treats the lacked potentialities constitutive of an object as correlative to 
lacked possibilities of consciousness of an object.  Just as an object is  
 
constituted by what it lacks, so consciousness of an object is constituted 
by the possibilities it lacks.  Sartre shows this in the following passage: 
I am beyond the crescent moon as the possibility of a radical 
negation of the moon as a full disc;  and correlative with the return 
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of my future negation toward my presence, the full moon comes 
back toward the crescent in order to determine it in this as a 
negation;  the full moon is what the crescent lacks;  it is the lack of 
the full moon which makes the crescent a crescent….I attribute the 
dimension of the future to the crescent as crescent…and I 
constitute it as the crescent moon by the determining return toward 
it of what it lacks.198 
 
Since consciousness is (although it also is not) its object, one would expect this 
sort of correspondence between what is the case for consciousness and what is 
the case for its object.   
Why, though, does Sartre think that the possible consciousness of an 
object’s potentialities is the same as the consciousness of that object?  The  
reason seems to be that Sartre treats the potential actualization of the 
consciousness of an object’s potentialities as that which the self-present 
consciousness of that same object needs in order to be identical with itself, or 
“complete.”  As already noted in Chapter Two, Sartre treats consciousness as 
being separated from itself by virtue of its self-presence.  Because of this 
absence of itself from itself, Sartre treats consciousness as a lack of what would 
make it complete.199  In his discussion of possibility, Sartre specifies what would 
complete consciousness: “(t)his missing For-itself is the Possible.”200  The  
Possible here is the consciousness of the potentialities of consciousness’s 
object.  This is shown by Sartre’s claim that “…as a correlate of this possible 
non-thetic consciousness, the glass-drunk-from haunts the full glass as its 
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possible and constitutes it as a glass to be drunk from.” 201   So, the 
consciousness of an object endures through a change in that object because the 
consciousness of any potential developments of that object is what the former 
consciousness is in the first place, despite its also not being it due to the 
separation from itself found with its presence-to-self.  The original consciousness 
of an object thus endures because it is replaced by itself, not by another 
consciousness, when there is awareness of changes in an object of 
consciousness. 
 At least two problems exist for this attempt to explain the endurance of  
consciousness despite a change in what it is consciousness of.  The first  
problem has to do with the supposed “identity” of a present consciousness with a 
possible consciousness.  According to Sartre, the self-present consciousness of 
an object is the self-present consciousness of that object’s potentialities, since 
the latter is what the former lacks in order to be reunited with itself.  But how 
would that make the present consciousness of a crescent moon, for instance, the 
same as the eventual consciousness of a full moon?  After all, even if the 
crescent moon is what it is for Sartre due to its not being the full moon, just as 
much as consciousness is what it is due to its not being itself, that does not imply  
that a crescent moon is a full moon.  Or at least, without the supposition of some 
sort of an underlying identity (substance?), it does not.  So does Sartre not also 
need to appeal, in the case of consciousness, precisely to some sort of 
underlying identity?  (That identity would seem to have to lie in his notion of 
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facticity, as giving some sort of  “substance” to consciousness beyond what its 
object is able to give.  I will get to this point shortly.) 
This problem of how consciousness can also “be” its possible 
consciousness becomes even worse when one emphasizes that, whatever one 
might choose to say about consciousness both being and being separated from 
consciousness, self-present consciousness, at least on the pre-reflective level, 
both is and is separated from an in-itself being, namely an in-itself facticity that 
attempted to found itself.  Again, pre-reflective consciousness is the in-itself qua 
separated from itself.  As previously noted, the in-itself attempted to found itself, 
to be both its own foundation and identical with itself.  It only succeeded in being 
present to itself, however.  So what results is an in-itself being that is separated 
from  itself.  This in-itself being that lacks itself is consciousness for (at least the 
metaphysical) Sartre.  So what consciousness is missing in missing itself is a 
certain sort of in-itself being.  From this perspective, the being of consciousness 
does not consist in a lack of a for-itself being such that, in pursuing it, 
consciousness would be pursuing itself.  It rather consists in a lack of being-in-
itself such that, in pursuing it, consciousness as an in-itself being is in some way 
pursuing both itself and an impossible being, namely a self-caused being, as its 
own foundation. 
 Perhaps another way to understand the problem with Sartre’s reasoning is 
to examine it in the form of the following argument: 
  1)  Consciousness is present to itself. 
  2)  Whatever is present to itself is separated from or lacks itself. 
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  3)  Therefore, consciousness lacks itself. 
Although this argument may seem to be valid, there is an equivocation of the 
term ‘consciousness’ such that only one of two possible understandings of that 
term could mean that consciousness of an object lacks the possible 
consciousness of that object’s potentialities.  As noted earlier in this chapter, 
‘consciousness is present to itself’ can be understood as meaning either (a) an 
in-itself being is present to itself or (b) a for-itself being, which is already an in-
itself being present to itself, is present to itself.  Given (2), (a) would mean that 
consciousness lacks an in-itself being, the in-itself being that consciousness is;  
(b) would mean that consciousness lacks a for-itself being, a self-present being, 
since what is lacked is an in-itself being qua already present to itself.  Sartre’s 
discussion of consciousness in some sense being its possible consciousness 
seems to turn on (b), since the possible consciousness is what consciousness is 
said to lack in that discussion.  But (b) seems more like a description of reflective 
consciousness than of pre-reflective consciousness, and Sartre’s treatment of 
the possibility of consciousness is supposed to be part of a discussion of pre-
reflective consciousness.202  In any case, even if that treatment was part of a  
discussion of reflective consciousness, there would still be no reason to think that 
pre-reflective consciousness of an object lacked consciousness of such an 
object’s potentialities, and thus there would be no explanation here of the unity of 
pre-reflective consciousness. 
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The question of the distinction between reflective and pre-reflective 
consciousness may, however, relate to a possible objection to my distinction 
between (a) and (b).  That objection is that (a) and (b) are not really different at 
all, but are rather different ways of saying the same thing.  Although (b) claims 
that a self-present for-itself being is what consciousness lacks, the in-itself being 
that (a) treats as lacked by consciousness is likewise a self-present for-itself 
being.  The reason for this  is that the being that the lacking in-itself is present to 
is itself, not some other in-itself being.  Consequently, the lacked being in (a) is 
separated from itself and thus seems to be a for-itself being just like the lacked 
being in (b).  How, then, is the being present to and lacked by consciousness in 
(a) different from the being present to and lacked by consciousness in (b)?  
Perhaps one can even see (a) and (b) as instances of the two different ways for 
Sartre of looking at consciousness: 
Thus we are obliged to admit that the consciousness (of) belief is 
belief.  At its origin we have apprehended this double game of 
reference:  consciousness (of) belief is belief and belief is 
consciousness (of) belief….Each of the terms refers to the other 
and passes into the other, and yet each term is different from the 
other….Thus consciousness (of) belief and belief are one and the 
same being, the characteristic of which is absolute immanence.  
But as soon as we wish to grasp this being, it slips between our 
fingers, and we find ourselves faced with a pattern of duality, with a 
game of reflections….In fact if we seek to lay hold on the total 
phenomena (i.e., the unity of this duality or consciousness (of) 
belief), we are referred immediately to one of the terms, and this 
term in turn refers us to the unitary organization of immanence.203 
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It might seem that (a) is simply focusing on the duality of consciousness, with its 
description of the lacked as in-itself just being a matter of emphasis upon the 
lacked not being self-present consciousness.  And (b) would be focusing upon  
the unity of consciousness, with its description of  the lacked as a for-itself that is 
ecstatically being the lacking consciousness204 just being a matter of emphasis 
on that which is lacked being self-present consciousness.  Hence (a) and (b) 
might not be incompatible options, with one having to choose either one or the 
other.  Perhaps one could embrace both (a) and (b). 
 The problem with treating (a) and (b) as equivalent is that  such treatment 
makes pre-reflective and reflective consciousness equivalent.  I have already 
noted a problem with such equivalence in response to the earlier objection that  
pre-reflective consciousness is present to itself as for-itself consciousness rather  
than as in-itself facticity.  This problematic equivalence of pre-reflective and 
reflective consciousness seems to follow from the equivalence of (a) and (b), 
since (a) seems to be grounded in Sartre’s view of the very nature of pre-
reflective consciousness, while (b) seems to speak more to the case of reflection.  
Sartre, though, certainly does not think these two forms of consciousness are the 
same thing, despite the similarities between the failed recovery of the in-itself in 
the case of pre-reflective consciousness and the failed  
recovery of the for-itself in the case of reflective consciousness.    Reflection for 
Sartre is a “second effort”205 at a certain sort of self-founding, namely, an effort 
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by consciousness (as opposed to the in-itself) to found itself: an “intra-structural 
modification which the for-itself realizes in itself.”206  Without a distinction  
between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness, nothing would distinguish 
the first effort (on the part of the in-itself) at self-recovery from this second effort 
(on the part of consciousness).  Although it is true that Sartre does not think 
anything new is added by reflection to pre-reflective consciousness207, the fact 
that reflection “modifies” pre-reflective consciousness precludes any equation of 
the two forms of consciousness. 
Sartre claims that reflective consciousness is such that “the ‘reflection-
reflecting’ which is reflected-on exists for a ‘reflection-reflecting’ which is 
reflective.”208  This seems to involve the presence of the lacked being to itself in 
addition to its presence to the lacking being which it is, and it also seems to 
involve the presence of the lacking being to itself in addition to its presence to the 
lacked being which it is.  Sartre distinguishes the case of pre-reflective 
consciousness from this by claiming that it is simply the “reflection-reflecting,” 
with no additional “reflection-reflecting” reflecting on it.209  As in (a), then, pre-
reflective consciousness would involve the presence to consciousness of the  
being which consciousness is, with no other self-presence on the part of 
that being.  And this is arguably just the presence to consciousness of the in-
itself being which consciousness is. Consequently, just as real differences exist  
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between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, so also the distinction  
between (a) and (b) seems more than simply two ways of describing the same  
thing. 
 Regarding the distinction between (a) and (b) in this way, one may then 
see how a substitute of (a) for (1) in the original argument does not after all 
permit the conclusion that, at least on the pre-reflective level, consciousness is 
lacking with regard to a possible consciousness which it (impossibly) would be.  
The argument again:   
1)  Consciousness is present to itself. 
  2)  Whatever is present to itself is separated from or lacks itself. 
  3)  Therefore, consciousness lacks itself. 
If substituting (a) for (1) yields “An in-itself being is present to itself,” we can see 
the problem this generates. We could thus not read the conclusion (3) as saying 
that consciousness lacks a for-itself being which it (impossibly) would be, for the 
being that consciousness is said to be and to be present to in (1) is an in-itself 
being.  To read (1) as (a) and then accept consciousness in (3) as lacking with 
respect to a for-itself being would be, again, to neglect the difference between 
pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. 
Only by reading (1) as (b), then, and not as (a), can one justify Sartre’s 
conclusion about consciousness’s lack of its possible consciousness.  This would 
of course render the whole issue irrelevant to the case of the being of pre-
reflective consciousness.  But we need to remember that our original interest in 
Sartre’s view regarding a “lack” of being with respect to consciousness was that-
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in the face of Sartre’s view of consciousness as nothing more than its (ever 
changing) objects-it promised some sort of hope for making sense of the idea of 
consciousness as nevertheless maintaining an identity over time.  If the notion of 
lack in question were applicable only to the case of reflective consciousness, it 
could only explain the endurance of reflective, but not of pre-reflective, 
consciousness.  And this would in any case be in addition to the problem already 
noted earlier, namely that, even if reflective consciousness is what it is due to its 
lack of a possible consciousness that would make it the foundation of itself (just 
as the crescent moon is what it is due to its lack of what would make it a full 
moon), that does not seem reason to treat it as being that possible 
consciousness. 
A second problem with Sartre’s account of an object’s possibilities as an  
explanation of the endurance and unity of consciousness is that it does not 
account for all changes in what one is aware of.  Even if the consciousness of an 
object is in some way the same as the consciousness of that object’s 
potentialities, that does not explain what could be constant throughout 
consciousness of an object and the consciousness of something other than that 
object’s potentialities.  For instance, let us grant that the consciousness of dark 
clouds may be in some sense the same as the consciousness that correlates 
with the potential rain resulting from those clouds.  The question remains:  how 
can the former consciousness be the same as the consciousness of an 
unexpected happening, say, an unexpected surprise party later that day?  Surely 
one can be observing the clouds at one point and also be aware of the party at 
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some later point, but Sartre’s treatment of possibility does not seem to offer an 
explanation of how this can be so.  A surprise party does not seem like a 
potentiality of dark clouds, so one can not say that, due to the potentiality of the 
clouds that is the party, the consciousness of the party is the lacked possibility of 
the consciousness of the clouds.  What, then, enables there to be something 
enduring throughout changes in objects of awareness? 
In her article “Sartre on the Transcendence of the Ego,”210 Phyllis Sutton 
Morris offers a way for Sartre to have an enduring being throughout 
consciousness of different objects.  In that article, Morris suggests that it is the 
enduring body that accounts for the unity of consciousness for Sartre. 211 
Although there can be consciousness of a wide array of objects, the fact that the 
same body can be related to these differing objects explains what can be the  
same in the awareness of all such things.  One who is conscious of a chair, for 
instance, can be the same as one who is conscious of a table if both 
consciousnesses in some way involve the same body.  The following passage 
from Sartre suggests the reading offered by Morris: 
In one sense the body is what I immediately am.  In another sense I 
am separated from it by the infinite density of the world;  it is given 
to me by a reflux of the world toward my facticity, and the condition 
of this reflux of the world toward my facticity is a perpetual 
surpassing….the body is perpetually the surpassed.  The body as a 
sensible center of reference is that beyond which I am in so far as I 
am immediately present to the glass or to the table or to the distant 
trees which I perceive….that in relation to which the perceived 
object indicates its distance as an absolute property of its being is 
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the body….This means that it is at once a point of view and a point 
of departure- a point of view, a point of departure which I am and 
which at the same time I surpass toward what I have to be.212 
 
One can see here the omnipresence of the body for any awareness of 
something, in such a way that one can say that a common feature unifying 
different acts of consciousness is just a particular body “indicated” (or “reflected”) 
by all objects of consciousness.  What an awareness of a particular object has in 
common with awareness of any other particular object need thus not be due to 
any potentiality of the one object to become the other object.  Rather, it  is due to 
the body “indicated” by both such objects. 
 Several questions arise concerning this reading of Sartre.  For one, how 
can the ever-changing physical body be a constant being throughout different 
objects of consciousness?  As Locke noted, a problem with treating the body as 
the basis of identity throughout different acts of consciousness is its composition 
of “constantly fleeting Particles of Matter…” 213   The body replaces its cells 
continuously, so that no part of the body is the same throughout one’s lifetime.  
Of course, such constant change does not seem to preclude one from treating a 
body as in some sense the same thing over time, whether that body is one’s own  
or someone else’s, just as one can treat other changing objects as in some 
sense the same thing over time (a table, for instance, can surely be the same 
thing even if one paints it a different color). Perhaps such treatment is due to 
some overarching whole that is the body, independent of its replaced parts, 
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something like Locke’s “one Common Life”214  Could such a whole be what 
Sartre might take as constant throughout consciousness of different objects?  Or 
could it be that it is simply the body indicated as the same by different objects of 
consciousness that might yield for Sartre an enduring being throughout different 
objects of consciousness?  By this I mean that, even if the physical body that is 
indicated by objects of consciousness is not the same due to its state of constant 
change, all that matters is that it appears as if it is the same body indicated by all 
the different objects of a consciousness.  One might object to this explanation of 
the unity of consciousness since it would merely appear that something is 
constant throughout the awareness of various objects, and nothing would really 
be constant throughout.  Perhaps that might make the unity of consciousness 
illusory.  A possible response by Sartre might be his claim that with 
consciousness  “appearance and being are one-since the for-itself has to be its 
appearance….”215  So the fact that it appears as if the same body is indicated by 
the various objects of consciousness means that the same body is being so 
indicated.  This equation of appearance and reality might be explained by 
recognizing a distinction between the body as lived and the body-for-others, with 
Sartre saying that the former is the source of the unity of consciousness.  This 
distinction between these two senses of what the body is, as well as whether the 
lived body is in some sense the body-for-others, will be dealt with next. 
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For the time being, though, one can see a possible compatibility between 
the unity of consciousness and consciousness being nothing more than its 
object, especially if one recognizes the unifying body as simply that which objects 
“indicate” rather than as being altogether distinct from consciousness’s objects.  
In fact, the purely phenomenological reading of Sartre would have to treat the 
body in such fashion, since that reading treats consciousness as nothing more 
than the fact of the appearance of objects with their various indications.  A 
problem for this position arises, though, from Sartre’s apparent treatment of 
consciousness as both “nothing more” than its object and as also its self-
recovering facticity.  Chapter Five will offer a possible solution to this problem, a 
solution that ultimately rejects Sartre’s equation of consciousness with either its 
objects or the fact of their appearance. 
 Although this chapter has shown problems with Sartre’s explanations of 
both the necessity of self-consciousness being consciousness of a transcendent 
object and of the endurance of consciousness by means of its possibilities, it has 
also shown possible alternative explanations that seem compatible with his 
general position.  In any case, this might be regarded as conferring a reading of 
Sartre’s view of consciousness as not being itself in terms of at least some 
significant sense in which its very being is to be found in its object, despite the 
fact that its object is also something that consciousness plainly is not. 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITS PAST 
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 The claim that consciousness is not its past, like the claim that 
consciousness is not its object, is a claim that most would probably accept.  
What, after all, is its past?  The interest of the claim, though, stems from the fact 
that, just as with consciousness’s object, consciousness is in some sense the 
past it is not.  So, since consciousness is not the very thing it is, the very thing 
that would make it something, it is then nothingness.  But what does it mean to 
say consciousness both is and is not its past? 
 There are at least two ways of understanding how consciousness both is 
and is not its past.  The first way involves an understanding of the past in a fairly 
straightforward sense, the sense one has when saying, for instance, that the past 
was but is no longer, while the second involves an understanding of the past that 
in some way equates the past with the body.  Starting with the first understanding 
of how consciousness both is and is not its past, Chapter One noted Sartre’s 
position that although one is not whatever one was in the past, one also in some 
sense is whatever one was in the past as well.  An example from Chapter One 
showed that even if I am the same person that was previously reading but am 
now typing, I am not identical with myself as reading because although I am 
typing, I was reading.  This irremovable difference between what I was in the 
past but am now in the present persists even if what was true of me previously 
still is true, so that even if I am still reading as I was, say, an hour ago, that would 
not change the fact that I am now reading but I was reading an hour ago.  As 
also noted in Chapter One, a permanent self that exists throughout one’s past 
and present would not change things either, since such a self would still be such 
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that, again, it was whatever it was in the past but it is whatever it is in the 
present.  Still, as previously stated, this difference between oneself and one’s 
past does not eliminate the fact that one is in some sense what one was.  After 
all, one has to be the same one who was before in order for it to be true that one 
was.  As Sartre notes, “…the term ‘was’ is a mode of being.  In this sense I am 
my past, I do not have it;  I am it.”216  Using Chapter One’s example to support 
this point, I can surely now be the same one that was previously reading.  This 
identification with the past that one also is not is further demonstrated in the 
following quote from Sartre: 
A remark made by someone concerning an act which I performed 
yesterday or a mood which I had does not leave me indifferent;  I 
am hurt or flattered, I protest or I let it pass;  I am touched to the 
quick.  I do not dissociate myself from my past.217 
 
 According to this understanding of consciousness both being and not 
being its past, then, consciousness exists as the separation from self involved 
with temporality.  As noted in Chapter One, Sartre does not think non-conscious 
beings exist in this manner, but rather their temporal appearance is simply a  
matter of their reflection of the temporality of consciousness.  Being-in-itself  
simply is without not being anything, so that non-conscious things allegedly owe  
whatever negation is required for their seeming temporality to consciousness.   
For Sartre, only consciousness can not be without such external support, so that 
only consciousness can strictly speaking exist as not being the very past that it 
is. 
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 This separation from its past is what constitutes the freedom of 
consciousness.  For Sartre, consciousness is free because it has “the permanent 
possibility of effecting a rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from 
its past….”218  It is as if the separation of consciousness from its past creates a 
chasm that prevents the past from affecting consciousness as its cause.  By not 
being its past, consciousness has the power of withdrawing from all that has 
occurred in order to posit a non-existent end.  Such positing could not occur if 
consciousness were incapable of withdrawing from being, since “what is can in 
no way determine by itself what is not.”219  So, it is because I am not my past that 
I can attempt to achieve things that do not exist, such as a meal for this evening.  
As noted in Chapter One, Wilson claims that this freedom to act is what Sartre 
means to preserve by answering certain metaphysical questions.  As I will argue 
in Chapter Five, treating consciousness as a certain state of affairs helps explain 
how it can not be the past that it is, thus making it free, at least according to 
Sartre. 
 The second understanding of how consciousness for Sartre can both be 
and not be its past involves a connection between consciousness’s past and 
consciousness’s body.  As noted in Chapter One, Sartre claims that 
consciousness just is its in-itself facticity attempting to cause itself, and Chapter  
Two noted that consciousness, at least on the pre-reflective level, is present to 
and thus separate from itself as its in-itself facticity.  This is relevant to 
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consciousness’s past because consciousness’s facticity is its past, due to the 
fact that consciousness’s facticity is its body, and consciousness’s body is its 
past.  Sartre writes “…the body as facticity is the past….”220  So, by both being 
and not being its facticity, consciousness is both being and not being its past. 
 This explanation of consciousness both being and not being its past 
obviously requires answers to a couple of questions.  For one thing, why does 
Sartre think that the body is consciousness’s facticity, and what exactly does that 
mean?  Also, why does he think that the body is consciousness’s past, and what 
does that mean?  Hopefully, anwering these questions will explain how 
consciousness’s facticity, the very thing that is consciousness, at least on the 
pre-reflective level, is consciousness’s past.   
In order to answer the first question, one must recall that, according to 
Sartre’s metaphysical explanation, the facticity of consciousness is the in-itself 
being that attempted to found itself.  This attempt failed and resulted in the 
presence of facticity to itself.  Since this explanation is meant to account for what 
appears when one examines consciousness, one may wonder what aspect of the 
appearance of consciousness  invites this explanation.  Here is where the  
body enters in.  As already mentioned in the previous chapter, objects for Sartre 
always appear to consciousness with some reference to a body that has been 
surpassed.  Part of the presentation of an object is its location in relationship to 
one’s body.  So, a chair, for instance, always appears as being a certain distance 
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and direction from one’s body.  To say, for instance, that a chair is to the right of 
a table is to locate the chair in relationship to something else (since the chair may 
be to the left of the table for one located elsewhere), and that something else is 
one’s body.  Indeed, without the location of objects in relation to each other, a 
location made possible by the body as a reference point, there would be no 
objects.  The following passage illustrates this: 
It is not even conceivable that a consciousness could survey the 
world in such a way that the glass should be simultaneously given 
to it at the right and at the left of the decanter, in front of it and 
behind it….this fusion of right and left, of before and behind, would 
result in the total disappearance of “thises” at the heart of a 
primitive indistinction.221   
 
So the body is always indicated by an object of consciousness, and Sartre, as 
noted above, equates that indicated body with transcended facticity. 
 But why does he make that equation?  What is the connection between 
transcended facticity and indicated body?  Perhaps Sartre is noting the fact that 
the indicated body is always indicated as ‘already there,’ as something that 
existed prior to its indication.  For instance, when a chair indicates my body in 
some position relative to it, it always indicates something that was there before 
there was any awareness of the chair.  This might make the body like 
transcended facticity, because facticity seems at least capable of existing before 
any transcendence of it toward something else.  The problem with this 
explanation is that it does not distinguish the body from numerous other things  
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indicated by an object.  Objects do not simply indicate the body, but they also 
indicate, among other things, other possible objects of consciousness.  Many of 
these possible objects of consciousness are, like the body, indicated as already 
being there, as illustrated in Sartre’s example of presence to a cup which 
indicates presence to the bottom of the cup.222  Surely this indication of the 
bottom of the cup is of something that was already there before its indication, not 
of something that just came into existence at the time of its indication.  So the 
simple indication of the body as ‘already there’ does not seem uniquely to identify 
it as transcended facticity. 
 Perhaps the unique feature of the indicated body is that objects indicate it 
as surpassed.   In fact, Sartre says as much in the following: 
…the body is perpetually the surpassed.  The body as a sensible 
center of reference is that beyond which I am in so far as I am 
immediately present to the glass or to the table or to the distant tree 
which I perceive.223  
 
Unlike the body, then, other objects that are indicated by consciousness are not 
indicated as something surpassed in order to arrive at the indicating object of 
consciousness.  But what does it mean to say that the body is indicated as 
surpassed?  Since, as noted above, being surpassed could involve being  
previous to whatever something is surpassed toward, the body’s indication as 
surpassed could be taken as literally meaning that the body is a previous object 
of awareness before awareness of any and all other objects of awareness the 
body is surpassed toward  This suggestion, though, seems contrary to 
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experience, since one seems frequently to go from one object of consciousness 
to another without the body being an object of awareness prior to those other 
objects.  It is not as if awareness of a chair and then of a table is first awareness 
of the body, second awareness of a chair, third awareness of the body again, 
and fourth awareness of a table.   This succession of events certainly can 
happen, but Sartre’s claim that the body is always indicated as surpassed by 
objects of consciousness surely does not mean that such a succession always 
happens whenever one is conscious of different objects in succession. 
 Perhaps, though, one can uniquely identify the body as surpassed in 
awareness of objects by means of the body being indicated as ‘already there’ by 
each and every object of consciousness.  I have already noted that simply being 
indicated as ‘already there’ by an object does not distinguish the body from 
various other objects indicated by objects of consciousness.  But such indicated 
objects are not so indicated by every object of consciousness, while the previous 
quote from Sartre shows that the body is.  So, unlike the bottom of a cup that is 
indicated as ‘already there’ by another part of that cup, the body is indicated as 
‘already there’ by the cup, the chair, the table, the glass, the tree, etc.  Each and 
every object of consciousness thus appears as beyond the surpassed body 
because each and every object of consciousness, in order to be such an object, 
indicates the body as ‘already there.’  Indeed, this indication of something that is 
‘already there’ seems almost like a return to or looking back upon what is 
indicated, given the previous nature of something indicated as ‘already there.’  
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Perhaps this helps motivate Sartre’s metaphysical account of a failed attempt to 
recover the facticity that consciousness is, given the similarity between ‘looking 
back upon’ the body and the attempt to recover facticity.  One also finds here a 
reason that the indicated body seems like a good candidate for being, like 
facticity, what consciousness is.  Since each and every object for consciousness 
shares in common its indication of the body, the body seems like the only 
enduring feature of the varied objects of consciousness.  It thus seems fitting to 
treat it as what consciousness is throughout awareness of different objects, thus 
equating the body with the facticity that the consciousness of all objects is.  This 
account of what it means for the body to be indicated as surpassed might thus 
explain the equation of the body with facticity. 
 This explanation is not completely clear, though.  The reason for this lack 
of clarity is Sartre’s treatment of the body as more than one thing.  As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Sartre distinguishes between the body-for-itself and the 
body-for-others.  The body-for-itself, at least in one sense, is “never a given 
which I can know.  It is there everywhere as the surpassed….”224  It is thus the 
phenomenological upshot of metaphysical facticity, that which is indicated as 
surpassed by the objects of consciousness.  In another sense, though, the body- 
for-itself is not a center of reference for objects of consciousness,  but rather it is 
the arrangement of objects of consciousness that is surpassed toward another, 
non-existent, future arrangement of objects.225  The body-for-itself in the former 
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sense, as center of reference, or a “point of view,”226  is indicated but does not 
appear, but in the latter sense, as a “point of departure,”227 it does appear.  
Although my above equation of the body with facticity only made reference to the 
body-for-itself in the former sense, the two senses of the body-for-itself agree in 
the body being transcended toward something else.  They differ in what the body 
is in each case and in what each is transcended toward. 
 The body-for-others, on the other hand, is an object in the world, 
something that appears and thus involves the transcendence of the body-for-
itself in that appearance.  It is apprehended as a “wholly constituted object…a 
this among other thises.”228  It would thus be the body as what one sees when 
one looks in the mirror, for instance, an appearing thing that appears to others as 
well.  The body in this sense, then, does not seem to be what Sartre equates with 
the facticity of consciousness, since this object, like any other object, indicates 
the body-for-itself as a being surpassed toward it, and, unlike the body-for-itself, 
not every object indicates the body-for-others as a being surpassed toward it. 
 This distinction between the body-for-itself and the body-for-others raises 
a problem.  Despite the fact that Sartre treats these two aspects of the body as 
“different and incommunicable levels of being,…(that) can not be reduced to one 
another,”229 the fact remains that these are two aspects of the same thing.  How 
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can the body be both for-itself as well as the in-itself object that is the body-for-
others?  One might claim that making the body for-itself makes it not in-itself,  
and vice versa, thus leading one commentator to claim that “the…body…can be 
identified neither with the ontological status of an absolute for-itself nor with the 
ontological status of an in-itself.”230  This is not the problem from Chapter One of 
how to relate for-itself consciousness to in-itself non-conscious beings.  As noted 
then, Sartre connects the two types of being by making metaphysical claims 
about the origin of consciousness from the in-itself’s failed attempt at self-
causation, thus claims to the effect that the for-itself just is the in-itself doing 
something.  The problem is rather how the body-for-itself, which consciousness 
in some sense is, can be an in-itself object once it has already separated from 
itself by its attempted self-founding.  As an in-itself object, the body-for-others is 
not losing its self-identity by the failed act of self-foundation that makes 
something self-present consciousness.  Sartre’s insistence on the radically 
distinct types of being for consciousness and non-conscious objects might seem  
to preclude anything being both types, regardless of how intrinsically related they  
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may be. 
 Of course, one might wonder whether this problem applies to the claim in 
the previous chapter that consciousness is in some sense its object.  Is that not 
treating something (namely consciousness’s object) as being both 
consciousness and a non-conscious object?  If the nature of presence is such 
that consciousness of a table, for instance, requires that consciousness in some 
sense be that table, what more difficulty is involved in saying that the body-for- 
itself is consciousness and the body-for-others is that same thing as a non-
conscious object?  If an ordinary object like a table can be both a non-conscious 
object and the consciousness that is present to it, why is it problematic to say 
that the body is both, as well? 
 It should be noted that consciousness being an object it is present to does 
not mean it is that same object when it is not present to it, but Sartre seems to 
say that consciousness is always the body-for-others even when it is not an 
object of consciousness.  When one is present to a table, for instance, it may be 
necessary to in some sense be that table, but it is not necessary to still be that 
table when consciousness is then present to another object such as a chair.  By 
saying that consciousness is the body due to the body being consciousness’s 
facticity, it would seem that consciousness for Sartre is always the body-for-
others that is equated with the body-for-itself, even when the former is not an 
object of consciousness.  Still, though, this difference does not show how treating 
the body as both in-itself and for-itself is any more problematic than the previous 
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chapter’s treatment of consciousness’s in-itself objects as in some sense being 
consciousness. 
 In fact, it seems one could have a similar understanding of how both an 
object and the body can be for-itself consciousness and in-itself object.  I will 
argue in the next chapter that the best way to understand consciousness as both 
being and not being either its object or its body is to treat consciousness as a 
particular sort of state of affairs (or a fact or event), a state of affairs that is not an 
additional particular thing other than its constituents but that is still not the same 
thing as those constituents.  So, by treating consciousness as in some sense 
being its object, Sartre could be taken as meaning that consciousness is just the 
state of affairs of the appearance of objects along with their various indications.  
As already noted, this is how the purely phenomenological position understands 
Sartre.  Similarly, by treating consciousness as being its body, Sartre could mean 
that it is just the state of affairs of consciousness’s facticity being transcended 
toward its correlative objects.  This would be the previously-mentioned 
correlational position on Sartre.     As constituents of a state of affairs, 
consciousness’s objects or its body would in some sense be other than yet the 
same as the state of affairs that includes each.   All of this requires and will 
receive further consideration, but it shows that although the two positions differ 
on what state of affairs is consciousness, they offer similar accounts of how 
something can be both in-itself object and for-itself consciousness. 
 Despite this similarity in how consciousness’s objects and its body can be 
both for-itself and in-itself, Sartre treats the body as different from any other 
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object of consciousness.  The body-for-others is consciousness that is captured 
by another consciousness’s awareness of it, a capture that occurs by the other’s 
awareness of one’s body as an object.  Sartre notes this in the following account 
of one’s awareness of the other, an awareness like the other’s awareness of 
one’s own consciousness: 
…the Other’s body is his facticity…as it is revealed to my 
facticity….This facticity is precisely what the Other exists-in and 
through his for-itself;  it is what the Other perpetually lives in 
nausea as a non-positional apprehension of a contingency which 
he is, as a pure apprehension of self as a factual existence….The 
Other’s for-itself wrenches itself away from this contingency and 
perpetually surpasses it.  But in so far as I transcend the Other’s 
transcendence, I fix it….This body of the Other is given to me as 
the pure in-itself of his being-an in-itself among in-itselfs, and one 
which I surpass toward my possibilities….The Other is…given to 
me as a body in situation.231 
  
Since the body-for-others is one’s body in so far as it is an object of awareness 
for consciousness, it would seem that Sartre’s claims here about the Other’s 
body and one’s awareness of it would equally apply to the body-for-others.  What 
one sees here is that even though the body-for-others is an object among other 
objects, it is an object ‘in situation.’  This seems to show that the body-for-others 
is a special kind of object.  Indeed, Sartre explicitly states that the body-for-others 
is a conscious object.  Note the following: 
Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly 
consciousness;  it can not be united with a body.  Similarly being-
for-others is wholly body;  there are no ‘psychic phenomena’ there 
to be united with the body.  There is nothing behind the body.  But 
the body is wholly ‘psychic.’232  
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The body-for-others thus seems different from an ordinary object of 
consciousness like a table, for instance.  For whatever Sartre means by saying 
that the body-for-others is ‘psychic,’ one would surely not say that about 
something like a table. 
 Does this offer another explanation of how the body can be both 
consciousness and in-itself object?  For starters, it should be noted that any 
significant distinction between the body-for-others and other objects seems 
challenged by Sartre’s insistence that the body-for-others is in some respect just  
another object.  He notes for the body that “(e)ither it is a thing among other 
things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me.  But it can not be both 
at the same time.”233  The body as that by which things are revealed to me is the 
body-for-itself, so the body-for-others seems to be the body as a thing among 
other things.  This does not suggest some special feature of the body-for-others 
that would make it different from a non-conscious object. 
 But we have already seen that Sartre does treat the body-for-others as a 
special kind of object.  So what makes the body-for-others so special?  As seen 
above, the body-for-others, unlike other objects, is indicated by other objects as a 
facticity.234  This means that the body-for-others is indicated as being surpassed 
toward other objects.  The body-for-others is the same type of thing as another 
consciousness’s body in its appearance to me,235 and the other’s  
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body is indicated by objects as another center of reference other than the body-
for-itself.  This awareness of the other’s body is thus “a certain arrangement of 
the instrumental things of my world inasmuch as they indicate in addition a 
secondary center of reference which is in the midst of the world and which is not 
me.”236  So, objects not only indicate my body as that which they are beyond, but 
they also indicate another object, the other’s body, as something they are 
beyond. 
 Before examining whether this point explains how the body can be both 
for-itself and in-itself, it should be noted that this treatment of the body-for-others 
seems potentially problematic for Sartre’s account of the body-for-itself.  As I 
noted above, one way to understand how the body-for-itself is different from 
other indicated things is that the body-for-itself is indicated by each and every 
object of consciousness as having been ‘already there.’  Sartre, though, seems 
to say that the other’s body is also indicated by each and every object of 
consciousness, and surely such a body is also indicated as ‘already there.’  Thus 
Sartre’s claim that “it is the Other-as-body whom things indicate by their lateral 
and secondary arrangements.  The fact is that I actually do not know instruments 
which do not refer secondarily to the Other’s body.”237   
 Sartre here distinguishes the body-for-itself from the other’s body by 
means of the other’s body being indicated by each and every instrument (I will 
examine shortly whether this is a difference from each and every object) in a 
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secondary way, whereas the body-for-itself is presumably indicated by each and 
every object in some primary way.  But what is the difference between the other’s 
body being indicated secondarily and the body-for-itself being indicated 
primarily?  One difference offered by Sartre is that the indications of the body-for-
itself are indications which are “constitutive of the indicating thing,” whereas the 
indications of the other’s body are only “lateral properties of the object.”238  This 
seems to be a reference to the previously-mentioned point that an object is 
necessarily located in some position relative to the body-for-itself. Thus the fact 
that a glass, for instance, must appear either to the right or to the left of a  
decanter.  But why is the glass being to the right of the decanter in relation to the 
body-for-itself, for instance, constitutive of the glass, whereas the glass being to 
the left of the decanter in relation to the other’s body is only a ‘lateral property’ of 
it?  His reason cannot be that only some objects, at least instruments, indicate 
the other’s body, in contrast to all objects, or at least instruments, indicating the 
body-for-itself.  Recall his earlier claim that all instruments indicate the other’s 
body.  Indeed, this indication of the other’s body might seem as much a part of 
an object as does its indication of the body-for-itself.  If all instruments indicate 
the other’s body as well as the body-for-itself, then a glass being to the right of 
the decanter for the body-for-itself might seem no more essential to it than its 
being to the left of the decanter for the other’s body. 
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 Furthermore, it does not seem that the other’s body is only indicated by all 
instruments as opposed to all objects.  The reason for this is that all objects of 
consciousness are also instruments: 
…the body….is the immediate presence to the For-itself of 
“sensible” things in so far as this presence indicates a center of 
reference and is already surpassed either toward the appearance 
of a new this or toward a new combination of instrumental-things.239 
 
Thus an object of consciousness not only indicates a surpassed point of view, or 
‘center of reference,’ but it also indicates something else that such an object 
would be surpassed toward.  A glass of water, for instance, not only indicates 
one’s body in front of it, but it also indicates itself in the future as having been 
drunk from as well.  Since an instrument is the means by which one achieves 
some end or goal, or what Sartre describes as something “’able to be surpassed 
toward--,’”240 then all objects being surpassed toward some other object or 
objects seems to make instruments out of them.  So one cannot distinguish the 
other’s body from the body-for-itself by saying that all instruments, but not all 
objects, indicate the former while all instruments and objects indicate the latter.  It 
seems that all instruments and thus all objects indicate both the body-for-itself as 
well as the other’s body. 
 It should be noted that even if some objects did not indicate the other’s 
body, that would still not differentiate the other’s body from both forms of the 
body-for-itself.  As mentioned above, the body-for-itself is both a point of view 
and a point of departure.  As a point of view, the body-for-itself does not appear 
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but is indicated by each and every object of consciousness.  As a point of 
departure, though, the body-for-itself does appear as an object or arrangement of 
objects that one surpasses toward another object or arrangement of objects.  
Since one’s point of departure is an appearing “object,” this means that it is an 
object rather than what is indicated by that object.  After all, it would seem odd to 
say that an object is indicated by itself.  The body as point of departure, then, is 
not indicated by each and every object, so that the body-for-itself, at least as 
point of departure, can not be distinguished from the other’s body by means of 
every object being constituted, at least in part, by its indication of the body as 
point of departure but not of the other’s body.  Explaining how indication of the 
body-for-itself as point of view is constitutive of objects would, at least so far, not 
explain how the body-for-itself as point of departure differs from the other’s body. 
 Still, perhaps one could distinguish the body-for-itself as point of view from 
the other’s body by means of the fact that the indications of the body as point of 
view occur in some sense prior to the indications of the other’s body.  I have 
already noted that both of these forms of the body are indicated by all objects of 
consciousness, but perhaps a prior indication of the body as point of view would 
make it fundamental to what an object is in a way that indication of the other’s 
body is not.  Perhaps an object’s indication of the body as point of view somehow 
establishes what an object is and thus enables it to then indicate other things like 
the other’s body.  If so, that would make sense of Sartre’s claim that the 
indications of the body-for-itself are constitutive of an object while the indications 
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of the other’s body are merely “lateral properties” of it.  This would be contrary to 
the previous claim that both indications might seem equally essential to objects. 
 Indeed, Sartre seems to demonstrate this priority of indications in his 
description of “the Look.”  “The Look” is the transformation of consciousness into 
an in-itself object in the midst of the world, a transformation brought about by 
another consciousness becoming aware of one.241  The earlier quoted claim 
about one ‘fixing’ another consciousness as an object is an example of one 
subjecting another consciousness to “the Look.”  In an example of one being 
subjected to “the Look,” Sartre imagines one getting caught while eavesdropping.  
At first, one is totally engrossed in what one is doing.  While looking through a 
keyhole, one’s consciousness is “a pure process of relating the instrument (the 
keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of 
losing myself in the world….”242  But suddenly, one hears footsteps from behind 
and realizes that another person is looking at one.  This realization brings on a 
particular sort of self-awareness,  and this self-awareness involves a 
consciousness of myself as existing on the level of objects in the world.  This 
encounter with what Sartre calls the “other as subject”  precedes one’s encounter 
with the other as object, or the other’s body, meaning that “the Other exists for 
me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently.  The Other’s body is for 
me a secondary structure.”243   As already noted, the latter encounter with the 
other’s body also entails the indication of the other’s body by objects of 
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consciousness.  This means that one’s awareness of objects prior to one’s 
encounter with the other as subject in “the Look,” an encounter that occurs prior 
to one’s encounter with the other’s body and the consequent indications of that 
body, is an awareness of objects prior to those objects’ indications of the other’s 
body.  Such a prior awareness of objects, however, no matter how pure and 
involved, must still include the indication of the body-for-itself as point of view by 
those objects.   
 As already noted, Sartre claims that objects must be located in some 
fashion in relation to one’s body, that “(i)n each project of the For-itself, in each 
perception the body is there.”244  In Sartre’s eavesdropping example, then, no 
matter how absorbed one may be in looking through it, the keyhole in some 
sense appears as in front of one’s body, thus indicating it.  The absence of such 
locating of objects “would result in the total disappearance of ‘thises’ at the heart 
of a primitive indistinction.”245  These ‘thises,’ then, that subsequently indicate the 
other’s body, seem to be what they are due to their indications of the body-for-
itself as point of view, indications that are prior to and thus without their 
indications of the other’s body.  Hence Sartre’s claim that objects’ indications of 
the body-for-itself are constitutive of the object while their indications of the  
other’s body are merely “lateral properties” of them.   Even though all objects 
indicate both the body-for-itself as point of view and the other’s body, the priority 
of indication distinguishes the indications of the former from the indications of the 
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latter.  In fact, such priority might explain Sartre’s claim that the other does not 
appear out of ontological necessity but is rather “impossible to deduce from the 
ontological structures of the for-itself.”246 
 Let us now return to the question that led to this discussion of the 
difference between these two types of indications.  Does Sartre’s treatment of the 
body-for-others as a facticity provide an explanation of how the body can be both 
for-itself consciousness and in-itself object?  Although consciousness originates 
as a particular sort of “effort” on the part of an in-itself being in Sartre’s 
metaphysical explanation, that explanation does not lead Sartre to the  
conclusion that, as a conscious being, one simply is (in the mode of being-in-
itself) an in-itself being.  We may see this reflected in his discussion of 
consciousness of the other’s body.  One’s awareness of the other’s body as 
being in situation, as being surpassed toward other objects, recognizes that the 
in-itself being of the other’s body has in some sense transcended itself.  As 
Sartre notes, in one’s awareness of the other “I apprehend this transcendence in 
the world.”247  Sartre’s treatment of the body-for-others as consciousness thus 
does not make the obvious mistake of failing to recognize the occurrence of such 
self-transcendence.  It does, however, make a transcending for-itself being into 
an in-itself being, and it does so while simultaneously treating it as still being for-
itself consciousness.  Sartre notes this when saying that “…the Other…appears 
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to me as a transcendence-transcended.”248  So the problem is not simply how an 
in-itself being could first become a for-itself being and then become an in-itself 
being again.  Indeed, such a sequence of transformations is how Sartre 
describes the movement from birth to death.249  That sequence, however, does 
not necessitate any treatment of the for-itself as also being an in-itself object over 
the same span of time.  Sartre’s claims about the body-for-others, though, seem 
like such a treatment. 
 We cannot solve this problem simply by claiming that the body-for-others 
is the facticity of one’s consciousness, so that treating the body-for-others as in-
itself object is simply treating one’s facticity as an in-itself being.  Although (in the 
metaphysical context) one’s facticity was originally an in-itself being, it is 
transcended in the failed attempt of consciousness at self-foundation.  In one 
sense then it is an in-itself being, namely, in the sense of it being an in-itself 
being that has become a for-itself being.  But that just shows that consciousness 
is a modification of an in-itself being, not that consciousness is still what it would 
be, namely self-identical, without that modification.  As such a modification, it 
does not seem that consciousness can also be a being without that modification.  
In any case, as one should remember, the notion of “facticity” in the specific 
sense of the body-for-itself is introduced by Sartre solely in phenomenological 
terms, not in terms of the metaphysical account that allowed him to speak of 
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facticity as the in-itself being remaining “at the heart of” the for-itself as an upshot 
of the failed attempt in question. 
 Perhaps, though, Sartre’s treatment of the body-for-others as an object of 
another consciousness shows that one cannot simply equate objects with in-itself 
beings.  I suggested earlier that Sartre treats the body-for-others as a conscious 
object, and perhaps any difficulty we have with that treatment is simply due to the 
assumption that an object just is an in-itself being.  Typical examples of objects, 
such as tables, chairs, glasses, decanters, trees, etc., are obviously self-identical 
in-itself beings, but  that does not mean that all objects are such.  Is there any 
reason not to treat the body-for-others as both an object and a for-itself being? 
 Indeed, one might say that being an object simply means being that which 
appears to consciousness with a certain level of distinction or separation from 
consciousness, rather than meaning that which is an instance of the in-itself.  
Consciousness is only non-positionally aware of itself, whereas it is positionally 
aware of objects.  This seems to correspond with the body-for-itself being 
indicated without ever appearing while the body-for-others does appear to 
(another) consciousness.    So indication without appearance seems to involve 
some sort of distinction or separation of consciousness from itself, but less 
separation from consciousness than does its appearance to itself as an object.  
So perhaps one can say that this makes the appearing body-for-others an object 
but not an in-itself being. 
 Wider seems to support this suggestion in her article “Hell and the Private 
Language Argument:  Sartre and Wittgenstein on Self-Consciousness, the Body, 
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and Others.”250  Wider there claims that for Sartre another consciousness is 
necessary for one to achieve full self-consciousness, since one can never 
sufficiently detach oneself from oneself in order to fully view oneself.  So, she 
states, “(i)t is necessary for me to be body for the Other to be able to look at me 
and thus to establish my objectivity.  Without this experience of my objectivity, I 
could never learn to ‘look at myself’ from the outside so to speak, as if I were 
another.”251  This seems to treat something’s status as an object as a function of 
its mode of appearance, since one’s objectivity is a consequence of the Other 
being able to look at one.  Indeed, one might expect Sartre to determine 
something’s mode of being by its mode of appearance, given his praise of 
modern thought for “reducing the existent to the series of appearances which 
manifest it.”252  If this line of thought is correct, then, the body-for-others is an 
object due to its appearance and it is a for-itself being due to its transcendence of 
its in-itself being. 
 Before moving on, a brief summary of what has been established so far in 
this discussion is in order.  This second understanding of consciousness both 
being and not being its past seems to follow from consciousness’s past  
somehow being part of what its faciticity is, given that consciousness both is and 
is not its facticity (as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two).  
Consciousness’s past can be seen as its facticity if one in some sense equates 
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the past with the body and then equates the body with facticity.  Consciousness’s 
facticity can be seen as the body if one sees that the indication of the surpassed 
body seems to be necessary for something to be an object for consciousness.  
The body indicated by objects of consciousness is both what consciousness is as 
well as an object for another consciousness.  Being such an object does not 
make the body a self-identical in-itself being, it simply means that the body 
appears as sufficiently distinct from another consciousness, thus enabling an 
access to the body only available to another consciousness. 
 With these conclusions about the body and its connection to 
consciousness’s object in hand, let us see if they can help solve a potential 
problem with the last chapter’s claim that consciousness is in some sense 
nothing more than its object.  Such an understanding of consciousness would 
seem to lend itself to what one may call the ‘no content’ view of consciousness.  
This view states that consciousness does not contain anything like private 
experiences or appearances, since consciousness is not simply always the 
consciousness of something, but it also exhausts itself in its transcendence to its 
object.  Sartre expressly endorses the ‘no content’ view when he states that 
“consciousness has no ‘content.’  We must renounce those neutral ‘givens’ 
which…find their place either ‘in the world’ or ‘in the psyche.’  A table is not in 
consciousness-not even in the capacity of a representation.”253  This would be 
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exactly what one would expect if consciousness is (and is not) its object, with 
nothing to have or contain some representation or appearance of the object. 
 A problem with this view, however, is that Sartre seems to accept the 
notion of private appearances in the following: 
The grass is something qualified;  it is this green grass which exists 
for the Other;  in this sense the very quality of the object, its deep, 
raw green is in direct relation to this man.  This green turns toward 
the Other a face which escapes me.  I apprehend the relation of the 
green to the Other as an objective relation, but I cannot apprehend 
the green as it appears to the Other.254  
 
This acceptance of private appearances seems to mean that there is something 
more to consciousness of an object than just that object, since one can 
experience the object of the other’s consciousness (in the above quote, the 
grass), but not that object’s appearance to the other (the grass as it appears to 
the other).  The object and its appearance to the other thus seem distinct.  It 
stands to reason then that the object of one’s own consciousness and the 
appearance of that object are distinct as well.  But how then is consciousness of 
an object nothing more than that object?  Moreover, how can Sartre claim that 
consciousness has no contents? 
 Adrian Mirvish offers an account of Sartre that explains how there can be 
private appearances despite Sartre’s claim about consciousness having no 
content.  In his article “Sartre and the Gestaltists:  Demystifying (Part of) Being 
and Nothingness,” 255  Mirvish argues that Sartre was objecting to the 
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Introspectionist school of psychology when he denied that consciousness has 
any ‘givens’ in it that would constitute its contents.  According to that school, what 
one experiences are not actual objects in an external world, but rather distinct, 
atomic sensations in the mind.  These sensations are caused by the smallest 
perceptible stimulations of one’s sense organs.  Objects are nothing but 
combinations of these sensations, so that one never actually experiences 
anything in the external world, but rather only encounters the private contents of 
one’s mind.256 
The problem for Sartre with this account of our experience of objects is 
that it relies upon us being able to experience objective, external reality in order 
to arrive at its notion of private sensations.  Introspectionists rely upon 
experiments with physical sense organs, like the eyes, to see how their 
composition can explain our experience of the external world.  Such experiments 
suggest that the eye is like a camera, producing images based upon its  
stimulation by external matters.  These images are thus not anything external to 
one, but are rather simply one’s own private experience.  But the experimenter 
must assume that what she is observing in her experiment about the sense 
organs is more than just her private sensations, but rather are actual sense 
organs in the external world with their stimulation by external matters.  The  
psychologist thus inconsistently assumes our access to objective, external reality 
in order to establish our experience of nothing but purely private sensations.  Her 
conclusions undermine the basis for those conclusions.  As Sartre states, 
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“(s)ensation supposes that man is already in the world since he is provided with 
sense organs, and it appears to him as the pure cessation of his relations with 
the world.” 257   Mirvish claims that Sartre was rejecting the position that 
consciousness contains such sensations when Sartre described consciousness 
as having no contents. 
 This claim is significant since it allows for something else besides 
sensations as a content of consciousness.  This something else for Mirvish are 
appearances that necessarily involve reference to an external world and external 
objects in that world.  Mirvish notes how the Gestalt school of psychology offers 
an account of experience that involves such a reference to external reality, and 
he further notes how that school mirrors Sartre’s objections to the notion of 
private, atomic sensations.  Both Sartre and Gestalt psychology do not think that 
one’s actual experience of objects can be constructed out of the combination of 
supposedly more basic sensations, and they both claim that one experiences 
objects as synthetic totalities with an essential reference to the external world.258  
Mirvish offers the following quotes as evidence of Sartre’s agreement with the 
Gestalt school on the nature of experience: 
…we do not encounter anywhere anything which is given as purely 
felt, as experienced for me without objectivation.  Here as always I 
am conscious of the world, and on the ground of the world I am 
conscious of certain transcendent objects.259 
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…in no case do we get out of an existing world….we might show 
that what is called…the specificity of the senses is referred back to 
pure determinations of objects as such.260 
 
…an object must always appear to me all at once…, but…this 
appearance always takes place in a particular perspective which 
expresses its relations to the ground of the world….261 
 
These passages, along with Sartre’s earlier quoted claim about appearances of 
objects to the other (“This green turns toward the Other a face which escapes 
me.”) suggest for Mirvish appearances of objects to consciousness, appearances 
which are distinct from although necessarily indicative of transcendent objects in 
an external world.  Mirvish thus would not agree with an account of 
consciousness as nothing but its object. 
 One problem for Mirvish’s account of Sartre is that it posits an 
intermediary between consciousness and its objects, a positing which Sartre 
clearly rejects.  As already noted in Chapter Three, Sartre treats the presence of 
consciousness to what it is consciousness of as an internal negation of 
consciousness’s object, a relationship between consciousness and what it is of  
that involves consciousness in some sense being that which it is of.  This means 
that consciousness, although not identical with its object, is not some separate 
being other than its object.  Thus Sartre’s claim: 
…the term of origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the thing 
which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an 
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing                      
only by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very 
content.262 
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Since all that exists with consciousness of an object is that object and 
nothingness, it would not seem that an appearance of an object, being distinct 
from an object and being a something contained by consciousness, is included in 
Sartre’s ontology.  Also, aside from any notion of consciousness in some sense 
being its object, Sartre’s claim that consciousness has no content would not 
seemingly allow for Mirvish’s appearances. 
 But what about Sartre’s point about grass appearing to another 
consciousness in a way that it does not appear to one’s own consciousness?  
Sartre may deny in certain passages that anything other than an object exists in 
consciousness of that object and renounce any content for consciousness, but 
Mirvish’s point seems to be that this does not cohere with Sartre’s treatment of 
the grass’s appearance to the other.  Hence Mirvish’s attempt to reconcile these 
seemingly incompatible aspects of Sartre by suggesting that Sartre was merely 
rejecting sensations as contents of consciousness, not all possible contents of 
consciousness.  As just noted, though, Sartre seems to clearly reject anything as 
a content of consciousness. How can one reconcile that with his talk of 
appearances of objects to another consciousness? 
 The first step in such a reconciliation is realizing that objects of 
consciousness for Sartre are really the “synthetic unity” of their appearances.263  
By this he means that “(t)he phenomenal being…is nothing but the well-
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connected series of its manifestations,”264 and each appearance of an object 
“refers to the total series of appearances.”265  These appearances, though, are 
not contents of the mind, but are rather transcendent of consciousness.  As 
already noted, Sartre claims that all consciousness is consciousness of 
something, and whatever it is conscious of is transcendent of consciousness.266  
So, in claiming that grass, for example, appears differently to another than it does 
to me, such difference could just be due to one of the appearances that 
constitutes the object that is grass appearing to the other while another such 
appearance appears to me.  Thus the grass can appear larger, for instance, to 
one examining it closely than it does to one looking at it from a distance.  Such 
different appearances, though, do not necessitate any private appearances, 
since all appearances are transcendent of consciousness, nor is anything other 
than an object required to explain such difference, since the object that is the 
grass is simply the synthetic totality of its appearances.  There is thus nothing 
needed other than the object of consciousness, nor is there any need for any 
contents of consciousness. 
But this appeal to transcendent objects’ identity with their appearances 
does not solve the problem of one not having access to what appears to the 
other.  Sartre’s quote about the appearance of the grass to the other states that  
one cannot apprehend the grass as it appears to another.  How can this be if 
what appears to consciousness are transcendent appearances that constitute 
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objects?  If appearances are transcendent of consciousness, it would seem that 
any consciousness could be aware of what appears to any other consciousness.  
Perhaps an explanation of this is possible by means of this chapter’s appeal to 
facticity, and thus the body, as constitutive of what an object is.  As noted earlier, 
Sartre treats an object for consciousness as indicating or reflecting the facticity of 
consciousness, and one can see such reflected facticity as an aspect of 
consciousness’s object.  Perhaps, then, an object appears differently to another 
than it does to me because that object indicates the other’s facticity, or body, to 
the other, and that indication is constitutive of what that object is.  An object for 
my consciousness is constituted by its indication of my facticity instead.  By 
indicating different facticities, or bodies, to different consciousnesses, objects can 
appear differently to different consciousnesses without having to resort to 
appearances of objects as entities that somehow occupy consciousness.  
Contrary to Mirvish, then, one can thus maintain that consciousness is not a 
container of appearances of its object. 
This appeal to an object’s indication of the body as somehow constitutive 
of that object might, however, pose a problem.  If an object appears differently to 
different consciousnesses because it indicates different bodies, and if such 
indications are constitutive of that object, then it seems that two consciousnesses 
would never encounter the same object.  If an object is what it is due to its 
indication of a particular facticity, then its indication of two different facticities 
would make it two different things.  Perhaps one could avoid this difficulty by 
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claiming an essential element common to the object in all of its indications of 
different bodies, thus making indications of the body a necessary but not entirely 
determinative condition of an object.  Indeed, Sartre’s previously mentioned 
example of a glass appearing in some position relative to his body (right, left, in 
front of, behind) seems to assume such an essential core, since he speaks of the 
same glass being in some different position relative to another’s body.  Thus the 
necessity of an object’s different locations in relation to different bodies does not 
seem to preclude there being the same object for different consciousnesses.  
One can thus make sense of consciousness being nothing more than its object 
even though one can not be aware of certain appearances to the other.  Aside 
from reconciling such inaccessible appearances with Sartre’s equation of 
consciousness with its object, though, (an equation which I will ultimately reject in 
Chapter Five), the constitution of objects by their indication of the body can 
reconcile such private appearance with consciousness having no contents.   
 With this difficulty addressed, let us return to consciousness both being 
and not being its past.  Having already shown how consciousness’s facticity is its 
body, the next step in understanding this interpretation of consciousness both 
being and not being its past is explaining how the body is the past.  As already 
noted, the body is what consciousness surpasses in its awareness of objects.  
So, objects not only indicate the body as a means of location, but they also 
indicated the body as what was in some sense there before their appearance.  
Since the indication of the body makes an object what it is, the surpassed body is 
always there as what was before whatever one is aware of.  It would thus seem 
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that the body would always be indicated as what is past, thus possibly explaining 
Sartre’s equation of the body with the past. 
 So, to return to the distinction drawn at the beginning of this chapter, there 
are at least two ways of understanding how consciousness can both be and not 
be its past for Sartre.  The first way appeals to the nature of temporality and the 
self-separation that it requires, while the second way appeals to the body as 
surpassed toward consciousness’s objects.  It is interesting to note that the first 
way does not treat the past as what is transcended toward consciousness’s 
objects, while the second way does.  This might make the first way seemingly 
unsuitable for the correlational treatment of consciousness, since that treatment 
regards consciousness, and thus the past that it in some sense is, as related to 
appearances by its self-transcendence toward appearances.  I will address this 
matter in Chapter Five.  In any case, consciousness not being its past could once 
again be treated as making it nothing, since it is not the very thing (its past) that it 
is, the very thing that would make it something.  Although anything would be 
nothing by not being what it is, Sartre claims that only consciousness, and not in-
itself objects, does not require some sort of external support in order to not be 
the past that it is. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONSCIOUSNESS AS A STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 The fact that consciousness for Sartre both is and is not its objects as well 
as its past and its body indicated by its objects may be taken to lead to the 
conclusion that consciousness is a state of affairs (or an event or occurrence) 
involving its objects and all that they indicate, but having no other constituents 
besides.  To begin with, at least, as noted in Richard Aquila’s article “Two 
Problems of Being and Nonbeing in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,”267 an event 
or state of affairs in some way both is and is not the things constituting it.  An 
example illustrates this point about states of affairs.  The state of affairs 
consisting of my presence in a room involves certain particulars, namely, myself 
and my room, as well as, perhaps, the relationship of being-present-in.  These 
particulars and that relationship, though, are not identical with the state of affairs 
that is my presence in the room, even if one takes the particulars and the 
relationship all together.  The reason for this is that the particulars and the 
relationship have to be in a certain order, namely of myself being present in the 
room rather than the room being present in me.  This ordering of the particulars 
and the relationship is what the state of affairs is, so that the state of affairs is not 
the same thing as the things it involves.  It also, though, is not anything else 
besides those things it involves, since the order of the particulars and the 
relationship is just those things existing in a particular way.  A state of affairs thus 
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 is and is not its constituents since it is nothing more than yet still is not the same 
thing as its constituents, and this might then at least be taken as a start toward 
the previous chapters’ claims that consciousness is in some sense the objects 
and the past that it is not. 
 One might object that a state of affairs is dependent upon its constituents 
but is still something additional to its constituents.  A lightning bolt, for instance, 
would be nothing without a certain set of conditions existing in the sky, such as 
the charge of the particles in the air, since the lightning bolt would not occur 
without such conditions.  But that certainly does not show that a lightning bolt is 
nothing other than those conditions.  Indeed, a lightning bolt is a sudden addition 
to any such conditions.  Similarly, one might say that a state of affairs such as my 
presence in a room would not exist without its constituents, but the state of affairs 
could still be an additional, albeit dependent, thing with respect to its 
constituents.  Indeed, one could treat the constituents as the cause of the state of 
affairs, much like the charge in the air is the cause of the lightning bolt.  Such 
treatment would certainly challenge any claim that a state of affairs is nothing 
else besides its constituents, especially if one accepts Hume’s claim that “the 
ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct.”268   
 Although it is true that a state of affairs being nothing without its 
constituents does not prove that it is nothing in addition to them, I do not think 
that a state of affairs is merely a dependent yet distinct thing with regard to its 
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constituents.  Returning to the example of the state of affairs of my presence in a 
room, that state of affairs is not simply an ordering of its constituents that is 
brought into existence by those constituents, as an effect is brought about by its 
cause, but rather that state of affairs is those constituents as ordered in a 
particular way.  Unlike an effect and its cause, there is no way to describe the 
state of affairs that is my presence in a room without referring to the constituents 
of that state of affairs.  A state of affairs is just a way that its constituents exist, if 
one will, and as such there is no additional entity in question beyond those 
constituents.  Consequently, a state of affairs is not something in addition to its 
constituents, which, again, seems to make it similar to consciousness not being 
something in addition to its objects and past. 
 One problem with this understanding of consciousness as a state of affairs 
is how consciousness differs from other states of affairs that are not instances of 
consciousness.  Surely one can think of any number of states of affairs that 
would not seem to be such instances, such as the state of affairs of a tree being 
in a meadow, for example.  Of course, an awareness or experience of such a 
state of affairs would surely be an instance of consciousness, but such a state of 
affairs without any awareness of it would not seem to be.  Like consciousness, 
such states of affairs do not seem to be the same thing as their constituents, 
since they are not simply their constituents taken all together without regard for 
any particular ordering of those constituents, but they do not seem to be anything 
more than their constituents, since they are just their constituents ordered in a 
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particular way.  Consciousness must have something else to it, then, in order to 
distinguish it from any and all other states of affairs. 
 One possible way of distinguishing consciousness from other states of 
affairs is the suggestion that consciousness is not just a state of affairs but is also 
a condition of possibility for all other states of affairs.  Such a suggestion would 
simply extend what Sartre claims about the role of consciousness in what he 
calls “negatites,” or negative states of affairs, so that consciousness played such 
a role with all states of affairs.  According to Sartre, the reason that 
consciousness is a condition of possibility for negatites is that such states of 
affars, such as someone’s absence from a certain place or the distance between 
two points,269 are “little pools of non-being”270 that require the existence of 
nothingness at the heart of being.  Being-in-itself, though, “does not contain 
Nothingness as one of its structures,”271 so that there must be something besides 
being-in-itself that “supports it (nothingness) in its being (parenthesis mine).”272  
The reason for this is that, as already noted, Sartre claims that the in-itself simply 
is and thus is not such that it is not something.273  In order to account for the 
nothingness in negative states of affairs, then, Sartre has to appeal to something 
as the support and source of this non-being.  That something is consciousness. 
 The reason that nothingness requires a source according to Sartre is that 
nothingness can not exist apart from being, but is rather dependent on being.   
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According to Sartre, “nothingness is logically subsequent to (being) since it 
opposes being in order to deny it (parenthesis mine).”274  In order for there to be 
nothingness, there must be nothing of something.  As Sartre notes, our everyday 
sense of nothing always assumes a prior specification of being.275  For instance, 
when one says that there is nothing in the refrigerator, one is meaning that there 
is not anything desirable to eat there.  That is, there is not a specific being or 
beings there.  The being that the nothingness “in” negative states of affairs 
depends on, however, cannot be the beings-in-themselves that are the 
constituents or ingredients of such states of affairs.  For as just noted, what is in-
itself simply is and is not such that it is not, so that the in-itself “does not contain 
Nothingness as one of its structures.”276  So, whatever being conditions 
nothingness by not being can not be the in-itself.  In order for there to be 
nothingness, then, “in” such states of affairs, it follows that “…there must exist a 
Being… by which nothingness comes to things.”277  Nothingness must somehow 
be a product of a very different sort of being from the in-itself, one which can in 
its own right, by contrast, not be.  In some sense, that being must obviously be, 
since it is the being that this nothingness depends upon,278 but it must also  
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somehow involve not being in its very being such that “it nihilates Nothingness in 
its being in connection with its own being.279  For otherwise, just like the in-itself, 
it could not be the source of the not being, or nothingness, “in” the negative 
states of affairs that are encountered in the world.  There must thus, Sartre 
concludes, be a being which can both be and not be.  Such a being “must be its 
own Nothingness,”280 which seems to mean that it must be what it is not and thus 
not be itself. 
Sartre of course claims that the for-itself is the being which is not, and, 
thus, not itself.  In this respect, he particularly emphasizes the human behavior of 
questioning.  According to Sartre, questioning requires one to dissociate oneself 
from being, to be outside the “causal series which constitutes being and which 
can produce only being.”281  Whenever one questions, one realizes the possibility 
of a negative reply.  This possibility of negative reply, this possibility of the denial 
of something, shows the existence of nothingness.  The reason that the 
questioner must have nothingness as part of her being, he argues, is that one 
could not be in suspense, as it were, neither affirming nor denying the existence 
of something, if one were simply part of the deterministic process of being-in-
itself.  The indeterminateness of the being questioned, its presentation as neither 
being nor not being at the time of the question, requires the indeterminateness of 
the questioner as neither affirming nor denying it.  The  
                                      
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid, pp. 57-58. 
281 Ibid, p.58. 
 149
questioner is thus the combination of being and nothingness that is 
required for the existence of nothingness in the negative states of affairs that are 
encountered in the world, since she must be in order to perform the act of 
questioning with regard to the world, but she must also not be in order to avoid 
being caused to either affirm or deny what is questioned.  The for-itself is thus 
that which both is and is not what it is;  it is the being that is also a nothingness 
as well as a source of nothingness (namely with respect to those negative states 
of affairs that it encounters in the world). 
Several problems exist with this reasoning by Sartre.  For one thing, it 
seems that simply abstaining from either affirming or denying whatever one is 
questioning could just as easily be caused by the deterministic process of being-
in-itself as could affirmation or negation.  Using one of Sartre’s examples, if one 
examines one’s carburetor with the question of what is wrong with it, one could 
eventually discover that the answer is nothing,282 so one neither affirms nor 
denies a problem with the part at the time of the question.  It seems, though, that 
the act of withholding judgment could be caused as easily as could the act of 
judging that something is wrong with it.  Even though, as noted in Chapter One 
and Chapter Four, Sartre certainly affirms the freedom of consciousness and 
wishes to avoid any deterministic cause for consciousness, there seems no 
reason to conclude that the for-itself is exempt from the determinism of being-in-
itself simply because of the suspension of judgment involved with questioning.  
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Another problem has to do with the for-itself’s provision of the nothingness 
found with negative states of affairs.  Sartre concludes from the presence of 
nothingness in the for-itself (established by, among other things, its ability to 
question) and absence of nothingness from the in-itself that the nothingness 
found in negative states of affairs must come from the for-itself.  But how does 
this nothingness get to states of affairs? One might answer this question by 
reference to a point made in Chapter One’s discussion of temporality.  According 
to that discussion, Sartre claims that consciousness supplies the nothingness for 
the temporality of objects by means of their reflection of the temporal nature of 
consciousness.  Could one then not also say that consciousness supplies the 
nothingness for encountered negative states of affairs by their reflection of the 
nothingness of consciousness as well?  This notion of “reflection” might seem 
more understandable if one recalls the suggestion from Chapter One that Sartre 
is making purely phenomenological claims about things as they are experienced 
by consciousness, rather than claims about things existing independently of 
consciousness.  This might suggest that experienced negatites are in some 
sense dependent upon consciousness, and thus their ability to reflect the 
nothingness of consciousness might make more sense. 
However well the notion of reflection works as an explanation of how 
consciousness provides nothingness for them,  this appeal to Sartre’s 
phenomenological focus as an explanation of consciousness’s provision of 
nothingness for negative state of affairs seems problematic.  In fact, the notion of 
negative states of affairs as dependent on consciousness seems incompatible 
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with Sartre’s phenomenological description of consciousness as consciousness 
of something transcendent of it and “not supported by any existent different from 
itself;  it has its own being.”283  Even if one can show how this independence of 
experienced negatites can fit with their being somehow dependent on 
consciousness, simply noting Sartre’s phenomenological orientation does not 
support such dependence on consciousness.  It seems conceivable that one 
could focus on how things appear to consciousness without having to conclude 
that consciousness is the reason for how they appear, since consciousness 
could encounter things that it has no role in constituting.  In fact, Sartre seems to 
embrace this view of consciousness when saying that “for consciousness there is 
no being outside of that precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of 
something….”284  So, Sartre’s phenomenological focus seemingly only shows 
how consciousness reveals things rather than how it constitutes things.  It would 
not thus seem that such a focus would necessarily explain consciousness’s 
provision of nothingness for negative states of affairs.  Of course, one could just 
take Sartre’s focus on how things appear to consciousness as simply meaning 
that consciousness for him is somehow responsible for what it experiences, but 
such treatment would be an unsupported position.  It would also seem 
incompatible with the fact that Sartre argues for consciousness’s provision of 
nothingness for negative states of affairs based on the impossibility of the in-itself 
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to make such a provision and the ability of conscious beings to perform the act of 
questioning. 
Returning to that argument, there is a further problem with it, beyond how 
there is a ‘transferring’ of nothingness to negative states of affairs.  As previously 
noted, nothingness for Sartre is always the denial and non-existence of 
something (as seen in the earlier example of there being nothing in the 
refrigerator meaning there is not something, namely anything desirable to eat, in 
the refrigerator).  Consequently, he claims that nothingness requires support 
from being.  It would thus seem that the being that supports and is a condition of 
possibility for nothingness is whatever nothingness is the non-existence of.  
Since the for-itself is the supposed support of nothingness, nothingness would 
then be the non-existence of the for-itself.  But this does not explain the non-
existence of in-itself objects involved in negative states of affairs.  (It should be 
noted that my earlier example of there being nothing in the refrigerator is a 
negative state of affair that involves the denial of in-itself objects.)  What about 
the non-existence of a chair, for instance, in the negative state of affairs that is 
the chair not being the table?  Must not the chair be the support of nothingness 
since it is not being something?  Although Sartre claims that negative states of 
affairs originate from human acitivity and “indicate an aspect of being as it 
appears to the human being who is engaged in the world,”285 in-itself objects are 
often not something else in such states of affairs and thus seemingly support  
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nothingness.  This would exclude such objects from being-in-itself, though, 
since they would no longer simply be but would then also be the nothingness that 
they support.  Sartre, though, certainly does not think that non-conscious objects 
are nothing;  only conscious beings are nothing.  But there seems no reason 
here why non-conscious objects would not be nothing, since nothingness is the 
non-existence of something, and what is not something, in this case the objects 
that are not other objects, is the support of nothingness.  The fact that 
nothingness is always the non-existence of something, rather than simply being 
non-existence, is why Sartre claims that nothingness depends on being.  It would 
thus seem that non-conscious objects, not just consciousness, would be the 
support of nothingness and thus, according to Sartre’s previously-mentioned 
reasoning, would be nothingness. 
One might suggest that Sartre simply meant that consciousness is its 
object, so that non-conscious objects would be the support of nothingness since 
they are nothingness-supporting consciousness.  Identifying such “denied” 
objects with consciousness would possibly make Sartre’s argument for the 
latter’s provision of nothingness applicable to the former, as well.  As I argued in 
Chapter Three, Sartre does, after all, maintain that in some sense consciousness 
is its object.  So, if consciousness of a chair, for instance, is the same thing as a 
chair, then consciousness being the support of nothingness means that the chair, 
as consciousness, is such a support.  As mentioned earlier, consciousness for 
Sartre is nothingness since it supports nothingness, and nothingness is the 
denial of something.  So, perhaps one could say that this denial of something 
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that constitutes the nothingness of consciousness just is the non-existence of the 
chair by other objects not being the chair. 
A possible problem with this suggestion is that no matter how closely one 
wants to tie consciousness to its object(s), one can not identify consciousness 
with its object(s).  The reason for this is the already-mentioned separation 
involved in the presence of consciousness to whatever it is consciousness of.  
Presence to an object is a relationship with that object, so there must be a 
distinction between what is present to an object and the object itself.  Thus, 
consciousness of a chair can never be a chair, meaning that one can not account 
for a chair or any other object being the support of nothingness by appealing to 
its identity with consciousness.  One might respond, though, that 
consciousness’s lack of identity with an object does not preclude it being its 
object, since, as already noted, consciousness is what it is not.  Consequently, 
one might make sense of how something that is not consciousness (non-
conscious objects which also are in some sense consciousness) could support 
and thus be nothingness. 
It would seem, though, that despite the non-existence of non-conscious 
objects due to them not being other objects, such objects can not be the support 
of nothingness.  The reason for this is that, unlike consciousness, such objects 
can not be the nothingness that they support.  They are not their own 
nothingness because they are not what they are not.  A chair, for instance, is not 
the table that it is not.  By not being their own nothingness, they would have to 
absurdly produce nothingness without actually being nothingness, an 
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impossibility for Sartre since “(i)t would be inconceivable that a Being which is full 
positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness….”286  
Consciousness, on the other hand, is its own nothingness since, as noted in 
Chapter Two, it is not itself by virtue of being present to and thus separate from 
itself.  It would thus seem that however much one ties consciousness to its 
objects, there still remains a difference between the two.  Unlike non-conscious 
objects, then, consciousness is thus suited to be the condition of possibility for 
nothingness.   
One problem for all of this is that even if non-conscious objects are not 
suited as the origin of nothingness, it would seem that any state of affairs, not  
just those that are instances of consciousness, would be so suited.  As 
previously suggested, consciousness not being itself and thus being its own 
nothingness could be due to it being a state of affairs that both is nothing more 
than its constituents while still not being the same thing as its constituents.  This 
would seem to be the case for other states of affairs besides consciousness, 
though, so they could seemingly originate nothingness, as well.  If that is so, then 
consciousness would not seem different from other states of affairs. 
In any case, however problematic Sartre’s reasoning is, it should be noted 
that it is a departure from a purely phenomenological approach to 
consciousness.  As stated in Chapter One, experience can not tell one that 
consciousness, or anything else, must be a certain way in order for there to be  
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something else, such as nothingness.  But, according to Sartre, the 
nothingness involved in negative states of affairs requires the existence of that 
which is not itself, which is consciousness. 
Furthermore, while the reasoning so far has only attempted to show 
consciousness as a condition of possibility for negative states of affairs, Sartre’s 
reasons for treating consciousness as necessary for negatites might actually 
entail its necessity for any state of affairs.  Aquila notes that Sartre “uses the 
notion of a ‘negative’ state of affairs so broadly as to include virtually all states of 
affairs.”287  For instance, Sartre claims that one’s apprehension of a line segment 
from A to B involves an apprehension of nothingness if one distinguishes 
between points A and B and views them in relation to one another.288  The 
nothingness involved here is the fact that A is not B and vice versa, and the 
apprehension of that fact differs from simply apprehending the line segment that 
runs between those two points.  The former apprehension seems to be of the 
state of affairs that is A and B being distant from each other, while the latter 
apprehension seems to be of an object, namely the line segment.  As Aquila 
states, the former is “seeing that A and B are distant from one another…,”289 and 
such seeing involves presence to nothingness.  Thus even the state of affairs of 
A and B being distant from each other seems an example of “those little pools of 
non-being”290 that are negative states of affairs, and this suggests that just about 
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any state of affairs could be treated by Sartre as a negative one.  After all, just 
about any state of affairs involves constituents that are related to and thus 
distinct from each other, and such distinction involves the non-being found in 
negatites.  Consequently, a treatment of consciousness as necessary for 
negative states of affairs seems equivalent to simply treating it as necessary for 
any state of affairs, at least for Sartre.  
 Although this attempt to distinguish consciousness from other states of 
affairs that are not consciousness seemingly goes beyond the purely 
phenomenological level, the treatment of consciousness as a state of affairs 
might nevertheless in some ways seem  a reduction of consciousness to the  
phenomenological level of appearances.  The reason for this is that Sartre’s 
description of consciousness, noted in Chapter Three, as the internal negation of 
an in-itself object or objects would seemingly suggest that consciousness is a 
state of affairs involving such objects and nothing more.  According to such a 
suggestion, my consciousness of a table, for instance, would just be the fact that 
the table appears and indicates various things like my body, my past, and other 
phenomena that either already have or will appear.  Consciousness would then 
be only that which appears.  One might object that if consciousness is the state 
of affairs that involves appearing things, then it is something beyond that which 
appears, but one must remember the earlier response to the objection that a 
state of affairs might be a dependent yet still additional entity to its constituents.  
As noted then, a state of affairs just is its constituents ordered in a certain way, 
so that a treatment of consciousness as a state of affairs involving only its 
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objects is not a treatment of it as anything additional to the appearing things 
which constitute it. 
 All of this thus sounds like an embracing of Sartre’s previously-mentioned 
option in Chapter One of just considering the phenomena and their combination 
of the for-itself and the in-itself, as opposed to accepting “the ancient duality 
‘consciousness-being.’”291  As noted in Chapter One, Sartre could possibly base 
this combination of the two types of being on his metaphysical assertion that the 
for-itself just is the in-itself attempting to found or cause itself, and possibly  
based on this he thinks it is more profitable to reject the duality of the 
experiencing and the experienced.  As also noted in Chapter One, though, such 
an attempt by the in-itself at self-foundation, or at anything else, would seem to 
be an impossibility.  On the other hand, the previous chapters seem to offer other 
reasons for an exclusive regard for phenomena.  While consciousness as self-
conscious must be separated from itself, and so in some sense not be whatever 
it is, presence to something also requires that what is present in some sense be 
whatever it is present to.  So consciousness must in some sense be the 
indicating objects that it is present to.  The fact that consciousness is both self-
aware and present to something thus requires that it both not be and be 
something, specifically its indicating objects.  This seemingly leads to 
consciousness being the state of affairs of objects appearing and indicating 
various things that either have appeared (the past) or will appear, since such a  
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state of affairs both is and is not the indicating appearances that constitute it.  
Such a state of affairs thus is and is not consciousness’s objects, which makes it 
consciousness.   
Sartre’s seeming focus on the phenomenological and the treatment of 
consciousness as a state of affairs involving the appearance of indicating 
phenomena might thus seem like a rejection of any type of experiencing being 
beyond the level of appearances.  After all, if one reduces consciousness to the 
phenomenological level of simply being the appearance of indicating objects, 
what place is there for something beyond such appearances that is experiencing 
those appearances?  In fact, in many ways, Sartre’s treatment of consciousness 
as nothing more than its objects might appear to be the equivalent of Hume’s 
denial of any enduring, separate self or mind that perceives all of the contents of 
such a mind.  According to Hume, “…(t)he mind is a kind of theatre, where 
several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide 
away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.”292  Rather than 
treating the mind as an additional entity to all of its perceptions, Hume says that 
only perceptions exist.  This certainly sounds similar to Sartre’s apparent denial 
that consciousness is an additional entity to its appearing objects.   
One possible difference between Sartre and Hume points out a potential 
problem for a purely phenomenological reading of Sartre.  That difference is 
Sartre’s claims, noted in the last chapter, that appearing phenomena always  
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indicate the body and the past, both of which constitute the facticity that 
consciousness is.  One could perhaps see this claim by Sartre as nothing more 
than an addition to Hume’s basic denial of the mind as something more than 
what appears, an addition Sartre makes by simply noting a particular aspect of 
appearances.  Wider, though, treats Sartre’s difference from Hume as more than 
that in the following quote from “A Nothing About Which Something Can Be Said:  
Sartre and Wittgenstein on the Self:” 
Although Sartre follows Hume in denying that there is a mental 
subject of experience, a Cartesian ego, he does argue that the for-
itself while nothing still exists.  It exists as something that does not 
appear in the world.  It is not therefore a nonworldly substance.  But 
it is something that cannot be apprehended in the world since it is 
the necessary condition for the world’s existence, the center of the 
world and its limit.  This view of consciousness goes beyond a 
simple Humean denial of a Cartesian self.293 
 
I would suggest, based upon what has already been said in the previous chapter, 
that this something that cannot be apprehended in the world is the body-for-itself 
(specifically, as non-appearing point of view rather than as appearing point of 
departure) and the past that consciousness is.  This indication by objects of 
consciousness’s facticity poses a problem for any treatment of consciousness as 
nothing more than its appearing objects, that problem being how consciousness 
can just be its objects when it is also its body and its past.  Despite Sartre’s 
previously-cited claim in Chapter Three that consciousness of an object is an 
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internal negation of an object that involves nothing more than that object, his 
treatment of the indicated body and past seems in conflict with that.   
   One might further object that consciousness being its facticity not only 
shows that consciousness is more than its object, but it also seems incompatible 
with consciousness being any, or at least most, of its objects at all.  Even if the 
appearing object that is the body-for-others is the same thing as the non-
appearing body-for-itself as point of view,  every other object is certainly not the 
same thing as the non-appearing body-for-itself.  After all, the body-for-others is 
just one object amongst many objects for consciousness.  A table that is an 
object of consciousness, for instance, hardly seems the same thing as the 
indicated yet non-appearing body-for-itself.  It might thus seem that 
consciousness could at most be only one appearing object, the body-for-others, 
and not any other object. 
 One might attempt to reconcile consciousness being nothing more than its 
objects with it also being its facticity by treating consciousness as a state of 
affairs distinct from the appearance of indicating objects, a state of affairs 
involving its facticity.  Perhaps, in particular, one could interpret Sartre as treating 
consciousness as the state of affairs that is the self-transcendence of 
consciousness’s facticity, so that consciousness would not then be anything 
additional to its facticity even though it would also not be, as a state of affairs, 
simply identical to the facticity that constitutes it.  One could thus preserve the 
notion that consciousness is nothingness due to its status as a state of affairs but 
still maintain the position that consciousness is in some sense its facticity.  Such 
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an understanding of consciousness would seemingly be an example of the 
previously-discussed correlational treatment of consciousness, since it equates 
consciousness with something beyond appearances (the body-for-itself and the 
past that comprise facticity), something that is somehow related to appearances, 
the latter in turn “correlated” with the specific ways in which facticity is 
transcended on any occasion. 
 There are several potential problems with this interpretation of Sartre.  
First, the fact that consciousness as a state of affairs that is the transcendence of 
facticity is arguably nothing more than its facticity does not seem to help us 
explain how consciousness is also nothing more than its object, which of course 
Sartre also seems to hold.  The fact that consciousness for Sartre is an internal 
negation of its object means that it is nothing more than its object, which 
seemingly means that consciousness is in some sense its object.  But how can 
consciousness be its object if it is instead the state of affairs that is the 
transcendence of facticity?  As such a state of affairs, consciousness would 
arguably be (and also not be) the facticity that constitutes (i.e., provides the sole 
constituents of) that state of affairs.  But how could it then be its object?  Or, for 
that matter, a state of affairs “constituted” (in the sense in question) by its object? 
 Another problem with the treatment of consciousness as the state of 
affairs that is the transcendence of its facticity is Sartre’s previously-cited claim 
that “it appears as the first necessity for…consciousness to be seen by itself.”294   
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This is a problem since, as previously noted, the body-for-itself does not appear 
but is rather indicated by what does appear.  Since the body along with the past 
are the facticity that consciousness is, it might seem that consciousness, as a 
state of affairs constituted by its facticity, could not always appear and thus be 
seen by itself.  Although the appearing object that is the body-for-others is for 
Sartre the same thing as the body-for-itself, the body-for-others is certainly not a 
constantly appearing object.  It is, instead, an occasional object of awareness. 
 Perhaps, though, one could say that consciousness being seen by itself 
does not require the constant appearance of consciousness, just the constant 
indication of consciousness as its facticity.  As noted in the previous chapter, 
Sartre claims such indication when noting how every object for consciousness is 
somehow constituted by its reference to the body-for-itself.  Indeed, one might 
argue that the notion of a constantly appearing consciousness is untenable due 
to the sort of reasons for Hume’s rejection of any idea of an enduring self.  Those 
reasons are found in the following passage:  
But there is no impression constant and invariable.  Pain and 
pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each 
other, and never all exist at the same time.  It cannot, therefore, be 
from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of  
self is deriv’d;  and consequently there is no such idea.295 
 
Perhaps, then, Sartre’s fundamental claim that one is never merely conscious of 
something, but rather one is always consciousness of being consciousness of 
something,296  should be taken as meaning that consciousness of something is 
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always consciousness of something that indicates consciousness’s facticity 
(specifically, the body-for-itself as point of view and one’s past).  This 
interpretation of Sartre’s claim has the additional benefit of offering a possible 
explanation of the difference between self-awareness and object-awareness, 
with self-awareness being the mere “indication” of and object-awareness being 
the actual appearance of what one is aware of.  In any case, regardless of that 
explanation’s plausibility, it would seem that one could indeed treat the constant 
indication of the body-for-itself and of one’s past as the necessary self-
awareness of consciousness on which Sartre insists.  And of course the equation 
of consciousness with a state of affairs constituted by its facticity would seem 
compatible with such insistence. 
 Still, any ability of consciousness as non-appearing (but always indicated)  
facticity to witness itself does not eliminate the previously-mentioned problem of 
consciousness being both its facticity as well as the internal negation of, and thus 
nothing more than, its object.  Perhaps, though, one can explain Sartre’s claims 
that consciousness is (and is not) its objects simply by a desire on his part to 
avoid problems he saw with a correlational treatment of consciousness, problems 
that possibly motivated him to embrace a purely phenomenological 
understanding of consciousness.  As noted in Chapter One, Sartre rejects 
Husserl’s notion that what one experiences and perceives, the noema, is simply 
a correlate of conscious activity, or the noesis.  According to Sartre, “Husserl 
defines consciousness as a transcendence…But from the moment he makes of 
the noema an unreal, a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, 
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he is totally unfaithful to his principle.”297  As one commentator notes, “…for 
Sartre…Husserl’s suspending, or bracketing, of existence does indeed rob the 
world of its richness.”298  So, Sartre sees Husserl as unfaithful to his principle 
because Sartre treats consciousness’s transcendence to what it is of as implying 
the independent existence of what it is of. 
 Sartre’s treatment of the phenomena that appear to consciousness 
certainly seems to make them more than Husserl’s allegedly unreal noema.  For 
Sartre, the phenomena have a certain independence from consciousness.  
Sartre shows this in the following passage from his Introduction: 
…the being of the phenomenon, although coextensive with the 
phenomenon, can not be subject to the phenomenal condition-
which is to exist only in so far as it reveals itself- and… 
consequently it surpasses the knowledge which we have of it and 
provides the basis for such knowledge.299 
 
The phenomena are thus not dependent upon consciousness the way a mere 
correlate of consciousness would be.  Still, as noted in Chapter One, Sartre 
continues to maintain that “(r)elative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to appear’ 
supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”300  Can one simply take this 
to mean that the relativity of the phenomena is just phenomena’s need for 
consciousness in order to be appearances, not phenomena’s need for 
consciousness in order to simply be?   Sartre seems to say as much when he 
notes that “the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be;  the ‘passion’ of 
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the for-itself only causes there to be in-itself.  The phenomenon of in-itself is an 
abstraction without consciousness but its being is not an abstraction.”301  Since 
being-in-itself is for Sartre the being of the phenomena,302 this passage shows 
that the phenomena do not need consciousness in  order to be.  This may seem 
odd since it would seem just as impossible for the phenomena to not appear as it 
is for a bachelor to be married, so that the phenomena would not seem capable 
of existing without appearing, thus needing to appear to consciousness in order 
to be.  Regardless of Sartre’s consistency regarding this matter, though, he 
seemingly differs from Husserl on the dependency of what appears upon what it 
appears to.   
 With this emphasis upon the phenomena’s independence in mind, 
perhaps one can understand why Sartre seemingly embraces the purely 
phenomenological position mentioned in Chapter One and throughout the 
subsequent chapters.  If the phenomena present themselves as robustly 
independent, then they are not like Descartes’ experienced ideas, for instance, 
which are in the mind and are nothing but certain modes of or manners of 
existing for the mind.303  With Sartre’s phenomena having no seeming need of 
anything else, then it might seem natural for him to describe consciousness of 
objects (which are presented by means of a series of appearing phenomena304)  
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as a state of affairs that is an internal negation of in-itself objects, consisting of 
such objects and seemingly nothing more than them.  As already quoted in 
Chapter Three, Sartre’s description of consciousness as an internal negation of 
an in-itself object involves a seemingly exclusive focus upon the appearing in-
itself beings: 
In short the term-of-origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the 
thing which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an 
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing only 
by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very content.305 
 
Given all of this, one could certainly be tempted to treat consciousness as 
nothing but the fact that phenomena appear and indicate other phenomena in 
various ways. 
 As already noted, though, Sartre also treats consciousness as its facticity. 
So a purely phenomenological understanding of consciousness in terms of its 
appearing objects would seem untenable.  And have we not also seen that a  
correlational treatment of consciousness-where the fact of phenomena appearing 
is a mere “noematic” correlate of particular ways in which facticity is transcended 
on any occasion-is likewise untenable, given Sartre’s claim that consciousness 
as the internal negation of its objects is such objects and nothing more?  But 
perhaps more can be said in favor of the correlation treatment.   
Perhaps it can at least do justice to Sartre’s claims about consciousness by 
showing that facticity contributes precisely to the necessarily independent 
appearance of appearing objects.  As noted in Chapter One, Husserl treats 
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consciousness as somehow transcending hyletic material in order to be 
conscious of the appearing noema.    Sartre rejects Husserl’s notion of the hyle 
because “we can not conceive how consciousness can transcend this subjective 
toward objectivity.”306  Regardless of how problematic such a move from the 
subjective to the objective may or may not be for Husserl, Sartre can in fact give 
a role to facticity similar to what Husserl gives to his hyle.  All he needs to deny is 
that it involves any move from the subjective to the objective.  The reason for this 
is that facticity is not subjective for Sartre, but rather it is the in-itself being that 
attempted to found itself and “is” thus consciousness.307  As noted in Chapter 
One, one can treat Husserl’s hyle as either surpassed by consciousness to its  
object or as in some sense even “constitutive” of its object.  Similarly, Sartre 
claims that consciousness transcends facticity (which amounts to it transcending 
itself) in its awareness of its objects,308 and, as noted in Chapter Four, he also 
treats facticity as in some sense constitutive of consciousness’s objects.  But the 
important thing to see is that this constitution of objects by in-itself faciticity could 
then in turn help account for the necessarily independent nature of what appears 
to consciousness, at least precisely as it appears to consciousness.  So, for  
instance, the fact that an object such as a table appears to the left of one’s in-
itself body and as subsequent to other appearing objects, also located in relation  
                                                                                                                
305 Ibid, p. 245. 
306 Ibid, p. 20. 
307 Ibid, p. 133. 
308 Ibid, p. 409. 
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to one’s body, would necessarily make such an object present itself as in some 
sense having the very same sort of in-itself status as one’s in-itself body.  (And 
the same would of course go for the in-itself status of the past in general.)  In 
fact, Sartre’s venture beyond phenomenology when saying both that facticity 
impossibly attempts to cause itself and that consciousness is (and is not) a past 
that, unlike the body, is not indicated as surpassed by its objects (as mentioned 
in Chapter Four), may be regarded as attempts on his part to treat facticity as 
more than what simply appears in order for it to contribute to objects’ appearance 
of independence.    Consequently, Sartre can make the following comments in 
Nausea about the world one experiences: 
It left me breathless.  Never, until these last few days, had I 
understood the meaning of “existence.”  I was like the others, like 
the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring 
finery.  I said, like them, “The ocean is green;  that white speck up 
there is a seagull”…When I believed I was thinking about it, I must 
believe that I was thinking nothing, my head was empty, or there 
was just one word in my head, the word “to be.”  Or else I was 
thinking…how can I explain it?  I was thinking of belonging, I was 
telling myself that the sea belonged to the class of green objects, or 
that the green was a part of the quality of the sea…If anyone had 
asked me what existence was, I would have answered, in good 
faith, that it was nothing, simply an empty form which was added to 
external things without changing anything in their nature.  And then 
all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day;  existence had suddenly 
unveiled itself.  It had lost the harmless look of an abstract 
category:  it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded 
into existence….309 
  
 The point of this suggested reading of Sartre, then, is that perhaps his 
apparently one-sided focus on what appears when describing consciousness as  
                                      
309 Sartre, Nausea, New Directions Publishing Corporation, New York, 1964, p. 127. 
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the internal negation of its object involves a failure to appreciate that 
appearances can consistently be regarded as dependent upon something else, 
compatibly both with a rejection of Husserlian “idealism” and also with adoption 
of a “phenomenological” point of view in ontology.  Namely, they can be regarded 
as so dependent precisely for their necessary appearance of being something in-
itself, independent of the consciousness of them.  But of course, on the other 
hand, this would make no sense apart from another point of view in ontology, or 
at least in what Sartre chooses to call “metaphysics.”  Sartre’s failure to be clear 
about the exact ways in which he did not depart from Husserl may thus be seen 
as having its own necessary correlate in the unclarities that we have encountered 
throughout as to the relation between the “metaphysical” and “ontological” sides 
of his analysis. 
 Sartre might only need the presentation of independence by appearances 
in order to preserve his understanding of Husserl’s central insight that 
consciousness is always consciousness of something.  In fact, one might think 
such means of preservation is most faithful to Husserl, as noted by one 
commentator in the following quote:   
…consciousness is always consciousness of something…ought 
perhaps more properly to be regarded as either a definition or a 
descriptive psychological fact.  If regarded as a definition then 
“consciousness of something” is only a synonym for 
“consciousness.”  If viewed as a psychological fact, intentionality is 
an introspectively discoverable characteristic of our conscious lives.  
To go beyond this and argue that the state of being conscious of 
something logically implies the necessity of this “something’s” 
external existence is to be misled verbally by the seeming 
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implication of substantial being on the basis of the meaning of the 
word “consciousness.”310 
 
So, even though, as noted in Chapter Two, Sartre takes Husserl’s insight to  
imply that “there is no consciousness that is not a positing of a transcendent 
object,”311 perhaps such positing can occur even if the object only seems 
transcendent.  If so, then consciousness would not need to be merely the internal 
negation of its object, since, as noted in Chapter Three, that need emerges from 
the alleged impossibility of consciousness, like anything else, being connected to 
that which it is not.  If consciousness’s objects only seem independent while 
really being dependent upon consciousness, then there is no reason to say that 
consciousness must in some sense be nothing more than the objects to which it 
is present. 
 Perhaps the earlier example of awarness of a table can demonstrate both 
what the correlational reading of Sartre claims and how that reading differs from 
other understandings of Sartre.  According to the recommended correlational 
position on Sartre, consciousness of a table is a fact about the body and the past 
that the table necessarily indicates, namely the fact that they have been 
transcended toward that table.  The transcended body and past exist 
independently of conscious experience, and the fact that their transcendence in 
some sense constitutes the experienced table makes the table at least appear as 
independent of experience as well.  This position differs from Husserl in that it is 
                                      
310 Robert E. Butts, “Does ‘Intentionality’ Imply ‘Being’?  A Paralogism in Sartre’s Ontology,” 
Kant-Studien, 52, 1960, p. 432. 
311 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 11. 
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subjective hyletic “stuff” that is transcended toward whatever is experienced, and 
one can always choose to apprehend the experienced, such as the table, as not 
having independent existence.  The purely phenomenological reading of Sartre, 
on the other hand, differs from the correlational reading by simply viewing 
consciousness as the fact that the table appears and indicates a body and a 
past.  The body and past are thus not what consciousness is for that reading, but 
rather are just what is indicated by appearing phenomena. 
 It would seem plausible to say in conclusion that while Sartre’s claim that 
consciousness is nothingness apparently meant several different things to him, it 
is best understood, on the most fundamental level, as meaning that 
consciousness is the state of affairs of its facticity being transcended toward its 
object.  As already stated, as a state of affairs, it would in a way not be anything 
more than its constituents (one’s body and past).  But it would not be simply the 
same as them either.  Sartre’s claims about consciousness being nothing more 
than its objects would then seem due to an unnecessary treatment of such 
objects as really independent rather than as simply appearing that way.  And the 
connection between Sartre’s claims about consciousness being its facticity and 
about it being nothing more than its objects would be, finally, that one could 
explain objects’ appearance of independence by the role of facticity in the 
consciousness by which such objects are apprehended. 
 This understanding of consciousness as the self-transcending facticity that 
objects appear to would seem to be an affirmation by Sartre of a kind of 
“experiencing subject.”  Instead of consciousness simply being the purely 
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phenomenological fact that objects appear, it instead seems to be a fact about 
what such objects appear to.  Specifically, it is the fact that consciousness’s 
facticity transcends itself toward its objects.  Furthermore, this treatment of 
appearances as a correlate of consciousness certainly does not preclude the 
latter “appearing” itself, as well, at least in an important phenomenological sense.  
For as already noted, consciousness is in some sense the body (and past) that is 
both necessarily “indicated” by what appears and also appears itself as the body-
for-others.  The fact that it appears, though, does not make consciousness just 
an appearance. 
 Although it is true that some of Sartre’s claims about consciousness are 
problematic, such as his claims about in-itself facticity somehow attempting to 
found itself and about consciousness being nothing more than its object, it would 
thus seem that one can glean a fairly plausible account from him of 
consciousness and appearances as standing in some sort of relation of 
correlation.  That account treats consciousness as a body and past that are 
transcended toward appearing objects and that such objects always indicate.  
Whether or not such objects exist independently of such transcendence, they 
necessarily appear that way.  This account would then make him more similar to 
Husserl than he professes to be.  But it seems to make the most sense of all that 
he says.  Despite his efforts to distance himself from Husserl’s alleged failure to 
recognize the independent nature of what one experiences, it would seem that at 
least a central element in Husserl’s position can actually help explain, within the 
confines of a “phenomenological ontology,” that very independence.  Any 
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understanding of Sartre would seemingly have to recognize this irony in the 
relationship between the two thinkers.  That the explanation in question is itself in 
turn dependent on some sort of “ontology” of consciousness that is what Sartre 
calls “metaphysical,” and that involves what seems to be the most striking 
unclarities in his book, may make one marvel at the extent to which Sartre 









 Sartre’s claim that consciousness is nothingness seems best understood 
as meaning that consciousness is the state of affairs of its facticity being 
transcended toward objects correlative with it, with facticity at the same time 
being the only constituents of that state of affairs.  I call such an understanding of 
Sartre the correlational position.  This does not imply that Sartre actually meant 
this by treating consciousness as nothingness, but rather that such an 
understanding of him makes the most sense out of all that he says.  Although 
Sartre says many things that sound as if consciousness for him is a different 
state of affairs, namely, of the appearance of objects with their various 
indications, an understanding of Sartre that I call the purely phenomenological 
position, such an understanding of Sartre suffers from at least two problems.  
First, it does not make sense of his claim that consciousness is its facticity, given 
that none of its appearing objects are its facticity.  It is arguable that perhaps the 
body-for-others is.  Even that object, however, is not strictly identifiable with 
consciousness’s facticity, since facticity is consciousness’s past as well as its 
body.  Second, the correlational position seems to account for what arguably 
motivated the purely phenomenological position, namely objects’ appearance of 
independence from consciousness.  It is this second problem that shows the 
superiority of the correlational position, since that position shares the first 
problem with the purely phenomenological position, given that Sartre also claims 
that consciousness is something other than its self-transcending facticity, namely 
its objects.   
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 Despite these problems, the purely phenomenological position seems 
more able than the correlational position to reconcile certain features of Sartre’s 
phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics.  According to Sartre’s 
phenomenological description of consciousness, consciousness is always of a 
transcendent object, and according to his metaphysical explanation of 
consciousness, consciousness originates from the in-itself’s failed attempt at self-
causation.  Since this attempt at self-causation does not seemingly involve 
anything other than the in-itself being that attempts self-causation, it would not 
seem that consciousness would necessarily involve any transcendent objects 
that it would be of.  The purely phenomenological position can explain why this 
failure at self-causation and resulting presence to self would require having a 
transcendent object since it treats consciousness as in some sense being its 
appearing objects in the first place. 
 There might seem to be another explanation of why the metaphysical 
failure at self-causation necessitates consciousness having a transcendent 
object, an explanation that is compatible with the correlational position.  Self-
consciousness, the result of the failure of self-causation in question, is, at least 
on the pre-reflective level, the indication of consciousness by transcendent 
objects that is a phenomenological datum for Sartre.  Without such indication, 
there is no self-consciousness, so that consciousness needs transcendent 
objects to indicate it in order for it to be self-conscious, and so be consciousness 
in the first place.  Since this explanation does not treat consciousness as being 
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its objects, it seems compatible with the correlational position’s treatment of 
consciousness. 
 This explanation might also seem to account for the very fact of Sartre’s 
designation of consciousness as being its objects, since one can only 
phenomenologically find consciousness by way of its objects. But however 
plausible an explanation this may be for Sartre’s claim that consciousness is just 
its objects, it simply ignores Sartre’s metaphysical explanation of consciousness.  
For even if pre-reflective consciousness is only aware of itself by means of its 
reflection by its transcendent objects, that simply does not speak to the question 
why the act of attempted self-causation in question should be necessarily related 
to a transcendent object.  It would seem that such an attempt could only involve 
itself, and thus it would seem that its resulting presence to itself might only 
involve itself.  The phenomenological description of consciousness as always of 
a transcendent object is certainly not incompatible with the claim that 
consciousness originates from a failure at self-causation, but the latter does not 
explain nor entail the former,  without the additional claim that consciousness in 
some sense is its objects. 
 There might not seem to be any need to reconcile Sartre’s metaphysics 
with his phenomenology.  For the former’s claims seem to involve an 
impossibility in Sartre’s own view.  The claim that an in-itself being attempted to 
do anything, whether what it attempts is possible or not, would seemingly assert 
an impossibility since Sartre treats an attempt or project as something only found 
with the for-itself.  Given this, one might of course then wonder why Sartre made 
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such claims at all.  In fact, one might find it more charitable to simply ignore those 
claims, made throughout Being and Nothingness, and only acknowledge his 
statement, made toward the end of the book, that it simply seems as if 
consciousness originated from such an impossible attempt.  
 It is, however, important that Sartre treats facticity’s attempt at self-
causation as an actual occurrence.  By treating facticity as actually doing 
something that does not appear phenomenologically, Sartre will then at least 
have an explanation of the fact that phenomena necessarily appear as 
independent of consciousness.  In particular, one may hypothesize that facticity 
helps to ‘constitute’ phenomena for Sartre in a way that is comparable to 
Husserl’s view of  “hyle” helping to constitute the “noema,” by getting 
“transcended” in a noesis that incorporates it.  As such, facticity’s existence 
beyond its appearance can be reflected in the phenomena in a way comparable 
to Husserl’s view of the hyle’s incorporation in the noema, but with a very 
different upshot from Husserl’s view.  In fact, the very impossibility of facticity’s 
attempt at self-causation insures that such an attempt does not appear, meaning 
that, precisely in its ‘constituting’ role, facticity exists beyond the 
phenomenological level.  One can thus not treat it as nothing more than what is 
indicated by appearing objects, a treatment that would make it simply an aspect 
or feature of such objects.  This poses yet another problem for the purely 
phenomenological position, since such treatment would seem to be the only one 
it could give of facticity.  Thus, however successful Sartre’s enterprise in fact 
was, it would seem that we can at least understand what he was trying to do, and 
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applaud it as an ingenious attempt to utilize some of Husserl’s insights about the 
‘constitution’ of what one experiences precisely in support of a transcendental 
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